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SPAIN IN REVOLT

by HARRY GANNES

and THEODORE REPARD

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When China Unites

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WHEN CHINA UNITES

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When China Unites

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CHAPTER I

Opium, Cannon, and the Taipings

THE story of modern China is the history of one fifth of the human race striving to attain its national independence. The 450,000,000 Chinese are on the eve of realizing that unity which will ultimately consolidate them into the largest sovereign nation in the world. Militarists in many ages have dreaded that prospect. More than a century ago Napoleon Bonaparte, in a moment of prophetic insight, declared of China: "There lies a sleeping giant. Let him sleep! For when he wakes, he will move the world." More recently the late Baron General Tanaka warned his Japanese co-conspirators plotting complete dismemberment of China: "Our plans will be utterly shattered if China wakes up some day."

Long before America's greatest concern over a new world war centred in the Pacific, when gold had brought the rush of pioneer migration to the Pacific coast, William H. Seward in 1852 predicted for his fellow Americans: "The Pacific, its shores, its islands, and the vast region beyond, will become

the chief theater of events in the world's great hereafter." Seward's visions were confirmed and enlarged by that omnivorous American student of the Far East, the statesman whose name is so closely associated with basic American policy in China, John Hay, Secretary of State in the most active period of American penetration in the Far East. Said John Hay: "The world's peace rests with China, and whoever understands China socially, politically, economically, religiously, holds the key to world politics during the next five centuries."

- Though in their day these soldiers and statesmen did not exaggerate the importance of China in world politics, today the fate of China is more than ever before intimately and immediately connected with the future of all mankind. Henry L. Stimson, Secretary of State in the Cabinet of President Herbert Hoover, during the most dangerous days of Japan's intervention in Manchuria, when the peace of the world was balanced on the razor-edged swords of the Japanese military clique, has said: "The future of China is one of the great problems of the ages. . . . But one thing is clear, she must develop in her own way. . . . Hers is the most persistent culture in the world. Forty centuries have demonstrated that."

If there is a single semi-colonial area on the globe where the commercial, political, and military interests of all of the big imperialist powers of the world meet and clash and where seething inner and outer conflicts threaten the peace of the world, it is China. The military plans of the most belligerent European power, Nazi Germany, are inextricably bound up with an alliance with Japan in the Far East. That alone should be sufficient to make it certain that China, the Soviet Union, and the United States, if war cannot be prevented, will be drawn into the next world conflict, should it orig-

inate in Europe or in the Orient. Indeed, the preliminary stage of the next war in reality began with Japan's invasion of Manchuria and its virulent program of winning imperialist hegemony in the Pacific and colonial domination over China.

Political forces have matured and are in motion in the ancient Celestial Empire that must answer the question, not whether China will survive, for that never can be called into question even with the grave perils facing her, but how rapidly and with what effect on the rest of the world can China be united. For once China can face her foes as an integrated nation, she will become the greatest force for change in the "unchanging" East. Acting thus in a day when the rest of mankind is undergoing the most rapid transformations in human history, and when, more particularly, Socialism has become a neighbour of China on her vast northern and western borders, China's policies become of daily acute concern to all who cherish peace.

China's contact with Western nations extends from the early stages of European capitalism down to the rise of Socialism in the Soviet Union in our day. The latter fact, coinciding with China's greatest efforts to extricate herself from her oppressed position as a semi-colonial victim, must have the profoundest consequences not only on China's immediate neighbours (Indo-China, Tibet, India, Japan, and the Philippines) but for the major world powers as well.

For more than eighty-five years China has been subjected to incessant invasion, loss of territory, forcible acceptance of unequal treaties, and the whole gamut of imperialist penetration. What relatively small modern industry was introduced into the country, as an auxiliary to foreign exploitation of the

nation's resources, remains largely in the hands of foreign concerns. Considering the area and population of the country, the size of foreign investments in China is not large, but it is somewhat of an index to the extent of the interference by the imperialist nations in China. In 1934 Japan had invested in China \$2,540,000,000; Great Britain, \$1,160,000,000; and the United States, \$340,000,000.¹ The most striking feature of the trend of foreign investments in China is the tremendous relative growth of Japanese-owned enterprises. In a period of three years (from 1931 to 1934) Japanese investments in China had increased from \$1,137,000,000 to \$2,540,000,000, this rise occurring during the most intensive period of Japan's military activities in Manchuria and in sections of North China.

Foreign domination over China's economic life, enforced by gunboats and soldiers, has helped to preserve its semi-feudal backwardness. And here is the economic key to China's future progress: Between seventy and eighty per cent of the country's population is engaged in agriculture.² Feudal,

¹ "Japan's Increasing Investments in China," by Chiang Chuan-Chen, *China Weekly Review*, July 25, 1936.

² While Chinese statistics are generally chaotic and inaccurate, they are especially imperfect with regard to the most important economic aspect of the country, the agrarian situation. However, a broad picture can be obtained from the inadequate statistics on the class divisions of the agricultural population and land distribution. Roughly there are between 50,000,000 and 60,000,000 peasant families (the number fluctuates with the tide of famines and civil wars, as well as with foreign invasions). These families, comprising more than 300,000,000 people, cultivate from 1,314,000,000 to 1,580,000,000 mou of land. (An acre equals 6.59 mou.) The characteristic feature of Chinese agriculture is its semi-feudal nature; that is, the dependent position of the tillers of the soil on the big landowners, usurers, feudal remnants in the government, and the local war lords, who levy heavy feudal exac-

Asiatic-agrarian economy has been the foundation of China's unbroken historical and cultural past. But the retention now in the modern imperialist world of her feudal remnants in agriculture threatens to destroy China's historical and national continuity. For imperialism, which first assailed China's feudal self-sufficiency, now works to preserve the worst of the feudal elements as an aid to its exploitation and domination of the country. Thus her semi-feudal backwardness keeps China a prey to the strongest and most cunning of the powers, each of which at various historical periods took the lead in subjugating her.

So long as the country remained untouched by capitalist industry, no modern industrial or proletarian classes could come into existence to lead the nation's political battle for salvation. Ever since the period immediately following the

tions on the labour of the farmers. Feudal forms in the Chinese countryside range from outright feudalism as it was generally known in the Middle Ages in Europe, with the peasants labouring as serfs or semi-slaves on huge landed estates, dominated by feudal manors, up to rich and middle peasants who appear to be guided by modern capitalist agriculture, but who are nevertheless subjected to feudal conditions. About fifty per cent of the Chinese peasants are technically owners of their own farms, while the other fifty per cent (the relation of the two categories varies widely in different parts of the country) are tenants or part-tenants, paying huge tribute to feudal landowners. Of the landowners, it has been estimated that 49.5 per cent have parcels of land ranging from 1 to 20 mou, accounting for 15.9 per cent of the cultivable land of China; 23.7 per cent of the peasant families own from 20 to 40 mou, or 22.8 per cent of the cultivable land; 15.6 per cent own from 40 to 75 mou, or 25.4 per cent of the total cultivable area; and 11.2 per cent, comprising the big landowners, hold 35.9 per cent of the cultivable land of China. For a valuable study of the agrarian problems of South China, see *Landlord and Peasant in China* by Chen Han-seng (New York: International Publishers Co.; 1936).

forcible opening of China's ports, the fundamental aim of all China's revolutions, therefore, has been to make China a unified nation as a basis for the rapid revolutionary development of Chinese economy, government, and culture. And in that battle China has followed a tortuous and tragically painful and costly course because of the great power and might of her opponents—a situation aggravated by the conflict of the invaders among themselves over conquest and profits gained by forcibly retaining China in an inferior economic and political position.

It will be necessary briefly to examine the first response of the Chinese people to foreign invasion in order to understand the evolution of the struggle and the logic of China's maturing policy with regard to the latest and more dangerous assault on her national existence.

For we are witnessing a completion of the cycle begun by the Opium Wars. And it has been especially the emergence of Fascism in Europe and the rise of Fascist militarism in Japan that have intensified China's efforts to liberate herself from the gravest threat to her national integrity since British cannon first boomed the end of China's isolation.

The Opium War of 1840-2, the first violent invasion of China, was followed within a decade—a record of speed for the period—by the first anti-Manchu, anti-foreign rebellion. Opium, it must be recalled, was the original battering ram of the foreign "civilized" powers to break through the age-encrusted walls of China's isolation. The history of the wholesale importation of opium into China, when extricated from the conscious attempt to obscure the facts, is as simple as it is dastardly. The country was first doped and then shot into accepting early capitalist penetration. As a self-sufficing

Asiatic-feudal economy, China could manage to export a small surplus of its much-demanded novel commodities, tea and silk. As the trade developed, however, China insisted on payment only in silver, having no need for the exchange commodities offered by the mercantile nations. The drain on British silver reserves became immense. The British, as opium-growers in India, conceived the profitable idea of supplanting the flow of silver specie into China by the substitution of opium as a medium of exchange.

After fruitless negotiations the answer of the Manchus to the ruinous opium trade, which threatened (as they saw it) not so much the morals of the Chinese as the wrecking of their state revenues, was the violent destruction of the imported drug. This precipitated the Opium Wars. The Manchus revealed their weakness when they were easily defeated by the British in the first Opium War. The subjugation of the country written into the treaties that ended hostilities put still heavier burdens on the people. The speedier penetration of foreign commodities, as well as the increased importation of opium, helped to disjoin the ancient self-sufficing feudal handicrafts. This and the shame of China's treatment after the initial Opium War brought about a wave of social unrest such as the country had never before experienced. The elemental popular upsurge that followed not many years after the first Opium War is known as the Taiping rebellion. The uprising was anti-Manchu, and, though less clearly defined, also a movement against the emboldened foreign invaders.

Seven years after the conclusion of the first Opium War the peasants of South China rose against the Manchus—who, were themselves originally foreign invaders of China. The Manchus had ruled the country since 1644. Their decline and corruption were especially exposed by their weakness in the

face of British attack. Beginning in 1849 and lasting for fifteen years, until finally put down by British and American aid, the Taiping revolt had actually ruined the rule of the Manchus. The tottering dynasty was saved in its last stages by the assistance of foreign powers, who thereafter used it in the dismemberment of the country.

Not only was the Taiping uprising aimed at the Manchus and the foreign invaders; it was also a peasant rebellion. The Taiping army was composed primarily of peasants and handicraftsmen. Acting to alleviate the burdens of the peasantry, the Taipings on every occasion burned the deeds of the landlords and gentry and the promissory notes of the usurers. In 1853 the Taiping government promulgated a decree establishing a "Land System," which provided for distribution of the land among the landless peasantry.

Fighting against the Taipings was a united front of landlords, gentry, merchants, and nobles assisted by the foreign powers, especially from their newly established centre at Shanghai. The so-called "Ever Victorious" army, organized by the Chinese supporters of the Manchus, was first drilled and commanded by an American named Frederick Townsend Ward. On his death another American, Henry Burgevine, took over command; and the troops were finally led to victory over the Taipings under the generalship of the Englishman "Chinese" Gordon. Before their collapse the Taipings had spread their rule over sixteen of the eighteen provinces of China. At one time they dominated the ancient capital of the Mings at Nanking, later the Kuomintang capital. Under the leadership of Hung Hsiu-chuan, known popularly as the "heavenly prince" because as the saviour of his country he was regarded by his intimate followers as a brother of Jesus Christ, the Taipings established the King-

dom of Peace (Taiping Tien-kuo).

The Taiping rebellion was the forerunner of China's great battle against foreign domination, for the abdication of the Manchu dynasty, and to accomplish the agrarian revolution. Failure of the Taiping uprising was due primarily to the fact that the classes capable of leading a successful revolution against so formidable a force as the Manchus, their combined native feudal allies, and the newly found aides among the capitalist invaders had not yet arrived on the stage of Chinese history.

Rescued by foreign intervention, particularly by foreign military leadership and arms, the revived Manchu dynasty began to pay off its debts, sometimes under pressure, by parcelling out choice portions of China to the foreign powers. The Treaty of Nanking (1842) had given Hong Kong to Britain, as well as an indemnity of \$21,000,000 (Chinese).¹ The cities of Canton, Amoy, Ningpo, Shanghai, and Foochow were designated as "treaty ports," open to vigorous foreign capitalist penetration. A second series of wars (1856-8 and 1859-60) facilitated the further subjugation of China. More oppressive and unequal treaties were forced on her. Both England and France increased their grip on the prostrate country.

Tsarist Russia, whose Far Eastern territory was already contiguous to China, lost but little time after the first Opium War in moving closer to Manchuria and Mongolia. The second series of Opium Wars enabled the Tsar to win control over still another slice of China's domain in the north. The extreme weakness of China, made manifest in the Sino-

¹ The Chinese silver dollar is designated in this fashion to distinguish it from the United States dollar, referred to in China as "the gold dollar." The par value of the Chinese dollar has never been settled. It varies between 46 and 50 cents (American).

Japanese war, encouraged Russia to hasten her invasion of Manchuria and Mongolia before Japan could take full advantage of its military victory. Under the cover of an "alliance" with China, Tsarist Russia acquired a lease on the southern extremity of Liaotung Peninsula, including Port Arthur, in Manchuria. This gave Russia an ice-free naval base, in the Pacific. To exploit fully its grip on Manchuria, the Tsarist government succeeded in 1896 in signing a contract for the construction of the Chinese Eastern Railroad, a short-cut connecting the Trans-Siberian Railroad across northern Manchuria to Vladivostok, a southern branch of the line running down to Port Arthur.

The years between 1895 and 1905 saw Russia intensify her efforts to penetrate Manchuria and Mongolia. Imperialist Russia's pressure on these Chinese areas irritated the new rising Eastern power, Japan, and directly led to the Russo-Japanese war of 1904-5, which ended in the crushing defeat of the Russian army and navy. The aftermath of the Tsar's defeat in the Sino-Japanese war was the 1905 revolution in Russia.

The Nanking Treaty had inspired the young American Republic to further its voracious trade aspirations in the freshly opened markets. It is from here that the origin of the open-door policy must be traced and not from the more definitive formulations of John Hay on the eve of the collapse of the Manchu dynasty.¹

¹ The American open-door policy originated in Britain's efforts to make China her exclusive prize, and probably another India, after the first Opium War and the signing of the Treaty of Nanking in 1842. Caleb Cushing, American envoy to China, who signed the first trade and diplomatic treaty with that country, frankly told the American public that his mission was to counteract Britain's trend towards monopolizing China. He declared he would endeavour to open China's

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It is ironical, too, that the American Republic (that is, before the era of imperialism) was the first to devise the most obnoxious formulation of what is now known as extraterritoriality. Caleb Cushing, American plenipotentiary who negotiated the Treaty of Whanghia in 1844, fully realized the advantage to foreigners of the extraterritoriality clause. In a letter to John Nelson (July 5, 1844) ¹ he outlined what he considered the sixteen main points of advantage of the Treaty of Whanghia over the British Treaty of Nanking; and one of those points was the extraterritoriality clause. "It was not the British but the Americans," later wrote the peppery Putnam Weale, "who gave extraterritoriality its first complete definition in their treaty made in 1844, wherein Article 21 states: 'Subjects of China who may be guilty of any criminal

door to American trade. "I go to China, sir," he said in his address just before he sailed for the Orient in 1843, "if I may so express myself, in behalf of civilization, and that, if possible, *the doors of three hundred millions of Asiatic laborers may be opened to America.*" (Claude M. Fuess: *Life of Caleb Cushing*, 2 vols. New York: Harcourt Brace & Co.; 1923.) The Chinese government had advised certain American missionaries and naval officers stationed in Chinese waters that the United States would be welcomed as a competitor to counteract Britain's attempt to monopolize Chinese trade. In a letter to President Van Buren, Cushing wrote (December 27, 1842): "It does appear that she [Britain] has made the arrangement [the Nanking Treaty] for her benefit only, and if other nations wish for like advantages, they must apply to China and obtain them on their own account. . . . I have information from Canton that the Chinese are predisposed to deal kindly with us, more so, as we only can, by the extent of our commerce, act in counterpoise to that of England, and thus save the Chinese from that which would be extremely inconvenient for them, viz., the condition of being an exclusive monopoly in the hands of England. . . ." (Fuess, Vol. I, pp. 407 et seq.)

¹ Sen. Doc. 67, 28 Cong., Sec. Sess., p. 77.

act towards citizens of the United States shall be arrested and punished by Chinese authorities according to the laws of China, and citizens of the United States who may commit any crime in China shall be subject to be tried and punished only by the Consul or other public functionary of the United States thereto authorized according to the laws of the United States. . . .” This negation of China’s sovereignty was later extended for all of the imperialist powers into a special legal system for foreigners excluding them from judgment by Chinese law and even, in many instances, subjecting Chinese on Chinese soil to foreign law.

In the Anglo-American trade conflict as typified by the Nanking and Whanghia Treaty manœuvres we have the origin also of the Anglo-American conflict in the Far East, later responsible for the creation of the Anglo-Japanese alliance, which, in turn, was to develop into the bitter Japano-American conflict for hegemony in the Pacific.

Though piecemeal partitioning of China began in 1842, the most threatening operation was performed by the Sino-Japanese war of 1894–5. Previous to that war, Japan had sent an expedition against Formosa in 1874. The threat of war at that time was settled by China’s paying Japan an indemnity of 1,500,000 taels (\$1,125,000). “More significant even than this readiness to pay,” writes Hosea Ballou Morse in his authoritative work *International Relations of the Chinese Empire*,¹ “was the facile abandonment of the Liuchiu Islands, which had paid tribute for five centuries—a prelude to the successful laughing off of all tributary dependencies, one after the other—Annam (to France), Korea (to Japan), Burma (to Britain); and, more or less completed, Manchuria,

¹ New York: Longmans, Green & Co.; 1910–18. 3 vols.

Mongolia (to Japan) and Tibet (to Britain).” Besides the cession of Formosa and the Liaotung Peninsula (Manchuria) and the ultimate loss of Korea to Japan as a result of the Sino-Japanese war of 1894–5, China was forced to pay a \$150,000,000 (200,000,000 taels) indemnity. In order to settle this disastrous war, the Manchus within forty months borrowed \$280,000,000 (Chinese).

By this means of territorial conquest and handsome indemnities Japan was able to obtain the initial capital accumulation for its rapid capitalist and later imperialist development, only to mature as a more powerful menace to China’s sovereignty.

The Treaty of Shimonoseki, however, concluding the Sino-Japanese war of 1894–5, served to discredit the Manchu dynasty further and to stimulate the organization of the revolutionary groups that were beginning to recover from the Taiping defeat.

New revolutionary societies sprang up. The traditions of the Taipings continued to be carried forward under the new conditions by the forerunners of more advanced class forces. The opening of China’s markets to the world created a modern merchant class, precursors of a native industrial bourgeoisie. The Chinese merchants came in contact with foreigners. Though many of them were in the comprador category—agents of the foreign imperialists—a number began to absorb the political ideas of Western democracies. Intellectuals, students, young officers, peasants, and workers began to search about for forms of organization and ideological-political programs for China’s battle for freedom. They looked to the democratic countries for their revolutionary inspiration. In China neither the industrial bourgeoisie nor the modern proletariat had yet grown to political maturity or class independence. Railroads, textile mills, steamship lines were yet in their

infancy in China. The first railroad (a short-line narrow-gauge system) was formally opened on June 30, 1870. The first cotton mill was founded by Viceroy Li Hung-chang in 1890, a semi-governmental concern with 65,000 spindles. It was not, however, until after 1895, and especially following the Boxer uprising in 1900, that railroad construction, the first large-scale capitalist enterprise in China, was in full swing. Thus was laid the basis for the emergence of the revolutionary advanced class, the Chinese proletariat.

The aspirations of the numerous contradictory social strata of China's population desiring national liberation were merged in the leading figure of one man who expressed most accurately the unifying ideals that ran through divergent and yet undeveloped economic and political categories. Dr. Sun Yat-sen was the living human bridge spanning the historical era from the post-Taiping days to the successful overthrow of the Manchus and to the rise of the Kuomintang. He was—and his ideas now that he is dead remain—the most widely accepted revolutionary guide in China's struggle for national independence. He combined within himself the theoretical and the practical expression of conflicting groups who desired different roads to achieve China's independence and economic and cultural progress. Dr. Sun was a national reformist who at times exhibited revolutionary tendencies. Though hampered by the conflicting nature of the Chinese bourgeoisie, he was the most advanced and far-seeing of the Chinese national revolutionaries of his time. His ability to see and act for the victory of the national revolution in China was closely connected with the victory of the Russian revolution, which made a deeper impression on Dr. Sun than any other historical event and most directly affected his tactics after 1917. Because of his plebeian origin, he, among the na-

tional revolutionary bourgeoisie, could reach closest to the peasantry and proletariat; and it is not surprising that the crowning admonition of his life as a teacher and leader of the revolution was that his followers retain Kuomintang-Communist unity and that China adhere to its friendship with the Soviet Union to ensure allies in its battle for national freedom.

Dr. Sun originally based his theories of the land question on a study of Henry George; his ideals of democratic government on Abraham Lincoln's teachings; and his understanding of Socialism on reformist versions of Marxism, though later he learned much from Russian Bolshevism. His ideas, however, were not a living scientific synthesis of revolutionary theories, but a contradictory combination, which in the actual tasks of revolutionary politics and organization perforce exhibited irreconcilable practices.

Dr. Sun was born to a family of poor peasants in 1866, one year after the collapse of the Taiping uprising, in the village of Tsui Heng near Canton in Kwantung province. His uncle had fought with the Taipings and undoubtedly instilled in him his first revolutionary inspiration. While still very young, Dr. Sun went to Honolulu at the behest of his brother, a merchant. It was in Hawaii that he first came into contact with Western civilization and ideas. On his return to China in 1883 he began his revolutionary activities. About a year later he entered Queens College, Hong Kong. China's defeat in the Sino-French war of 1885, which was a powerful impetus in developing the first anti-imperialist forces of China, had a profound effect on Dr. Sun. Though he became a physician, the disastrous Sino-Japanese war and its drastic and ruinous effects on China decided him to take up the life of a professional revolutionist. He travelled widely in Europe

and America, and eventually became the outstanding ideological figure and practical organizer of the republican movement of China.

Confronted with intensified revolutionary activities, a clique of the Manchu hierarchy, hoping to save the throne, raised the suggestion of self-reform of the monarchy. Their efforts were ill-fated. The dynasty was an aged, brittle feudal structure that could not be repaired without breaking. Contributing to preserve the dynasty intact for a few years longer was the crafty Empress Dowager, Tze Hsi, the Chinese Cleopatra. She was able in 1898 to break up the monarchical reform movement, which had won over some of the important Manchu scholars. Coming out of her formal retirement, the Empress Dowager virtually imprisoned the Emperor. She took the reigns of power into her own hands. A number of the leaders in the movement for monarchical reform were beheaded, and the movement was crushed.

From that time on, hardly a year passed without one or more insurrections. The year after the Empress Dowager had beheaded the monarchical reform movement, Hung Chuan-fu, third brother of the famous Taiping leader Hung Hsiu-chuan, alarmed the Manchus with the ghost of the Taipings by leading an armed uprising in the south. Like the scores of other local uprisings which had preceded it, it was isolated and ineffective. But watching each wave of the revolutionary storm rise higher, the Manchus in desperation decided to canalize the anti-Manchu movement into an anti-foreign outburst. They sent their spies among the Boxers, a primitive revolutionary secret society composed of Chinese almost fanatical in their opposition to the Ching rulers and particularly their foreign allies. The Boxers' rudimentary anti-imperialism took the form of indiscriminate hatred of all foreigners,

whom they associated with the disintegration and impoverishment of China. Like most early anti-imperialist organizations in the colonies, the Boxers resorted to scattered violence rather than mass organization and demonstrations.

In 1900 the Manchus, through their *agents provocateurs*, were able to direct the Boxer uprising chiefly against the foreign legations in Peking. They thus succeeded in their aim of ridding themselves of troublesome revolutionists and bringing foreign armed aid to their assistance; but the cost of foreign intervention in retrieving the monarchy proved to be too heavy. The Boxer indemnity (\$325,000,000) that China had to pay for the Machiavellian manoeuvres of the Manchus became an added incentive to the growth of republican agitation. The indemnity cost, spread out among the people, gave new economic causes for rebelling against the corruption and domination of the Manchus. The Dragon Throne tottered under the weight of the Boxer indemnity. To allay popular discontent, the Son of Heaven promised the people, theretofore considered the lowliest vassals, the inauguration of a constitution and parliament by the year 1910. On November 4, 1910, however, an imperial edict postponed the date for the reform to the year 1913.

The number of insurrections increased. The death of the Empress Dowager in 1908 had removed the strongest personality among the decadent Manchus. Assassinations of provincial governors and other authorities became more frequent. The revolutionary discontent expressed itself in violent forms and terroristic acts. In 1909, unsuccessful attempts were made to assassinate the father of the boy Emperor.

The year 1910 saw the growth of popular indignation, a new factor along with the frequent insurrections. Popular demonstrations, for the most part unorganized, supplemented

the individual acts of terror. Oppression by the Manchus, and the outcome of the Boxer uprising, had drawn into the revolutionary ranks strata of the Chinese people not previously politically active. For example, the provincial satraps, to collect their share of the increased taxes, enforced because of the Boxer indemnity, piled new burdens on the impoverished people. Food prices soared. Yet in some provinces the authorities added new taxes on rice, aggravating famine conditions. In the middle of April 1910 the so-called rice riots of Changsha broke out. Though starting as a mass movement against the rise in the price of rice, due to higher taxes, the violent demonstration showed evidence of broader political significance, particularly the first practical example of a popular anti-imperialist demonstration. The famished people shrieked imprecations against the Manchus and their foreign allies. A crowd of more than fifty thousand coolies, artisans, small merchants, peasants from the surrounding countryside, and students stormed the Governor's yamen. When the Governor refused to comply with the demands of the people, his house was burned to the ground. The crowd then directed its hatred against the big foreign companies that seemed to fatten while the Chinese starved. Warehouses of the largest foreign corporations were attacked and raided. Such concerns as the old British opium-trading house of Jardine Matheson, Butterfield & Swire; the Japanese trust Mitsui; and the Standard Oil Company of the United States, were the chief foreign objects of attack of the hungry crowd. Missions were also wrecked, though no foreign lives were taken.

The events of 1910 brought home to the American government the temper of the Chinese people. The Cabinet of President Taft had more faith in the Manchu promises of reform than did the Chinese people. In his message on foreign rela-

tions, December 6, 1910, President Taft was over-optimistic concerning the possibility of peaceful, gradual reform in China. "It is a matter of interest to Americans to note," he said, "the success which is attending efforts of China to establish gradually a system of representative government. The provincial assemblies were opened in October 1909 and in October of the present year a consultative body, the nucleus of the future national parliament, will hold its session in Peking."

But the Chinese people in their desire to rid themselves of the Manchu dynasty were no more the advocates of gradual reform than were the American people in their War of Independence.

CHAPTER II

The 1911 Revolution

BEFORE 1911 China was known as a country of many rebellions but few revolutions. A combination and accumulation of unbearable conditions finally led to the outbreak of the 1911 revolution. I have already briefly outlined the encroachments of the foreign powers, the onerous taxation to pay the Manchu debts, the rise in food prices and its consequences in Changsha and other places, and the increase in sporadic uprisings and attempts at assassination.

The numerous grievances of the Chinese people were dramatized and brought to a head by a period of wild-cat railroad grabbing. For example, Sheng Kung-pao, Minister of Communications, increased the nation's indebtedness by \$87,500,000 in a few months on account of railroad construction. In May 1911 an imperial edict had been issued centralizing control of all railways under construction in the Peking government to prevent provincial authorities from interfering with the matter of concessions. The law applied particularly to the two most ambitious projects, the Hankow-Szechwan and the Canton-Hankow lines.

Popular resistance to the railroad scheme in Szechwan province, unconsciously an anti-imperialist movement, had already reached tremendous proportions by the middle of August 1911. Merchants and students demonstrated against the railroad project, against the imperial edict, against the new tax burdens imposed on them. Boycotts, merchants' strikes, mass demonstrations heralded the coming storm that was to uproot the Ching dynasty.

Foreign diplomats in China advised their chancelleries at home that China faced revolution. The Tsar's Minister at Peking, A. A. Neratoff, on September 29, 1911 wrote to the Foreign Minister at St. Petersburg: "The increased agitation in favour of freedom in the matter of railway economy might turn Szechwan to open rebellion."

As a prelude to the approaching World War, the rival powers were racing for position in China. Tsarist Russia demanded additional commercial facilities and received them. Talk was rife of Russian and Japanese plans to seize Mongolia and Manchuria, and of Britain's efforts to obtain valuable strips of Chinese territory along the Yunnan-Burma border.

At about this time the State Department in Washington was informed by W. J. Calhoun, United States Minister to China, of widespread popular disturbance and violent agitation, particularly against rumoured new schemes to dismember the country. "I have instructed those of our consuls who have reported to me on this general subject," confidentially wrote Mr. Calhoun, "that they should take advantage of every opportunity to impress upon the Chinese officials that there is absolutely no foundation for the world rumours current that China is to be partitioned among certain of the powers, and that the Chinese populace should not be al-

lowed to proceed with any supposed defensive measures because of such rumours."

Boastingly Mr. Calhoun reported to Washington that he had urged the Manchu authorities "to suppress effectually the circulation of any inflammatory literature and to bring to an end this foolish movement which is only calculated to deceive the ignorant people to instigate riots and disturbances thus endangering the lives and property of all foreigners, Americans included."

Revolutions must have leadership and organization. But such leadership comes from parties of revolutionary classes. The weakness of the revolutionary leadership of 1911 arose out of the lack of a consolidated nationalist bourgeoisie, a completely unorganized peasantry, and the absence of the political leadership of the most revolutionary class, the proletariat, which in China was then in its early embryo stage. Workers, coolies, handicraftsmen, peasants, soldiers were drawn into the vortex of revolution though not with their own leadership, without their own programs, and only as an adjunct to the conspirative plans of the leading revolutionists. The abortive attempts at revolution before 1911 were led, for the most part, by men recruited from among students, merchants, and army officers.

The 1905 revolution in Russia, precipitated to a great degree by Tsarist defeat in the Russo-Japanese war over hegemony in Manchuria, had an important influence in hastening and shaping the character of the 1911 revolution in China. "Geographically, economically, and historically Russia belongs not only to Europe but also to Asia," declared V. I. Lenin in a lecture on the 1905 Russian revolution. "This is why the Russian revolution not only succeeded in arousing the biggest and most backward country of Europe and in

creating a revolutionary people led by a revolutionary proletariat. It achieved more than that. The Russian revolution gave rise to a movement throughout the whole of Asia. The revolutions in Turkey, Persia, and China prove that the mighty uprising of 1905 left deep traces, and that its influence, expressed in the forward movement of hundreds and hundreds of millions of people, is ineradicable."

The experiences of the Russian people in their fight against Tsarism in 1905 attracted the attention of Dr. Sun Yat-sen and many other Chinese national revolutionaries. The mass uprisings in Russia and the methods of the social-democratic organizations influenced Dr. Sun in his first attempts at reorganization of the exclusive Chinese secret societies.

Ineffectual attempts were made before and immediately after the 1911 revolution to organize independent political groups of workers. A month or two after the outbreak of the Wuchang insurrection in October 1911, a neo-Socialist Party was formed in China.¹ It was a very small group devoted chiefly to the "study of Socialism." Interest in Socialism revived in the year 1913. In that year students in Peking cooperated with rickshaw coolies and railway workers in their unsuccessful efforts to form trade unions. Later the National Labour Party was formed in Shanghai in 1913 with a branch of seven hundred members. In 1916 the All-China Farmers' and Labourers' Federation was founded. All of these organizations went out of existence soon after their formation and had no lasting effect on the development of the workers' movement.

Particularly illustrative of the incohesive nature of the 1911 revolution was the mélange of the leadership. The old mandarin system of licensed scholars was breaking down; and

¹ *The Masses*, [New York] October 1914.

some of them joined the revolvers. Within China new schools had sprung up. The first graduates of the mission schools and the new technical institutions were now old enough to participate in politics. Then began the stream of returned students from foreign universities. While in 1904 there were little more than 600 Chinese students in Japanese schools, in 1905 the number jumped to 2,400; in 1906 to 8,600; and in 1907 to more than 10,000.

Besides, some of the village gentry, the lower government officialdom, some out of conviction and others in expectation of better jobs and lusher graft, flocked to the rebel banners.

The organization which had most to do with guiding the final overthrow of the Manchus was the Cheng-Kuo Kuo-Ming Tung Meng Hui (the United Revolutionary League of China), more popularly known as the Tung Meng Hui (United League). This party was formed in 1905 by Dr. Sun Yat-sen. As a young man, Dr. Sun had joined the Ka Lao Hui, a secret society carrying on Taiping traditions. But in his travels and study Dr. Sun realized the inadequacy of the ancient societies and the necessity of a more appropriate program and organizational apparatus. The Tung Meng Hui itself was a restricted society secretly organizing insurrections. It did not conceive of attempting to draw in the great mass of the Chinese people. After the overthrow of the Manchus, however, the Tung Meng Hui was enlarged and broadened and reorganized into the Kuomintang (Nationalist Party).

The program of the Tung Meng Hui was the San Min Chu-I, or the Three Principles of the People,¹ as first tenta-

¹ Briefly, the Three Principles of the People as advocated by Dr. Sun Yat-sen are: (1) *The Principle of Nationality*; that is, the struggle against the unequal treaties and the semi-colonial status of China. (2) *The Principle of Democracy*; the people's right of suffrage, initia-

tively propounded by Dr. Sun before a gathering of students in Brussels in 1905. The Three Principles of the People, however, had no influence whatever on the course of events in 1911, and, in fact, were not fully formulated until 1924. His ideas of national liberation did play a very important part in the 1911 revolution.

The Russian envoy in Peking early in October 1911 received a secret report revealing that about a thousand men, many of them in high office, were planning to lead the rebellion. Sensitive about matters of this kind, the Tsar's agent in China reported to his government: "Among the prominent members of the committee is included an officer to whom the government entrusted a special task—to prevent revolutionary propaganda from penetration into the imperial guard."

The accidental explosion of a bomb in the Russian concession at Hankow led to investigation and the discovery of all the paraphernalia of a planned uprising. This chance detection precipitated the revolt.

On October 10, 1911 a well-organized insurrection was launched at Wuchang, an important industrial city. The initial lively resistance and counter-assault of the Manchu garrison quickly crumbled when fifteen thousand picked men, comprising the three new modern army corps, joined the revolution.

The success of the rebellion in Wuchang inspired similar victories in Hankow and Hanyang on October 12. Fighting

tive, referendum, and recall, and the rights of women. The core of this principle, as propagated by Dr. Sun, is the phrase of Abraham Lincoln: "government of the people, for the people and by the people." (3) *The Principle of the People's Livelihood*; that is, the problem of economic reconstruction of China, the land question, and China's relation to Socialist development.

then spread to distant parts of China.

Dr. Sun Yat-sen at the time was in Europe touring among the overseas Chinese republican societies to obtain financial aid for the Tung Meng Hui. Huang Hsing, the capable organizer of scores of previous insurrections, then a co-worker of Dr. Sun, was in Shanghai. He quickly departed for Hankow after the report of the Wuchang success. Chiang Kai-shek, later Nanking Generalissimo, at the outbreak of the 1911 revolution was about to graduate from the Tokyo Military Academy, which he attended as a scholar of the Chinese government. He returned to Shanghai and was commissioned by Chen Chi-mei to command the 83rd brigade of three thousand men.

In rapid succession, after the Wuchang-Hankow-Hanyang successes, the provinces of Hupeh, Hunan, Kwangtung, Kiangsi, Shansi and Shensi lined up on the side of the revolution.

In Shansi province the troops assassinated the Governor and burnt the Manchu city of Taiyuanfu. They established a revolutionary government under Yen Hsi-shan, the provincial government that lasted longest through the subsequent buffeting of the political storms and militarist wars covering three decades. At Canton the Manchu garrison was annihilated. A government headed by the shrewd Hu Han-min, follower of Dr. Sun Yat-sen, was established there.

By this time the Manchus were frantic. They first appealed to the Japanese government to intervene and put down the rebellion. Other powers frowned on such a unilateral step. Each was jealously watching the other to see that no advantages were taken before the outcome was certain.

The tottering Ching dynasty appealed to General Yuan Shih-kai to come to its rescue. Two years before, Yuan had

been exiled from Peking in disgrace. The Manchus now saw in him a reliable agent who for his own advantage might save their throne. In Yuan they believed they had a leader whose prestige among the Chinese could win those class groups who still wavered, hating the monarchy but fearing a republic.

Yuan was a protégé of Li Hung-chang, the most capable diplomat of the Manchus, a man who had represented the dynasty in all its relations with the foreigners after the Taiping uprising. Li Hung-chang had won his post as viceroy by organizing the successful expedition against the Taipings, thanks to British assistance. In Yuan Shih-kai the Manchus saw another Li Hung-chang of the Taiping days. Yuan had been imperial resident at Seoul, Korea, at the time of the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese war. The fact that he was driven out by the Japanese invasion gave him the glamour of one who had suffered with China in her day of humiliation and defeat. A past master in the art of mandarin intrigue, he was as corrupt as he was bold. Restored to favour, after balking to give himself time to see which was the stronger side, Yuan was made viceroy with imperial orders to take any and all measures necessary to "direct the suppression and pacification of the rebels."

While commanding Yuan to crush the revolt mercilessly, the Manchu rulers at the same time published an edict abjectly apologizing to the people. "We swear," they vowed in a very unregal language, "that we will recognize reforms and effect a proper constitutional system of government."

After both negotiating and fighting with the rebels with equal energy, Yuan convinced the Manchu princes that the rebels were too strong to be conquered by force of arms.

To the London *Times* correspondent in Peking Yuan declared: "Constitution of a republic could only mean insta-

bility of a rampant democracy, of dissension and partition."

To Dr. Sun Yat-sen he wrote: "A republic is the best form of government. . . . That in one leap we have passed from autocracy to republic is really the outcome of many years of strenuous effort exerted by all of you and is the crowning blessing to the people. . . . Never shall we allow monarchical government in our China."

Not only did Yuan hold in his grasp all the threads of intrigue leading to the threatened and incompetent Manchus, but he also reached out for the tangled skein from the republican camp as well. His prestige was artificially built up. Soon after he began his mandarin manoeuvres, the Tsar's Minister to China, in October 1911, in a confidential report to S. D. Sazanoff, Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs at St. Petersburg, wrote: "Yuan Shih-kai's prestige was created by the foreigners and exaggerated by them."

Imperial rule in China was ended. The Ta Ching Chao (the Great Pure Dynasty) ruled no more. The last Emperor, the five-year-old boy Pu Yi, born February 11, 1906, abdicated on February 12, 1912. But the world had not heard the last of the Manchus. Pu Yi was to be employed by Japan as "Executive Chief" and later as "Emperor Kang Teh," to decorate their puppet state of Manchukuo when they tore Manchuria away from China in 1931.

For a brief period a dual central government existed in China, one in the north, ruling from Peking, and the other in the south, with its headquarters at Nanking, the future capital of the Republic. Dr. Sun Yat-sen had been elected provisional President of the Republic late in December 1911 by an assembly of provincial delegates meeting in Nanking. If these delegates were not elected or chosen by the people, at least they represented those who had made the revolution

and had overthrown the Manchus. For reasons not fully explained and variously argued by Sun's biographers, Dr. Sun resigned the presidency in favour of Yuan Shih-kai. His resignation was precipitated largely because of the lack of a unified revolutionary organization supported by the people.

Yuan's ambitions were grossly inflated by his success over the hard-working revolutionary leaders. The latter, because of their long years of exclusively conspirative activities, were not as well known to the people as the prominent general whom accident and intrigue had put in command of the armies when the Manchus abdicated. Yuan's visions of power were further enlarged by the whispered promises of additional support from the powers which vied with each other to make the most capital out of China's turmoil. A sharp though subdued conflict resulted over who would profit most from the presidency of the corrupt Yuan.

The American envoy, W. J. Calhoun, informed the State Department in Washington that Britain and Japan were working together in the situation, as were France and Russia. "All of the powers," he said, "are more or less suspicious of the Americans."

When it received the news that the Manchus had ceased to rule, the United States House of Representatives hastened to congratulate the Chinese people "on their assumption of power, duties and responsibilities of government." The State Department then urged Mr. Calhoun that "the text [of the resolution] should be circulated among the American consulates in China to be given discreetly such publicity as will be conducive to the interests of the United States."

The revolt had been strong enough to overthrow the Manchus, but was not powerful enough to erect a democratic re-

public. The primary reason was the decisive power of foreign imperialism, which was inimical to a free and united China. Furthermore, there existed no organized class strong enough to take over the government and guide the Chinese people in the completion of both the anti-imperialist revolution and the agrarian democratic transformation of China. The Chinese bourgeoisie was not yet sufficiently cohesive and did not have the support of the peasantry, while the proletariat had not reached manhood and could not stand independently. Particularly the Chinese bourgeoisie pursued a generally inconsistent course in the movement for national liberation.

The overthrow of the Manchus and the subsequent enlargement of the revolutionary party, occurring as they did just before and during the World War, accelerated the emergence of the revolutionary class forces as well as sharpened and perfected their anti-imperialist program and forms of struggle.

The attitude of leading proletarian revolutionary leaders throughout the world towards events in China can be ascertained from the following quotation from V. I. Lenin, who in an article written in May 1913, entitled "Backward Europe and Advanced Asia," stated:

"In Asia a powerful democratic movement is growing and spreading. There the bourgeoisie still sides with the people against reaction. Hundreds of millions of men are awakening to life, to light and freedom. What joy this world movement awakens in the hearts of all class-conscious workers! . . . And 'advanced' Europe, it is plundering China, helping the enemies of democracy, the enemies of freedom of China."

Having gained recognition and financial assistance from the powers, Yuan determined to consolidate his grip on China by destroying the Kuomintang, then the largest and

most influential revolutionary organization. The first blow struck at the Kuomintang was the assassination of its foremost leader, Sun Chi-jen, in Shanghai on March 21, 1913. Later Yuan declared a vendetta against the Kuomintang. Kwantung and Fukien provinces declared their independence, but the uprisings of the Kuomintang against the usurping Yuan failed because the revolutionary wave had exhausted itself and Yuan had consolidated his domination with the connivance of the foreign capitalist powers.

When the World War began, the general of the Manchus was dreaming of transforming his military dictatorship into a twentieth-century dynasty. But the imperialists who had made him collectively were ready to break him singly.

The World War was to give birth to the most predatory schemes in the history of the invasion of China. The 1911 revolution had brought the intimidated Chinese people forward in struggling against mediæval conditions and against their foreign oppressors. Yuan was to be brushed aside by the violence of imperialist ambitions as well as by the resistance of the people.

The pressure and threat of the imperialists, though constant, were not always even. The war was to illustrate this truth, as post-war activities were to emphasize it.

Revolution in China was followed by the World War; the World War by a plague of divisive wars. The Chinese people responded to the consequent burdens with revolution at a higher level.

A World War Ally Betrayed

THE World War found China in the throes of still uncompleted revolution. While the European powers were temporarily distracted from Far Eastern affairs, and the United States was deeply absorbed in the profitable war trade, Japan believed its sun was rising high over China.

The war was first felt in China through the skirmish to oust the Germans from their concessions in Kiaochow,¹ Shantung province. On August 23, 1914 Japan declared war on Germany for this very purpose. By November 7 the German garrison at Tsingtao capitulated. To prevent the European conflict from spreading any farther in China, the Chinese government announced the abolition of the war zone in Shantung.

¹ Kiaochow is a strategic strip of land in Shantung province on the bay of Kiaochow, equidistant from Chinnampo, Korea, Shanghai and Nagasaki, Japan, thus making it extremely valuable to Japan's scheme for the domination of China. Kiaochow was originally seized by German armed forces in 1897 on the pretext of the "murder" of two German missionaries. The German government had built up the town of Tsingtao as its most important base in China.

Previously British, French, and Russian imperialism had been the most aggressive contestants for hegemony in China. The United States, under the banner of the "open-door" policy, sought to meet and counteract the efforts of its competitors by penetration of its own.

In his lavish distribution of China's wealth, Yuan played no favourites among the powers. In return for the so-called "reorganization" loan of \$111,766,295 floated by the five-power banking syndicate representing Great Britain, France, Russia, Germany, and Japan, Yuan generously distributed industrial, commercial, and territorial largess to all the leading powers.

To the Tsar's government he gave concessions in Outer Mongolia and Northern Manchuria; to Britain, autonomy of Tibet, which increased British influence there; to Japan, concessions of hundreds upon hundreds of miles of feeder railway lines for her Manchurian railroads; to Belgian capitalists, sweeping railroad concessions; to the Standard Oil Company of the United States, exploration rights in Northern Shensi oil fields; and to the Bethlehem Steel Corporation, an order to build a merchant marine and to construct a naval base in Fukien province.

Yuan at first met very little organized opposition from the people to his squandering of the nation's resources. The overthrow of the Manchus had served to allay the initial revolutionary wave. Generous bribes to some of the more corrupt hangers-on who had joined the rebellion for their own private gain disorganized other potential opponents.

The Kuomintang had not yet fully reorganized itself. Nor had it adjusted its program, tactics, and form of organization to meet the new conditions.

The Chin Pu Tang, or so-called Progressive Party, headed

by General Li Yuan-hung, who had been dragged trembling from under his wife's bed to lead the 1911 military actions against the Manchus, had become the dominant political faction in Peking. It supported President Yuan Shih-kai. In addition, there was the Pei Yang military party, and the Chia Tung Yi. These too gave unquestioned adherence to Yuan.

During the war Japan accelerated its move for the domination of China. The most adventurous Japanese militarists embarked on their bold plan for the complete conquest of China and its reduction to a Japanese colony, a scheme that was to have but a short respite after the Washington Naval Conference of 1921-2, when it was followed by the world-shaking seizure of Manchuria in 1931.

Very soon after Japan entered the war, the Black Dragon Society (*Kokuryūkai*), forerunner of the future Fascist-militarist groupings in Japan, avidly examined Japan's unequalled opportunity to dominate China. This most chauvinist organization in Japan was successful during the World War in impressing the government with the necessity for prompt, sweeping, and daring action in China. The Black Dragon Society circulated a memorandum among army and government officials in which it urged:

"The present gigantic struggle in Europe has no parallel in history. Not only will the equilibrium of Europe be affected and its effect felt all over the globe, but its result will create a new era in the political and social world. Therefore, whether or not the Imperial Japanese Government can settle the Far Eastern question and bring to a realization our great Imperial policy depends on our being able skilfully to avail ourselves of the world's general trend of affairs so as to extend our influence and to decide upon a course of action towards

China which shall be practical in execution.”¹

The influential army officers who directed the Black Dragon Society warned that after peace was established, the European and other powers might work jointly to thwart Japan's aspirations in China. “Now is the most opportune moment for Japan quickly to solve the Chinese question,” they pressed. “Such an opportunity will not occur for hundreds of years to come.”²

To this confidential document were attached ten proposals which served as the core of the future notorious Twenty-one Demands. These ten proposals of the Black Dragon Society, which up to 1937 still served as the foundation for every new set of demands presented to China, were as follows:

(1) In the event of internal trouble in China, Japan shall send an army to safeguard Chinese territory; (2) China shall recognize Japan's privileged position in South Manchuria and Inner Mongolia, and cede sovereign rights to Japan in those territories; (3) after Japan's occupation of Kiao-chow, Japan shall acquire all rights and privileges previously held by Germany; (4) Japan shall be ceded strategic harbours in Fukien province by China to be converted into a Japanese naval base; (5) Japan shall supervise the training of the Chinese army; (6) China shall adopt the Japanese style of weapons; (7) Japan shall supervise the building and training of the Chinese navy; (8) Japan shall be entrusted with the supervision of China's finances; (9) China shall engage Japanese “educational experts”; (10) China shall first consult and obtain consent of Japan before entering into finan-

¹ *Modern Chinese History*, edited by Harley Farnsworth McNair (New York: G. E. Stechert & Co.; 1923), pp. 760-8.

² *Ibid.*

cial agreements with other powers, or agreements for lease or sale of territories.

It was a matter of only a few weeks thereafter before the Japanese Minister to China, Hioki Eki, on January 18, 1915 personally presented the first draft of the Twenty-one Demands to President Yuan Shih-kai. The very paper on which these demands were inscribed was significantly watermarked with a profusion of Japanese warships and bristling machine-guns. More direct threats were also made; and President Yuan was advised that it would be better if he kept the whole affair secret. Besides bullying, Minister Hioki also broadly hinted to Yuan that favourable action on the Twenty-one Demands would win the goodwill of the Japanese government to further Yuan's personal ambitions. Yuan Shih-kai felt himself so firmly in the saddle of government that he had begun to flirt with the idea of monarchy.

The Twenty-one Demands, which hung over China like the sword of Damocles, were, up to that time, the most drastic, the most oppressive, and the worst blackmailing conditions ever imposed on China in her humiliating history of extensive semi-colonial exactions.

Divided into five distinct sections, the first group, comprising four demands, provided for the transfer of all German-controlled territories and other interests in Shantung to Japan. The second group, consisting of seven demands, gave Japan a freer road for increased penetration into South Manchuria and Inner Mongolia. In the two demands of the third group Japan was given control of the great Hanyehping Company's vast steel and coal interests in Hanyang, the Pittsburgh of China, one of the three Wu-Han cities (Hankow, Wuchang, Hanyang), situated at the junction of China's busiest and longest river, the Yangtze, and the important

Han River. The fourth heading contained one general demand, that the Chinese government should not cede or lease to any power but Japan any harbour, bay, or island along the coast of China. The fifth set, of seven demands, gave Japan virtual tutelage over the Chinese government, the army, police, and finances; and for good measure valuable railroad concessions around Wuchang, as well as a naval base in Fukien province, were thrown in.

Japan disclaimed any knowledge of the Twenty-one Demands when the United States got wind of them through secret diplomatic channels. But on May 7, 1915 the Japanese Minister delivered an ultimatum to the Chinese government demanding a favourable reply. Alarmed, the Peking government agreed to a revised list the next day. On May 25, despite protests by the United States, the Chinese government acceded to sixteen of the demands. In the draft finally accepted under protest all points contained in the fifth group were eliminated such as reference to missionaries, arsenals, governmental advisers, and the railways in the Yangtze Valley.

Monarchical agitation shamelessly followed Yuan's submission to the Twenty-one Demands. Yuan's dream of his installation on the Dragon Throne ended ignominiously, however, on February 23 after revolutionary uprisings threatened in several provinces. Soon thereafter, on June 6, Yuan Shih-kai died. Li Yuan-hung, leader of the Chin Pu Tang, then assumed the presidency.

After Yuan's death the so-called Military Party (Pei Yang) split up into three groups which were alternately and collectively to dominate the country until the ascendancy of the Kuomintang. First, there was the corrupt Anfu Club, headed by the Japanese agent Tuan Chi-jui; second, the Chihli

Party, named after the province ruled by its chief war lord, Tsao Kun, whose closest associate was General Wu Pei-fu; and third, the Fengtien Party, led by the Manchurian militarist Chang Tso-lin. Not principle but feudal origin and imperialist allegiance distinguished these cliques.

Though Li Yuan-hung was presidential choice of the provinces which had revolted against Yuan Shih-kai's monarchical aspirations, Tuan Chi-jui, leader of the pro-Japanese agents in the Chinese government, was named Premier. With the help of Japan, Tuan Chi-jui indulged in an endless intrigue against the other political groupings and against all of the pro-British and pro-American war lords.

All of the members of the Anfu Club were a choice lot of scoundrels, callously corrupt even for officials pampered under the decadent Manchu dynasty. They had control of the key ministries of communications and finance. The function of the Finance Minister was conceived of chiefly as that of obtaining bribes from Japan, while the Minister of Communications dispensed the country's resources to the Japanese capitalists.

As representative of a rival power, the United States Minister to China, Charles R. Crane, complained to the State Department: "It is necessary to state that Japanese influence is clearly and strongly behind the Anfus." He charged that the Anfus "indulge in a saturnalia of corruption unequalled since the establishment of the Republic." In one year the Anfus borrowed \$400,000,000 (Chinese) from Japan and squandered it all. A syndicate of semi-official Japanese banks had sent Komeio Nishihara to lavish loans on the Anfu Club, in return for which they got Chinese industries, national resources, and, above all, a tighter hold on the Chinese ruling clique.

Under American prompting, China had remained neutral in the first years of the war. When the United States became a belligerent, however, President Wilson urged China to participate. There is little doubt, also, from the evidence now available that President Wilson was fully conversant with the secret understanding between Japan, Britain, and the other Allied powers for the transfer of Germany's Shantung interests to Japan. Indeed, Japan's consideration for entering the war, as an ally of England under the Anglo-Japanese pact, was the receipt, as its share of war booty, of Pacific colonies wrung from Germany. The secret understanding between Japan and the Allies was expressed in an exchange of notes between the British Ambassador to Tokyo, Conyngnam Greene, and the Japanese Foreign Minister. On February 16, 1917 Ambassador Greene advised the Japanese government of the affirmation of the previous confidential understanding, saying: "His Britannic Majesty's government will support the claims of Japan in regard to the disposal of Germany's rights to Shantung and possessions in the islands north of the equator," and "the Japanese government will in the eventual peace settlement treat in the same spirit Great Britain's claims to the German islands south of the equator."¹ Japan further provided that in the event that China came into the war on the side of Allies, the confidential understanding would be respected nevertheless.

As one of the Allies, China, even as a semi-colonial country, would inevitably demand in the final peace settlement at least the return of the territories usurped by Germany in Shantung. President Li Yuan-hung justified China's entry into the war on the side of the Allies on these grounds: It

¹ *History of the Peace Conference of Paris*, edited by H. W. V. Temperley (6 vols. Oxford University Press; 1920-4), Vol. VI, p. 634.

would be desirable for China to have a seat at the peace conference to discuss and press the question of her territorial integrity; to prevent Japan from grabbing the former German concessions; to force repudiation of the infamous Twenty-one Demands; to urge the cancellation of the Boxer indemnity; to raise the issue of the unequal treaties, and to endeavour to win equal recognition of China's sovereign rights.

Throughout this period Tsao Ju-lin, Minister of Communications, a member of the Anfu Club, conducted secret negotiations with the Japanese War Office. Premier Tuan Chi-jui's aim was to have China participate in the war so that he could have an additional convincing excuse to obtain more loans from Japan, and, nothing loath, from the United States also. Under the pretext, further, of organizing a military expedition "against Germany" he believed he could move to crush the revolutionary groups.

On the part of the British, Leonard Simpson (Putnam Weale), the imperialist propagandist, then correspondent for the London *Daily Telegraph*, advised the Chinese authorities in the autumn of 1916 (with intimations that he spoke for the British government) that if China joined the Allies she could have the Boxer indemnity revoked and could hope, furthermore, for other concessions.

The entry of China into the war on the side of the Allies, at the behest particularly of the United States, presented Japan with grave problems concerning her imperialist schemes.

On the very day China entered the war, the secret archives published by the Soviet government soon after the revolution showed, the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs was conniving with Petrograd. The Foreign Minister strongly

urged the Tsarist Ambassador at Tokyo to obtain from the government in Petrograd solid assurances that German possessions in Shantung would be guaranteed to Japan if she undertook the supposedly difficult task of winning China for the Allied cause.

Then, just ten days later, to appease suspicion in the United States, Count Okuma, Premier of Japan, on August 24, 1917, cabled the following assurance to the American people through the New York *Independent*:

"As Premier of Japan, I have stated and now can state to the people of America and of the world that Japan has no ulterior motive, no desire to secure more territory, no thought of depriving China or other people of anything which they now possess. My government and my people have given their word and their pledge, which will be honourably kept as Japan always keeps her promises."

From all this one would conclude that the Chinese people were more than justified in the hope, so generally widespread, that an Allied victory would bring some measure of relief to China. China's suspicion should have been aroused by the Lansing-Ishii agreement. President Wilson's protestations of fair treatment for China turned out to be as reliable as his promises to the American people that he would keep them out of war. On November 2, 1917 an exchange of letters took place between the United States Secretary of State, Lansing, and Japanese Ambassador Ishii, the pivotal point of which was the following clause: "The government of the United States recognizes that Japan has special interests in China particularly in that part to which her possessions are contiguous." To this were appended dicta affirming the "open-door" policy of the United States, and gratuitous phrases about not interfering with the territorial integrity

of China. That the Lansing-Ishii agreement was in the nature of a secret understanding, perhaps to supplement the general Allied understanding with Japan, was revealed by the fact that the American envoy to Peking, Dr. Reinsch, was kept in utter ignorance of the negotiations leading to this decisive diplomatic exchange, as well as the consummation of it. "Since these negotiations," later wrote Dr. Reinsch, "concerned some of the most vital problems in the whole Chinese situation, it was surprising that everyone had been kept in ignorance of them."¹

The World War was China's great opportunity to free itself from foreign oppression. Instead of being drawn into the intrigues of the Allied or other powers, an independent course would have gained for China important if not decisive advantages in the struggle for national liberation. The great mistake of the Chinese rulers was to permit China to be entrapped in the diplomatic and war manœuvres of the belligerent imperialist powers. China had everything to lose and nothing to gain by allowing herself to be pushed into the conflict.

At the Peace Conference China was confronted by the united Allies bent on satisfying Japan's rapacious demands at China's expense. To appease China, President Wilson dangled the further promise that as soon as the League of Nations was established China could expect justice. Nevertheless, the Chinese delegation at the Paris Peace Conference was adamant in refusing to sign the Versailles Treaty. China, however, became a member of the League of Nations by virtue of signing the separate treaty of peace with Austria at Saint-Germain. The aftermath in the Far East of the

¹ Paul S. Reinsch: *An American Diplomat in China* (Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday, Page & Co.; 1922).

Peace Conference was to be the acutest intensification of Japanese-American antagonism.

That a social storm was brewing in China was evident before the Versailles Treaty was signed. Conservative Chinese sentiment was expressed, for example, as follows by the Chinese writer Hollington K. Tong, in *Millard's Review*, January 4, 1919: "China would feel disappointed," he said, "if the Allies are unwilling to renew with all sincerity their pledge for the preservation of her territorial integrity and are unwilling by interventional means to create a condition which will insure carrying out that pledge."

The Chinese people, at least, expected not only a return of Kiaochow from Germany but a promise of relinquishment of some of the other imperialist prerogatives. The peace treaty, however (Part IV, Section VII), had given to Japan the German concessions in Shantung, German rights in the Tsingtao-Tsinanfu Railway, ownership of a former German cable from Tsingtao to Shanghai and from Tsingtao to Chefoo, and German property in Kiaochow.

Actually, the transfer of Kiaochow to Japan was not in itself so crushing. But it was a shattering blow to Chinese hopes of getting from the Allied powers promised remission of unequal treaties. It was, above all, notice to China that she was an object of further aggressive designs and a victim of the war, inveigled into joining the Allies only to be later betrayed. Those Chinese businessmen friendly to the United States preached faith in war-time promises. For example, Hollington K. Tong, previously quoted, urged: "If Chinese proposals are characterized by reasonableness and are conceived in the large, wide, statesmanlike spirit of human progress, the great powers will accord them the fullest measure of support."

The United States Senate did make reservations to the Versailles Treaty; and in the American peace treaty with Germany the Shantung clauses were specifically and drastically repudiated. The United States had come out of the war more powerful, economically and militarily, and had no intention of brooking Japanese sway in China. After the conclusion of peace the United States, as an imperialist competitor, began more active opposition to Japan's encroachment on Chinese territory and markets. A continuation of the Japanese advances made during the war would seriously contest American aspirations.

But the Chinese people were not putting their faith then in any imperialist power. The war, which had hastened Chinese industrial development because of the disorganized conditions of the home industry of the European capitalist powers, fostered the maturing of a Chinese industrial class and a group of modern bankers.

The relatively rapid spurt of industrialization is shown particularly by the fact that coal output jumped from 8,886,453 tons in 1912 to 20,054,513 tons in 1919. Iron ore output rose from 721,280 tons in 1912 to 1,861,230 in 1919. The number of cotton spindles increased from 836,828 in 1912 to 2,366,722 in the same period. The number of modern banks in China was 9 in 1912 and more than 100 in 1919.

With the growth of industry and the bourgeoisie came the inevitable increase in the size and strength of the modern Chinese proletariat. At the same time the number of students in China and overseas increased, and the students during the soul-searching war period had grown in understanding and political stature.

The war and its consequences, furthermore, bared the aims and objectives as well as the methods of imperialism,

more than all the previous years of penetration in China had done.

The Chinese militarists, meanwhile, had interpreted the action of the Paris Peace Conference in their own opportunist way. They read in the concessions to Japan by the powerful Allies who had conquered Germany an acknowledgment of Tokyo's superior strength in the Far East. They therefore looked to the strong for greater graft-producing alliances. Nothing up to that time had so deeply stirred China as the announcement that the Kiaochow concessions would be transferred to Japan.

Up to the end of April 1919, when the victors were recasting the map of the world to suit their own advantages, China still hoped against hope that the Paris Peace Conference would at the last moment refuse to grant Japan's brazen demands in Shantung. Conversant with world events, Chinese students saw the hope of months vanish. There were then no avenues of recognized protest. There was no genuine parliament, no press, no organized public opinion, and there were no active national political parties. The revolutionary political factions did not arouse and lead the people to forestall the stinging rebuff of the Peace Conference. The Kuo-mintang was shaken by internal strife, and its energy was consumed in efforts to establish a government in Canton. It stood aloof from the great popular anti-Japanese resentment. Many of the former leaders of the 1911 revolution either had been silenced by sinecures or were deeply involved in fruitless bickerings over worthless and inapplicable constitutions or in forming puppet parliaments without participation of the people.

Just three days after the powers at the Paris Peace Conference announced their decision treating China as part of

the spoils of war, the Peking students were convinced that the time to act had arrived. The students at Peking University had decided themselves to initiate street demonstrations and to organize popular agitation against the Anfu ministers who had served Japan by ravaging China. More than fifteen thousand of them in a compact, determined body, bearing banners with anti-Japanese slogans and demands of punishment for the "three traitor ministers," marched through the sacrosanct legation quarter.

The angry shouting students gathered in front of the home of Tsao Ju-lin, most hated pro-Japanese Minister of Communications. Tsao Ju-lin was a secret agent of the Japanese War Office and was chiefly responsible for Japanese loans, which were nothing more than outright bribes. Seeing at a glance the temper of the crowd, Tsao quickly scampered out of the back door of his home and escaped the students' fury. Chang Chung-hsiang, Chinese Minister to Japan, implicated in the betrayals, was not so lucky. He was severely beaten by the furious students. Minister Tsao's home was burned, though the students, who hid neither their intentions nor their deeds, disclaimed responsibility for this incendiary act. In another demonstration Lu Chung-yu, director of currency, also a Japanese agent, was beaten.

Encouraged by the popularity and scope of the Peking actions, Chinese in Shanghai called a mass meeting to protest against the humiliation of China. Meanwhile the Peking students, sensing that demonstrations alone would not achieve their goal, organized a volunteer corps and began military training, believing that the country sooner or later could be aroused to unite and by force of arms drive Japan from Shantung.

At a conference in Shanghai on May 15, a national Stu-

dents' Union was formed—a significant political act of unification of China's students. That was followed by a general students' strike led by the Union on May 18 in Peking and on May 26 in Shanghai. Like a prairie fire the strike movement spread from city to city until more than fifty thousand students took part.

Realizing the seriousness of the demonstrations, the Anfu authorities in Peking thought they could terrorize the immature youth by arrests, beatings, and tortures. Thousands of students were flung into mediæval jails. Yet the agitation continued to gather momentum. Students were assigned to visit schools not yet participating. Arrests were answered by redoubled agitation. Posters flaying Japan and the Anfus appeared on walls throughout China. Leaflets and pamphlets were widely distributed telling of China's shame. Speakers went to the people, into the villages, among the peasantry, to the factory workers and coolies, explaining China's great injury and the need to arouse the nation to protest, resistance, action.

The students called for and helped to organize an efficient anti-Japanese boycott. The boycott effectively drew the Chinese merchants into the anti-Japanese agitation.

At the end of May, President Hsu Shih-chang, Yuan Shih-kai's old Secretary of State, issued a manifesto defending the three ministers. President Hsu's protection of the three betrayers served only to inflame the students, whose movement was reaching its apex and gaining sympathy from every stratum of the Chinese people. The students knew that the hated traitors were retained in office by Japanese gold and threats of the Japanese army "to save Tokyo's face."

Taking a leaf from the ancient book of the deposed Manchus, the Japanese strove to give the anti-Japanese movement

an anti-foreign turn as the Manchus did in the Boxer uprising of 1900. The scheme failed. Not only did the students avoid the snare, but the powers had been too sharply divided by the war to be able to act in concert.

When the students called their general strike in Shanghai, they were successful in enlisting the support of merchants, large and small. All of the Chinese shops in this great city were shut tight. Store clerks and labourers flocked into the streets and participated in the anti-Japanese manifestations. The strike of the Shanghai merchants was quickly successful in forcing the release of the students, though many refused to leave the prisons, further embarrassing the harassed Anfu clique.

Finally, by the middle of June, the traitors were forced to resign. The students' movement subsided, not without leaving a deep imprint on the whole of China, not without its lessons travelling to every nook and corner of the land, into the humble hut of the poorest peasant.

During this period the militarists played a crafty game of their own. Like feudal lords of the Middle Ages they strove to enlarge their fiefs, uniting with the stronger to destroy the still more powerful. The usual consideration was the promise of greater plunder and wider fields to ravage. The depredations of the war lords, poor crops, and the post-war economic crisis brought famine to this country of chronic hunger. More than 15,000,000 people faced death. The most conservative estimates say only 500,000 died of starvation in 1920, but more accurate figures, never obtainable in China, would be well up in the millions.

China at this time could be compared to Europe in the days of the great feudal wars—but with these striking differ-

ences: Since 1842 China has been the imperialist hunting ground of twenty-three capitalist nations. Three of them (Britain, Japan, and the United States) were contesting for hegemony. And the internecine struggles of the glorified native bandits who manœuvred a lot and fought a little, while their armies grew bigger and more expensive, were circumscribed and subordinated to the conflicts of the imperialists. The militarists were confronted, too, by the ever-growing anti-imperialist movement and the revolutionary upsurge of the masses.

The October Revolution in Russia had overthrown the Tsar, and its significance for China was even then seeping through the lines of the interventionist forces in Siberia on the border of China.

Until the middle of July 1920 the Anfu clique continued to dominate Peking. Then, preceding the rupture of the Anglo-Japanese alliance, fighting began among the ambitious war lords, first to oust the Anfus and then to decide which of the victorious generals was to supersede the vanquished.

Though Tuan Chi-jui, the foremost Anfu leader, got the assistance of Japanese army officers, his troops were defeated by a superior combination of war lords who held favour in the eyes of Britain and the United States. The war which ousted the Anfus was soon followed by the Washington Naval Conference, which shifted and sharpened imperialist relations in the Far East, marking a cross-road in China's struggles. Its immediate result was to inaugurate a period of more distinct military fiefs along the lines of imperialist spheres of influence.

Serious trouble began when General Wu Pei-fu, who had

been sent south into Hunan to suppress the opposition to the Anfus, was left out of the lush graft. Enraged, he returned to Chihli and joined with other militarists to drive out the Anfus. He was associated with Tsao Kun, leader of the Chihli province group and with Li Shun of Kiangsi, both of whom were obligingly at the service of the British. Allied to them also was General Chang Tso-lin, ruler of Manchuria and head of the Fengtien Party. Most of his official life a Japanese puppet, at that time Chang pursued a more or less independent game, co-operating with the other war lords to end the Anfu rule. He later became Japan's chief native agent in Manchuria.¹

Defeated in the fighting near Peking, Tuan Chi-jui fled from the capital. The deposed Anfu government was supplanted by a so-called Coalition government. The victorious Chihli and Fengtien groups, which had joined forces to depose the Anfu clique, became China's rulers. But the pro-British and pro-American Chihli militarists soon removed all of the Fengtien functionaries from office and filled the ministerial posts with their own men.

By that time, in 1922, the conflicts between the imperialist

¹ The attitude of the subordinate officers and political parvenus in various militarist camps during these predatory civil wars is well described by Tang Hua-lung, a prominent politician belonging to the so-called progressive party (Chin Pu Tang). When Hu Kuo-chun, a militarist, was fighting against Yuan Shih-kai in 1916, Tang Hua-lung wrote a letter to his brother, Tang Hsiang-ming, the then Tuchun of Hunan province, saying: "The two factions are fighting and there is no telling what side will win. But since I am on the side of Hung Hsien and you are on the other side of Hu Kuo, the welfare of our family is assured whichever side wins the victory." (Quoted in *Chinese National Revolution*, by Wang Ching-wei and others, p. 18. Shanghai: China United Press; 1931.)

nations had changed the conditions confronting the anti-imperialist struggle in China. The Chinese working class, too, was bestirring itself, entering the political arena as an independent and resolute force.

CHAPTER IV

Social Awakening

MORE social changes were packed into the years from 1921 to 1924 in China than in slow-moving centuries of the Ching or Ming periods.

During those years the reign of Wu Pei-fu, who ruled over the Peking government, coincided with two basic political developments: First, the growth of the labour movement brought the Chinese workers forward as the most revolutionary and determined anti-imperialist force. Second, a resolute shift took place in imperialist relations affecting China's struggle for national freedom.

China during 1921 to 1924 was split up more distinctly into feudal fiefs within imperialist spheres of influence than at any other time before or since. Wu Pei-fu, as War Minister, ruled in North China (Chihli, Honan, Hupeh, Shantung, and part of Kiangsu). He easily managed to make both President and the puppet Parliament his pliable tools. Though the central government at Peking was a purely sectional entity, Wu Pei-fu derived prestige as a national ruler from the fact that the powers recognized Peking as China's capital.

And on that account Wu controlled the important surplus customs revenues.

The rest of the provinces were similarly grouped under the control of war lords ranged around a super-tuchun whose power, in turn, was bolstered by some economically concerned foreign nation and supported by the native feudal landlords.

For example, the Three Eastern Provinces, as Manchuria was known before it was transformed into the Japanese puppet-state of Manchukuo, were dominated by Chang Tso-lin. Behind Chang stood the power of Japan.

Chekiang and the Shanghai area were ruled by Lu Yung-hsiang, a subordinate of Tuan Chi-jui. Though British influence was paramount in those regions, both the United States and Japan had important interests there and exercised influence on the various war lords.

Shansi continued under the rule of General Yen Hsi-shan, who played a relatively more independent role, though he, too, shuttled between Japanese and British allegiance.

In the south for a while reigned war lords who were completely under the influence of the British colony of Hong Kong. It was in Canton, however, that China later first established its base for independent government, to rally the people for the liberation of the country. While Canton was still under the sway of Chen Chung-ming, who had been won away from co-operation with Dr. Sun Yat-sen by the British, the provinces of Hunan, Szechwan, Kweichow, and Yunnan nominally gave allegiance to the southern government. When Chen Chung-ming was ultimately defeated by revolutionary armies, the British incited another militarist, Yan Hsi-ming, Governor of Yunnan, against the Canton government.

The marauding activity of the tuchuns, the intensification of their quarrels as part of the forthcoming reshifting of imperialist alliances, brought China to the brink of economic catastrophe. Commerce, industry, and agriculture became stagnant. To feed the huge armies, then numbering more than 1,500,000 men, taxes were increased, the peasants robbed, the merchants pillaged. The sufferings of the people exceeded their almost incredibly miserable plight under the Manchus. One day the peasants would bend under the oppression and gouging of a tuchun engaged in war and the next day break under the more crushing demands of some new conquering war lord.

Unsuccessful efforts had been made in 1913 and 1916 to organize modern trade unions in China. It was not until 1919 that the trade-union movement sank its roots into Chinese soil. The actual organization of trade unions was first achieved largely under the leadership of Chinese Communists. One of the major objectives the Chinese Communist Party set itself was the creation of a broad labour movement to improve the conditions of labour and to draw the newly developed and recently organized proletariat into the general revolutionary struggle. In the successful founding of trade unionism in China, the Communist Party received constant advice and assistance from the Communist International and the Profintern (Red International of Labour Unions). From its inception, Chinese trade unionism has been identified with the program of the Profintern. Chinese writers on labour unanimously credit the Red International of Labour Unions and its subordinate body, the Pan-Pacific Secretariat, with having rooted trade unionism in Chinese soil. The Amsterdam Trade Union International concerned itself chiefly with European labour, taking no steps to assist

the Chinese workers in their formative and turbulent stage of trade unionism. Previously, Chinese handicraftsmen, merchants, and others belonged to ancient guilds, some of which were later transformed into modern trade unions. It was only natural that the seamen, the first Chinese workers to be employed in connection with modern machinery, who came in contact with organized labour of other countries, should be the first to build a powerful trade union. Next came the railroad workers, for the railroads were the first capitalist channels for exploitation of the interior of China.

No accurate census of the number of industrial and other workers in China has ever been taken. The most reliable estimates were made in 1925-7 when the labour movement was more or less legal. Since that time no broad estimates have been made to supplement the figures of that period. The total number has not changed greatly, however. There has been some increase in industrial workers, but their number has fluctuated within narrow limits since the general world economic crisis. It can be roundly estimated that there are about 3,000,000 industrial and related workers in China, and 12,000,000 handicrafts workers and coolies. Su Chao-jen, trade-union leader, in his report on the labour movement in China (*Proceedings of the Pan-Pacific Trade Union Conference, 1927*), gave the following tabulation of what may be considered the modern proletariat of China, those engaged in modern industry, distribution, and related trade and offices:

Electrical workers	80,000
Textile workers ..	280,000
Silk workers	160,000
Miners	540,000

WHEN CHINA UNITES

Seamen	160,000
Railway workers	120,000
Wharf workers	300,000
Metal workers	50,000
Building-construction workers	200,000
Postal workers	90,000
Municipal employees and policemen ..	250,000
Salt workers	250,000
Tobacco workers	40,000
Rice-distribution workers	60,000
Printers	50,000
Other manufacturing workers	120,000
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TOTAL.	2,750,000

The number of handicrafts workers and coolies in China was estimated by the Pan-Pacific Trade Union Conference at 12,160,000. A more recent estimate (*The Way of Light*, Shanghai, April 16, 1931) gives the total at 11,960,000, distributed as follows:

Spinning and weaving workers	320,000
Native small-scale miners	600,000
Building workers	600,000
Tailors	850,000
Tea workers	350,000
Net-makers	80,000
Straw-hat braiders	120,000
Porcelain workers	250,000
Firecracker workers	200,000
Barbers	240,000
Metal smiths	160,000
Shoemakers	300,000
Paper-makers	150,000

Coolies	1,200,000
Salt workers	420,000
Rice-sellers	240,000
Shop employees and apprentices . . .	1,600,000
Boatmen	1,200,000
Printers	80,000
Other handicrafts workers	3,000,000

TOTAL 11,960,000

In 1918, 6,500 workers participated in strikes. By 1919 the strikers for that year rose to 91,500. The first walk-outs resulted in satisfaction of the workers' demands. Wages were so miserably low that relatively big increases did not add seriously in absolute figures to the wage-bill of the employers.

All Chinese writers on the labour movement are unanimous in stating that the success of the Russian Revolution was the most important influence not only in the foundation of the trade-union movement of China but in inspiring the Chinese proletariat to form its own political instrument, the Communist Party.

The early victories of labour attracted students and intellectuals to the working-class movement. Numerous translations of Marxist literature, of V. I. Lenin's speeches, of pamphlets on trade-union organization and tactics appeared in the Chinese language. The radical intellectuals began to absorb and discuss the Marxist-Leninist approach to the problems of the liberation of China. The Students' Union of 1919 was followed by a whole series of organizations such as Regeneration, the New Youth, Young China, and New China.

When after the defeat of the Russian White Guards under Admiral Kolchak, and the collapse of foreign intervention

in Siberia after eighteen months of warfare, Soviet Russia was able to make contact with China, the influence of the Russian Revolution gave a profound impetus to the Chinese anti-imperialist movement. The first historic appeal of the Soviet government to the Chinese people, on July 25, 1919, though it did not at first reach many of them, because of the stringent censorship of the imperialists and the resistance of the tuchuns, could not long be kept secret. The fact that the Soviet government had abolished national oppression on its territory and had thwarted the plots of Japan to seize Siberia, Inner Mongolia, and North Manchuria was to make a deep impression on those Chinese who did get the news. And when these facts were coupled with the official declaration of the annulment of all secret treaties of the Tsar and the offer to establish relations on the basis of full national equality, the consequence was still greater.

The Soviet government repeated its appeal on October 27, 1920, proposing: (1) to annul all pre-revolutionary treaties and to return without compensation everything seized from China by the Tsarist government and the Russian bourgeoisie; (2) to establish economic relations on the basis of most-favoured-nation treatment; (3) to refuse capitulation privileges for Russian citizens; (4) to reject payments under the Boxer Protocol; (5) to establish diplomatic and consular relations with China; and (6) to sign a special agreement regarding the use of the Chinese Eastern Railway.

The Chinese people greeted this announcement with unconcealed enthusiasm, while the foreign powers could hardly disguise their consternation. It was not until May 31, 1924, however, after the initial successes of the Chinese labour movement, and subsequent to the united front of the Kuo-mintang and the Communist Party of China, that a Sino-

Soviet accord embodying the above-mentioned points was finally signed between the two nations.

Communism had a modest beginning in China. With virtually no previous Socialist or proletarian traditions, since the labour movement sprang up as a post-war development, the Communist Party grew more rapidly in China and attained, comparatively, a greater part in the life of the nation than any other Communist Party, excepting the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

The First Congress of the Communist Party of China was inauspiciously held in the latter part of July 1924 in the French Concession at Shanghai. The party then had but a few dozen members in its ranks. Only thirteen delegates attended the founding Congress. Long after the wheat had been separated from the chaff in the severe struggle in China, there still remained of the thirteen charter delegates such men as Mao Tse-tung, later President of the Chinese Soviets and leader of the Chinese Red army, a man who was to take the most prominent part in the establishment of the national united front against Japanese imperialism; Chang Ko-tao, member of the Political Bureau of the Communist Party on its fifteenth anniversary; and Tung Pi-wu, president of the Supreme Court in the Soviet districts. Besides, there were a handful of others who remained faithful and who lost their lives in the ferocious battles that ensued, or who were tortured to death in the dungeons of the militarists. Chen Du-shu, one of the first to help organize Communist groups, was to desert to Trotskyism, just as Lu Chen-tsin, another delegate at the first Congress, was to become a police spy.¹

¹ *Communist International*, 1936, No. 10; "Reminiscences of the First Congress of the Communist Party of China," by Chen Pan-tsu; "Fifteen Years of Struggle for the Independence of the Chinese People," by Wang Ming.

On the eve of the 1925 revolution—that is, before the Shanghai massacre of May 30, 1925—there were only 900 members of the Communist Party. At the apex of the revolutionary events of 1925–7 the membership jumped to approximately 60,000. By 1937 the party had swelled to 450,000, the largest, after the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, in the Third (Communist) International.

From its inception, the Communist Party played a prominent part in the trade-union movement—in fact, had grown out of the early economic and anti-imperialist struggles. Its earliest weaknesses, later severely criticized at subsequent congresses of the party and at conferences of the Communist International, were admittedly (1) its failure to propose a program, based on the needs of the hundreds of millions of peasants, such as would win them as revolutionary allies against feudal survivals and thereby as fighters in the anti-imperialist upsurge; (2) a sectarian attitude towards other strata of the Chinese population who as Chinese were opposed to foreign domination.

The labour movement of China was to go through the most gruelling tests, the country was to endure a veritable plague of militarist wars, and the imperialist battleground in China was to witness a shifting of forces, before the first historic steps to revolutionary anti-imperialist unity were to be taken.

As early as October 1919 the United States sought an opportunity to disrupt the Anglo-Japanese alliance and to supersede the Lansing-Ishii agreement by a treaty that would give greater recognition to American interests in China. Furthermore, the State Department advised all of its diplomatic agents in the countries concerned to be on the look-out for any negotiations leading to the renewal of the Anglo-

Japanese alliance, though this fact was not revealed until March 16, 1936.¹

In 1920 the United States government, still alarmed lest the Anglo-Japanese treaty be renewed, began to launch such pressure on war-weakened Britain as ultimately led to the Washington Naval Conference of 1921-2.

Just before this, Japan, on the basis of its successes in China during and after the World War, began to spread the notion of Tokyo's supremacy in the Far East. The idea of an Oriental Monroe Doctrine, to have fuller fruition with the seizure of Manchuria in 1931, began to take shape not only in theory but in business, military, and political programs of Japan. A Far Eastern "Monroe Doctrine" was the attempt to create a slogan like the "White Man's Burden" or "*Drang nach Osten*" to justify Japan's conquest of China as its exclusive colony. Behind the smoke-screen of "Asia for the Asians" the Japanese government planned to make China the colonial monopoly of the giant Mitsui and Mitsubishi trusts. The view of Japan's Far Eastern hegemony was very frankly expressed, for example, as follows, by Professor I. Kawada:

"The term Oriental Monroe Doctrine has of late come to assume the nature of a motto for the country's foreign policy. Needless to explain, this is a theory claiming the recognition, by the Powers, of Japan's supremacy in the Far East, their respect of her special interests in the Orient, and their entrustment of her with all problems bearing on the East for their solution as a matter of principle. In short, it is an endeavour to realize the 'Orient for the Orientals' with the Japanese as their leader and supporter. This fun-

¹ U. S. State Department: *Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the U. S.*, 1920, Vol. II, p. 679; issued March 16, 1936.

damental principle underlying the Empire's foreign policy is no longer mere theoretical views of the politicians. It is now the political goal and impetus in reality, while the recent tendency among the Powers is towards their implicit recognition of this principle to a certain extent. All this indicates the establishment at last of the country's foreign principle on a proper fixed groove, and furnish a headlight not only to her diplomatic, but general administrative policies as well—a fact indeed worthy of congratulation for the country.”¹

Since 1902, when the first Anglo-Japanese alliance was signed, Britain fostered the strengthening of Japan as a counter-force to the rapid growth of its commercial rival, the United States. American rule in the Philippines and the negotiations in 1902 for the construction of the Panama Canal raised British fears of the United States as the most formidable competitor for control of the Pacific. For two decades, with British co-operation, Japan advanced economically at a rapid pace, increasing its foothold in China by defeating Tsarist Russia in Manchuria in 1905, and becoming a serious contender with the United States, as well as finally with Britain, for hegemony in China. The World War not only had given Japan a tremendous thrust forward but had, at the same time, seriously impaired Britain just as it augmented the economic and naval power of the United States.

Therefore, very soon after the Paris Peace Conference the American State Department began to move for a complete change of imperialist relations in the Far East. The United States sought to sever England's alliance with Japan and thereby block Japan's goal of supremacy in the Far East.

¹ *Japan Financial and Economic Monthly*, March 1918 (Vol. XII, No. 3).

The stage-setting for this event was the Washington Naval Conference, held September 12, 1921 to February 6, 1922. Nine nations were represented there: the United States, Great Britain, Japan, France, Italy, Belgium, Holland, Portugal, and China. At this Conference the United States achieved its guiding objective. It wrecked the Anglo-Japanese alliance, established naval equality with Britain, and compelled Japan to accept a poor third rating. The 5-5-3 ratio was an American naval victory, one that temporarily changed strategic relations in the Pacific.

For China the Conference achieved little, if anything. Japan was forced to restore Kiaochow, but continued its aggrandizement in other parts of China. Though the Tsingtao-Tsinanfu Railway was supposed to be returned to China on the payment of 53,000,000 gold marks, the transfer never was made. A Nine-Power Treaty with regard to China was adopted. For the United States this was another gain over Japan in that the treaty accorded with the American "open-door" policy. The nine signatory powers, including Japan, were pledged to respect the "territorial integrity" of China. Interpreting the Nine-Power Treaty to the United States Senate, President Harding said that it superseded the "special interest" clause in the Lansing-Ishii agreement and wiped out the "misunderstanding" that agreement created.

The Nine-Power Treaty was a severe reverse for Japan, a setback particularly to its immediate ambitious program in China. The entire policy of Japan thereafter was to overcome the retreat forced on her by the United States.

By 1931 Japan was able to achieve her goal and nullify the effect of the Washington Conference. But in the grave revolutionary events soon to engulf China, Japan made the most of her post-World War reverses by keeping in the back-

ground. Her crafty tactics helped to throw the brunt of the anti-imperialist impact on her most troublesome rival, leaving herself comparatively unscathed, prepared for the day when she could continue her schemes of Far Eastern supremacy.

Furthermore, titanic natural forces came into play to delay Japan's efforts to reassert her domination in China. The catastrophic and terrible earthquake of 1923 left a deep gap in Japan's economy and seriously retarded her aims on the Asian continent. The earthquake, which levelled Yokohama, killed more than 140,000 people and injured another 160,000. Officially, property damage was put at the large sum of 5,500,000,000 yen (\$2,741,530,000), though some have estimated it to have been above 10,000,000,000 yen (\$4,984,600,000). Destruction and injury of an important part of the Japanese navy in the quake and accompanying tidal wave served temporarily as a brake on Japan's aggressive policy in China.

And yet, despite these tactical retreats, anti-Japanese sentiment was so persistent among the Chinese, that we find one observer, Sidney L. Gulick, writing as follows in the *China Weekly Review* (June 23, 1923):

"The strength of the present anti-Japanese agitation is somewhat surprising to an onlooker in view of the recent adoption by Japan of a fundamental change in her policies towards China. This change was manifested at the Washington Conference and has been consistently carried out by a number of notable events."

Thus Japan's dissimulation, forced by inter-imperialist defeat, aggravated by the catastrophe of 1923 and by her own inner social conflicts, played an important part in the subsequent revolutionary events which were to shake China and the nations with commercial aspirations in the Far East.

The first substantial signs of the coming revolutionary storm were a succession of vigorous strikes. While the Washington Naval Conference was still meeting, a strike led by the Hong Kong Seamen's Union was called to demand pay increases and other improvements in working-conditions. By the end of January 1922, more than thirty thousand seamen had walked off the job. Originating as an economic action, when the Governor of the British Crown Colony of Hong Kong declared the union an "unlawful society" the strike was soon transformed into a popular anti-imperialist demonstration. More than fifty thousand workers of practically every trade on the island struck in sympathy with the seamen. Professor Ta Chen, eminent Chinese writer on labour questions, estimated that 166 vessels totalling 280,000 tons were tied up by the strike. The walk-out played havoc with British shipping and with the lucrative commerce of Hong Kong. After fifty-five days the shipowners were compelled to negotiate a settlement. On March 5 an agreement was signed, not only raising wages by from fifteen to thirty per cent, but granting recognition to the union as well. The Governor of Hong Kong at the same time rescinded his order of February 1 which had decreed the union illegal, thereby acknowledging a victory against British interference in Chinese affairs as well.

The leader of the successful Hong Kong strike was Su Chao-jen, secretary of the Seamen's Union, most revered leader of the Chinese trade unions. He was not a Communist at the time of the Hong Kong strike, but events of the strike soon led him to join the Communist Party. His death in 1929 was a great loss to the Chinese labour movement.

Out of this strike arose another important trend in the political life of China. The Kuomintang in Canton, under the leadership of Dr. Sun Yat-sen, generously supported the sea-

men's strike. More than \$3,000,000 (Chinese) were collected in Kwangtung province to aid the strikers. A people's movement developed in support of the strikers. Thus the strike not only revealed the growing strength of the labour movement but heralded the forthcoming unity of the Kuomintang and the political party of the proletariat.

The Hong Kong strike was followed by a wave of walk-outs in nearly every important industrial centre of the country. The Chinese workers, symbolized to the world of labour by the coolies, the lowest-paid human beings, toiling inhumanly long hours without any protective labour legislation, prey to native exploiters, militarists, and foreign imperialists, were showing their marvellous strength and fighting ability. To consolidate the strikers' organizational gains a national Congress of Chinese Trade Unions was held in Canton from May 1 to May 6. Present were 160 delegates, representing 200 trade unions with a total membership of more than 300,000.

Soon, under the persuasion of foreign interests, the employers began an offensive against the newly formed trade unions, whose successful strikes were instilling unrest into all Chinese labour. Strikes were savagely suppressed. At one fell swoop, in October 1922, eleven trade unions were outlawed. A strike of thousands of miners in the British-owned Kailan mines led to bloody encounters when the troops of Wu Pei-fu fired on the workers.

It was in such a charged atmosphere of labour conflicts that the railway workers of the Peking-Hankow Railway, under the general illusion that Wu Pei-fu was a friend of the common man in China, decided to call a national conference at Chengchow, Hunan province. The purpose of the conference was to formally inaugurate a union of the workers on the important Peking-Hankow line and to adopt a constitution for

the organization. One day before the conference was to open, when many delegates were already on their way to Chengchow unaware of the events taking place, Wu Pei-fu issued a general order prohibiting all meetings not specifically approved by the government. The order was exclusively aimed at the Peking-Hankow railwaymen's conference. On the next day, February 1, 1923, martial law was declared. But the delegates had already gathered. They barely had time to declare the union established and the constitution adopted when troops of Wu Pei-fu rushed into the meeting hall, killed a number of the delegates, and drove the others from the building.

In retaliation the workers called a general strike of twenty thousand railwaymen on February 4. The effectiveness of the strike was distressing to the authorities. A joint conference was therefore held of the Chinese militarists and the railway management, with the foreign consuls participating. After this conversation it was obvious that the decision arrived at was that the strike must be broken whatever the cost.

Wu Pei-fu went about his task with murderous ardour. Troops were dispatched to Changhsintin, and reinforced at Chengchow and Hankow. On February 7, as if in pursuance of a general order, the troops opened fire on crowds of strikers. More than sixty were killed. Hundreds were wounded, and thousands arrested. Workers refusing to return to work were beaten to death.

Though the strike ended in a defeat for the workers, it had serious consequences for Wu Pei-fu and his foreign sponsors. Wu's pose as a friend of the people was shattered. The workers throughout China were incensed against Wu and his backers. President Li Yuang-hung tried to soften the workers' anger by offering worthless legislative recognition of the

workers' right to organize. Fang Fu-an, in his book *Chinese Labour*,¹ says regarding the conclusion of the Hankow-Peking strike: "Although outwardly the strike was a failure, yet it made the government realize the growing strength of labour organizations."

Ultimately the strong popular resistance to Wu Pei-fu's strike-breaking deeds encouraged the militarist enemies of the Peking dictator to replace him.

One year after the massacre of the railroad strikers, on February 7, 1924, the Peking-Hankow railwaymen held their conference and formed a union with a membership of fifty thousand.

The Third Congress of the Communist Party, held in Canton in June 1923, six months before the opening of the first Congress of the Kuomintang, is unusually noteworthy. The Chinese proletariat had already unmistakably demonstrated its strength to China and to the foreign interests. Few doubted that the newly developed revolutionary class would be conspicuous in the forthcoming inevitable revolutionary events.

Therefore, the central question of the further development of China's struggle for national independence revolved around the Communist proposal to the Kuomintang for joint political action, more specifically, the establishment of a united front. Previously the Communist International, with the participation of Chinese Communists, had declared that the only important revolutionary group in China, outside of the Communist Party, was the Kuomintang. Unity with the Kuomintang, composed as it was of the liberal bourgeoisie, nationalist intellectuals, students, and certain strata of the workers, was considered by the Communist International as going a long way towards winning the majority of the Chi-

¹ Shanghai: Kelly & Walsh; 1930.

nese people for the liberation of the nation from semi-colonial bondage. And as this goal was a necessary preliminary to a Socialist solution of China's historical problems, the sooner such unity was achieved, the quicker the next stage of the revolution could be expected.

At the same time the Communist International cautioned the Chinese Communists that while supporting the Kuomintang in its national-revolutionary campaigns, the Communist Party should not lose its identity—should not merge with the Kuomintang and at all times should enter the united struggle under its own banner. This injunction is highly significant because a violation of it at the very initial stages of unity ultimately resulted in serious consequences in the armed battles for China's unification.

Both Right and Left opposition within the Communist Party disdained the united front with the Kuomintang, as proposed at the Third Communist Congress. The Lefts could not foresee the rise of the national liberation movement. They therefore minimized the need of unity with the Kuomintang. The Rights narrowly interpreted unity with the Kuomintang on a program of national liberation as an abandonment of Communism and the program of the Communist Party.

The Third Congress of the Communist Party of China accepted the tactics of anti-imperialist unity with the Kuomintang but failed to take heed of the Communist International's decisions concerning the indispensability of adopting an agrarian program, which, with Communist leadership, would satisfy the aspirations of the peasantry. In a document presented to the Third Congress in Canton, the Communist International emphasized the fact that the overwhelming majority of the Chinese people, the peasantry, would be swept

into the anti-imperialist upsurge, adding:

"The national revolution in China and the creation of an anti-imperialist front will necessarily be accompanied by an agrarian revolution of the peasantry against the survivals of feudalism. . . . The Communist Party, as the party of the working class, must therefore strive to establish an alliance between the workers and the peasants. This can be achieved only by unceasingly carrying on propaganda for and carrying out the slogans of the agrarian revolution, such as the confiscation of the land of the landlords, the monasteries, and churches and their distribution gratis among the peasants, the abolition of starvation rent, the abolition of the present system of taxation, the abolition of customs barriers between provinces (likin), the abolition of tax farming, the abolition of the mandarins, the establishment of peasant local government bodies. . . ." ¹

From 1920 until January 1924, when the first national Congress of the Kuomintang was convened, Dr. Sun Yat-sen conducted negotiations intermittently with representatives of the Soviet Union. Dr. Sun was early convinced that the only nation in the world pledged to assist China to achieve its national independence, the only country that desired a free and strong China, was Soviet Russia. When the discussions had reached a mature stage, Dr. Sun sent Chiang Kai-shek to Moscow to study the situation there. After a six months' stay in Soviet Russia, Chiang returned favourably impressed. Chiang, joined with Liao Chung-kai to support Dr. Sun's policy of collaboration with Communists against the resistance of Wang Ching-wei and Hu Han-min.

¹ P. Miff: *Heroic China* (New York: Workers Library Publishers; 1937).

After a preliminary process of reorganization which influenced the whole future structure of the Kuomintang, its First Congress was opened on January 20, 1924, at Canton, with 199 delegates present from 18 provinces, as well as from Manchuria, Mongolia, Tibet, and Turkestan and from Chinese overseas Kuomintang groups. After reorganization was formally adopted and a stirring manifesto approved, the most significant decision of this Congress was the declaration of co-operation with the Soviet Union, as the only country in the world anxious to see China a liberated nation; and the admission of Chinese Communists as members of the Kuomintang.

At the conclusion of the First Congress of the Kuomintang, Dr. Sun earnestly began to prepare for the unification of China on the basis of the Kuomintang-Communist agreement. To oust the corrupt militarists and to break the foreign grip on China, Dr. Sun decided to establish a military academy at Whampoa, near Canton, to train officers for the new army for national liberation. On the ground of his observations in Russia and because of his previous military training in Japan, Chiang Kai-shek was appointed director of the academy. The Soviet government, called on by Dr. Sun, as head of the Canton government, assisted in the establishment of Whampoa Military Academy, sending experienced military advisers to Canton.

It was not long after the formation of the united front with the Communists that agitation arose from the Right wing within the Kuomintang for a split with the "Reds." "Trouble was brewing inside the ranks of the party over the question of the Communist members, who, prominent in mass organizations, began to excite the jealousy of the older members," wrote Tang Leang-li, Kuomintang chronicler and biogra-

pher of Wang Ching-wei.¹ Dr. Sun lashed out vigorously against any such tendencies, recognizing in them imperialist influences on that strata of the Chinese bourgeoisie most closely associated in business with foreign corporations. The inner attacks against unity with the Communists encouraged more serious incidents from other enemies of the anti-imperialist movement. Rich merchants, assisted by influential British companies and encouraged by British authorities in Hong Kong, did not allow the movement to go unchallenged. Financed by the British Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank, Chen Lim-pak, comprador, organized a mercenary army, ostensibly for protection of merchants from "bandits" and strikers. This motley band of gangsters was officially known as the Merchants' Volunteer Corps. More popularly they were called the "paper tigers."

On August 10, 1924 a Norwegian steamer, the *Hav*, arrived at Canton loaded with ten thousand rifles and three million cartridges. The arms were consigned to the "paper tigers." Dr. Sun halted attempts to unload the arms. He ordered individuals responsible for trying to unload them apprehended. But Chen Lim-pak had already fled to Hong Kong where he was protected by the British police. Growing more audacious, the rich merchants organized economic sabotage, declared a general stoppage of business, and erected barricades in the Saikuan district. The British authorities made little secret of their intervention on the side of the merchants and Chen Lim-pak's "paper tigers." Dr. Sun was stunned by the British action, expecting a different attitude in view of the fact that the first Labour government ruled in London, with the Socialist Ramsay MacDonald as Premier.

¹ T'ang Leang-li: *Inner History of the Chinese Revolution* (New York: E. P. Dutton & Co.; 1930), p. 183.

Protesting against an insulting and threatening set of demands delivered by the British authorities in Hong Kong to the Canton government, Dr. Sun in a cable to Premier Ramsay MacDonald, on September 5, 1924, said that the commander of the British naval forces had issued a virtual ultimatum to the Canton government and that "the real aim of this ultimatum is the overthrow of my government."¹ In another cable sent by the Canton government to London, Dr. Sun stated: "Formerly the battle cry of the revolution was the overthrow of the Manchu dynasty. Henceforth, it will be the overthrow of foreign imperialism in China, whose intervention is the principal obstacle to the achievement of the historic mission of the Revolution."²

Meanwhile serious civil-war manoeuvres were taking place in the north of China. Dr. Sun left with southern armed forces to assist in ousting Wu Pei-fu, the Anglo-American puppet. Sun Yat-sen's departure was seen by the "paper tigers" as a good opportunity to show their strength. Their first provocative act was to open fire on a demonstration of students, workers, peasants, and store clerks. There were several hundred casualties. An extremely grave situation resulted, as the British authorities believed that the reactionaries in Canton could carry the day with the assistance of British gunboats. But the barbarous atrocities committed by the "paper tigers" turned the masses against them actively; and the government, though hampered by the absence of Dr. Sun, was able to win a telling victory over the reactionary army, thus temporarily allaying an adverse situation.

In the north Chang Tso-lin had taken up arms against Wu Pei-fu. Dr. Sun, who then considered Wu Pei-fu the most ob-

¹ *International Press Correspondence*, 1924, p. 715.

² T'ang Leang-li, *op. cit.*, p. 188.

noxious militarist, acted to assist in his overthrow. A former ally of Wu, Feng Yu-hsiang, the Christian General, deserted and joined with Chang Tso-lin and Tuan Chi-jui, and they successfully routed the Anglo-American war lord. Feng, who allowed himself to be used by the imperialists, nevertheless had a strong nationalist instinct. His participation in the struggle against Wu held out hope of a conference of north and south to bring about an agreement leading to some measures of national unification. Wu was driven to Hankow. Feng controlled Peking.

With the defeat of Wu, Tuan Chi-jui, who was installed as President of the Republic by Feng, proposed to Dr. Sun that a national conference take place for the "rehabilitation" of the country. Dr. Sun accepted the invitation of Tuan and Feng. In a statement issued before his departure for the north, Dr. Sun stated that his aims were to further the fight against imperialism and militarism, the twin scourges of China, and to complete the revolution of 1911. He added that he would make a proposal for the convening of a national assembly. To prepare for such an assembly, he urged the northern generals to agree to the calling of a preliminary conference to comprise representatives of trade unions, peasants, Chinese business and commercial groups, teachers, students, and delegates from the army. One condition of such a preliminary conference, Dr. Sun said, would be general amnesty for all political prisoners.

Dr. Sun's optimism over the possibility of progressive achievements from a conference with the militarists was unwarranted. While he was on his way to Peking a rift occurred between Feng Yu-hsiang and Chang Tso-lin. On his arrival in Tientsin, on December 4, 1924, Dr. Sun became seriously ill. He remained under a doctor's care for nearly a month.

Nevertheless he continued to press his proposal for a national assembly. On December 31 he left for Peking. When he arrived, his condition required hospital treatment. On January 26, 1925 he went to the Peking Medical Union Hospital. An immediate operation was considered necessary. The operation disclosed that Dr. Sun had long been suffering from an incurable form of cancer of the liver. His death sentence was pronounced by the doctors. The impending death of China's George Washington was a severe shock to all progressive forces in China.

Seventeen days before his death Dr. Sun, on February 24, signed a political testament in which he declared to all Kuo-mintang members:

"For forty years I have devoted myself to the cause of the People's Revolution, whose aim is to win for China national liberty and international equality. From the gathered experience of these forty years I have come to the realization that the only way to attain this object is by awakening the masses of the people and by joining hands with those nations in the world that treat us as equals in our struggle for the common cause. The Revolution is as yet unfinished. I thus exhort the comrades in the party to continue, until victory is attained, the fight for the realization of our goal, in accordance with the Plans for National Reconstruction, the Program of National Reconstruction, the Three Principles of the People, and the Manifesto of the First National Congress. Especially my reasoned designs for the convening of a National People's Assembly, and for the abolition of the unequal treaties, should be fulfilled within the shortest possible time. This is my last will."¹

While on his death-bed, Dr. Sun addressed the following

¹ T'ang Leang-li, *op. cit.*, p. 196.

letter to the Central Executive Committee of the Soviet government:

Dear Comrades: While I am here laid low by a sickness against which human skill is helpless, my thoughts are turned to you and to the fate of my country. You are at the head of a union of free republics—the heritage which the immortal Lenin bequeathed to the oppressed peoples. With the aid of this heritage the victims of imperialism will inevitably achieve their liberation from the international system which since ancient times has been rooted in slavery, wars and injustice. I am leaving behind me a party which, as I have always hoped, will be connected with you in the historic work of finally emancipating China and other exploited countries from this imperialist system.

By the will of fate I must leave my work unfinished and pass it on to those who by remaining true to the principles and doctrines of the party will be my true successors. This is why I command the Kuomintang to continue the national liberation movement until China is completely liberated. With that end in view I have instructed the party to keep in constant contact with you. I firmly believe that the assistance which you have rendered my country up to now will remain constant. In bidding you farewell, dear comrades, I express the hope that the day is near when the U.S.S.R. will welcome mighty and free China as a friend and ally, and that in the great struggles for the liberation of the oppressed peoples of the world both allies will march side by side to victory.

With fraternal greetings,

SUN YAT-SEN¹

¹ P. Miff, op. cit., pp. 28-9.

On March 12, 1925 Dr. Sun died. The death of this great Chinese revolutionist was an incalculable loss to China, for Dr. Sun's life was cut short on the very eve of a momentous revolutionary upsurge.

CHAPTER V

Anti-Imperialist Upsurge

"HUMAN life is the cheapest thing in Asia. . . . Therefore, it came as a distinct shock to most foreigners . . . when students so suddenly flared up to support the labourers in their struggle against what they considered to be improper conditions."¹

Thus exclaimed the organ of the American "open-door" advocates in China when faced by the great strike wave of 1925. An aroused people demanding improved conditions for coolie labour and liberation for oppressed China was "a distinct shock."

To the imperialist in China the elemental events of 1925, which rattled the chains of foreign domination, came as a total surprise. The myriads of silent yellow slaves who worked twelve to eighteen hours a day without a murmur, who lived constantly on the border of starvation without apparent protest, who died at a rate three times above that of European workers, as if suddenly run politically amuck, confronted the

¹ *China Weekly Review*, August 1, 1925.

foreign invaders with the spectre of 450,000,000 people standing erect.

May 30, 1925 will always be a nightmare to the foreign dominators of China, as it will persist as an inspiration for ultimate liberation of the Chinese people.

The events of 1925, which inaugurated a whole revolutionary epoch in China, occurred in a setting of temporary stabilization of world capitalism after its post-war crisis. The improvement in the economic position of the powers contending for commercial and colonial hegemony in China laid the groundwork for more intensive conflict over world markets and for the redivision of colonies. At the same time economic reconstruction had begun in the Soviet Union as a preface to the rapid development of Socialism, resulting in the political strengthening of the U.S.S.R.

Furthermore, the crest of the revolutionary wave had passed from Europe to the Near and Far East. The workers of Europe, after many post-war class battles, were for the moment quiescent. In the colonial and semi-colonial countries revolutionary outbreaks were just beginning. In 1925 there was a rebellion in Morocco, an uprising in Syria, and the great anti-imperialist upsurge in China.

The accumulation of age-old grievances, the longing for national independence, the annoyance of the unequal treaties, the persistence of militarist wars, were the general conditions in China within which the events of May 30 flared up. The crisis in the textile industry, with the misery and havoc it brought to the most numerous of the Chinese proletariat, was the fuse.

During the World War the growth of the Chinese native industrial bourgeoisie was especially expedited by disrupted

imports. By 1920 Chinese capital accounted for half of the investments in Chinese cotton mills. But the over-expansion of the war days resulted in the most severe competition in the post-war period, to the special disadvantage of the Chinese mill-owners.¹ Many Chinese industrialists went bankrupt, particularly in competition with Japanese mills. After the 1923 earthquake the Japanese trusts found it more profitable to rebuild textile mills in China, where cheap labour and materials, low taxes and tariffs returned fabulous profits. The general crisis brought about by the building of relatively too many plants, moreover, was met by lowering of wages. Textile employers, particularly the Japanese, resorted to the wholesale substitution of cheaper labour of women and children for that of men. Upon the protest of the discharged men, the Japanese overseers retorted with savage whippings.

On February 10, 1925 a strike of forty thousand workers took place in the fourteen mills of the Naiga Wata Kaisha, a Japanese-owned textile company. Starting as a demand for the satisfaction of economic grievances, this walk-out became a political event of world significance and a prelude to military action for the unification of China.

The textile workers demanded: (1) an end to the brutality of the Japanese overseers; (2) ten-per-cent wage increase for all workers; (3) reinstatement of those dismissed; (4) wages to be paid twice monthly; (5) arrears in wages to be paid; (6) no worker to be dismissed without just cause; (7) wages to be paid for duration of the strike.

After two weeks of struggle the workers won substantial compliance with their demands. The Japanese employers, however, had no intention of carrying out their promises,

¹ Bulletins, British Chamber of Commerce, 1923-4.

looking upon the settlement as clever strategy to break the strike.

Although the death of Dr. Sun Yat-sen had inspired the militarists with reactionary hopes, the political situation among the war lords was generally favourable to the rise of labour struggles and an anti-imperialist upsurge. After the death of Sun Yat-sen, Chen Chiung-ming, southern feudal war lord, sounded out Tuan Chi-jui in Peking on the question of joint action. The militarists manœuvred in Canton to make the most out of Sun's death. A plan was worked out to capture Canton and oust the Kuomintang government. The enemies of Kuomintang-Communist unity raised the slogan: "Support the San Min Chu-I.¹ Down with the Bolsheviks!" Yang Hsi-min, Yunnanese war lord, and Liu Chen-huan, Kwangsi militarist, had the support of those within the Kuomintang who had resisted the reorganization program; and, what is more important, they had the blessing of the British authorities at Hong Kong. But the events which led to Dr. Sun's fateful Peking trip to negotiate for the calling of a national assembly continued to be favourable for the development of industrial strikes and the rise of the national liberation movement. The ruthless suppression under Wu Pei-fu gave way to the bickerings of the war lords Tuan Chi-jui, Chang Tso-lin, Feng Yu-hsiang, and Sun Chuan-fang.

Following the Shanghai textile strike, workers in a Japanese mill at Tsingtao walked out. Silk workers in Canton struck and in Hankow ten thousand women workers went out on strike. In nearly each instance one of the demands was directed against the brutality of the foreign overseers.

When, after the wanton shooting of strikers and the destruction of their organizations, the workers were driven back

¹ Dr. Sun's Three Principles of the People.

to work—sometimes through trickery, as in the Japanese mill in Shanghai—the employers thought that the storm of strikes had subsided; that the Chinese proletariat had been subdued, as the nation had been since 1842, by the judicious application of the sword. As one of the most able publicists of British imperialism in China, Putnam Weale, expressed it after the shock of the events of May 30: "Inactivity is the bed-rock of the nation. . . . By inactivity is meant the sort of spiritual apathy which springs from unvarying conditions. Chinese life moves with a massive rhythm in such strict accordance with the seasons." ¹

Incensed at being duped, the workers of the Naiga Wata Kaisha mills, this time assisted by the more articulate students, began to protest. The workers and students decided to join forces especially to protest against the murder of the textile worker Ku Chen-hun, a Communist, by a foreman in a British-owned mill. The support of the students expressed the wide nature of the discontent in China. The struggle embraced almost every stratum of the population, including also the Chinese cotton-mill owners who were suffering from Japanese competition, and the great mass of the Chinese petty bourgeoisie, intellectuals, small merchants, and others who suffered impoverishment and indignities at the hands of foreign powers.

In the forenoon of the fateful day of May 30, 1925, several arrested students had been remanded by the Japanese assessor Tajima and the Chinese magistrate Loh to a mixed court in Shanghai. To protest these arrests and the frightful conditions of the textile mills the students of a majority of the Shanghai schools organized a procession that marched peace-

¹ Putnam Weale: *Why China Sees Red* (New York: Dodd, Mead & Co.; 1925), p. 96.

fully through the streets of Shanghai. At 1.55 p.m. students at various points on Nanking Road were making speeches denouncing imperialism. Most of the orations were anti-Japanese.¹ Under the direction of the British Police Inspector Everson, the police proceeded to break up the meetings and arrest the students. With each arrest the crowd in front of the Louza police headquarters began to enlarge. The Louza police station is situated on Nanking Road, in the centre of the Shanghai business district. A crowd of many thousands soon gathered to join the protesting students. Without warning, as the testimony in the case later revealed, the police fired into the crowd, killing nine Chinese and wounding scores.

The effect of this massacre on the minds of the Chinese was most succinctly stated by the All-China Federation of Trade Unions, which declared: "The events in Shanghai have illuminated the situation in China like a flash of lightning. Everything has become clear. Everybody—in China and outside—has seen the real face of imperialism, the face of a fiend and an assassin."² The forty-four shots, each of which struck a human target on Nanking Road "ushered in a period which will never see China the same," wailed the die-hard foreigners. "The police officer standing at the gates of his police station," wrote Putnam Weale, "and doing what his instructions laid down in case of dire extremity, shooting to kill, was a symbol of something that could trace its descent directly to the pre-Treaty days. [That is, before the Opium Wars were settled by the Treaty of 1842.] His error, if there ^{was} was one, was the error of an order that has not yet been adjusted to vast changes."

¹ *China Weekly Review*, June 13, 1925.

² P. Miff, op. cit., p. 31.

The struggle which had begun as a textile strike for economic demands, and which led to a protest against injustice and brutality, ultimately became the greatest political event for the liberation of China from the yoke of foreign domination. The shooting of the Chinese students and workers was mourned in every Chinese home that heard of it as though the loss were of their own sons. Indignation mounted. The students and the workers persuaded the shopkeepers to join all the workers of Shanghai in a general political protest strike. On June 2 there were more excited meetings, which were answered with increased savagery. The Shanghai Volunteer Corps, an aggregation of Russian White Guards, and employees in foreign business houses armed for special riot service were mobilized. Martial law was declared by the British-dominated Shanghai Municipal Council. More marines were landed, and some thirty foreign war vessels gathered in the Whangpoo off the Shanghai bund for "moral" effect.

On the part of the Chinese the killings were answered by more effective strikes. The street-car men walked out; the wharf coolies joined the strikers; printers, telephone workers, mechanics followed. The electric power plants and the waterworks were kept going by foreign volunteers or by troops who at the point of bayonets kept the Chinese at work. More than 150,000 workers were already participating. Chinese banks shut their doors. The port of Shanghai was paralysed. Forty-three steamships were tied up with their cargoes in their holds. Messages were frantically sent to ships at sea not to make for Shanghai but to unload at some other port. Hotel workers and domestic servants walked out.

Other cities joined in the protest. The movement was be-

coming national. Students and workers demonstrated against the imperialists in Nanking, Kaifeng, Hong Kong, Canton, Peking, Chunkiang, Hankow, Amoy, Tientsin, and Kiu-kiang. In many of these demonstrations the foreign soldiers and police added to the total of Chinese slain.

The United Committee, formed on June 5 to lead the strike, representing students, workers, and the middle class, called for a monster demonstration in the native city of Shanghai. More than a hundred thousand gathered. There, under the co-ordinated leadership of the Chinese anti-imperialist organizations, resolutions were adopted amid a storm of oratory, stating the conditions for the end of the strike. These included: dismissal and punishment of the guilty police; appointment of an impartial investigating commission; pensions to the families of the slain Chinese; replacement of the British and Japanese consuls in Shanghai, and dismissal of the head of the Shanghai Municipal Council; liberation of those arrested in connection with the events of May 30 and the general strike; apologies from the Japanese and British governments to the Chinese government, and of the British counsel to the Shanghai authorities. By this time more than 500,000 people in Shanghai were participating in the strike, of which some 220,000 were workers.

The workers took this occasion to consolidate their trade unions. More than seventy-two separate unions were formed in the early part of the general strike. A Shanghai Trades Council was created.

Though the Shanghai general strike was to last more than three months, and its effects were to be felt for another sixteen months in the events which followed in Hong Kong and Canton, it had already reached its high point by the middle of June. First the Chinese business men began to

desert. They were losing money. The pressure of foreign competition was great. On June 19 the Chinese Chamber of Commerce voted to call off the strike. By June 26 the Chinese banks had opened and general business began to resume its course. But the seamen's strike was still growing stronger. The proletariat kept up its fight, assisted by the students.

When the wealthiest members of the Chinese bourgeoisie in Shanghai deserted the strike, the Chinese militarists began to send troops against the strikers, even though in the earlier part of the strike they had contributed to the relief funds, so overwhelming was popular support for the anti-imperialist action begun by the workers. The Japanese cotton-mill owners offered conciliation to the workers and satisfaction of some of their demands. By September, work had been resumed in the Japanese mills, and one month later the workers returned to the British mills.

On June 18 the Shanghai strike, which had hit the prestige of the British hardest because of their predominant positions in the Municipal Council of the International Settlement, was reinforced by solidarity action of tens of thousands of workers in the British Crown Colony of Hong Kong.

When the British were apprised that on June 23 in Canton a mass meeting and a parade were planned, the latter to pass by the foreign concession, the British Consul General and naval authorities at Canton prepared for bloodshed. While the attitude of the British in Shanghai was imperious, in the area of Hong Kong and Canton it was nothing less than vicious. The strike which had started as an anti-Japanese manifestation evolved into an anti-imperialist action primarily in those industrial and commercial sections in which the British were dominant.

On June 21, on orders of the Hong Kong authorities, Commander Scott landed two Lewis-gun detachments on the small island of Shameen, the Anglo-French concession, separated from the Canton bund by the narrow Shakai creek.¹ The British Consul General at Canton, Sir James Jamieson, made a thinly concealed threat to Mr. C. C. Wu, Foreign Secretary of the Kwantung government, that the anti-imperialist demonstration in sympathy with Shanghai be called off or murder would be committed. The Consul General declared to Mr. Wu: "The blood of those who call upon crowd psychology to commit deeds of violence will be on their own heads. . . . I write in this serious strain so that it might not be said hereafter that brutal imperialist rifles wantonly massacred unoffending Chinese youth."²

In the early afternoon of June 23 an outdoor mass meeting attended by tens of thousands was held in the East Parade Ground of Canton to protest the killings in the May 30 incident at Shanghai. Later a procession was formed which marched through the streets with banners and flags flying. At about 2.30 p.m. the procession, admittedly in orderly formation, began to approach the bund opposite Shameen Island. In the van were the trade unionists; next came the peasants. Three quarters of the parade had passed by peacefully. Then came young students, girls and boys, followed by unarmed soldiers and cadets of the Whampoa Military Academy. When they arrived near the West Bridge which connects the mainland with the British concession Shameen, the sound of rifle fire pierced the air. Girls and boys fell to the ground killed and wounded. Panic gripped the

¹ British Foreign Office: Papers respecting the first firing in the Shameen affair of June 23, 1925. C.m.d. 26 36, p. 4.

² Ibid.

paraders. In their haste to disperse they stumbled over one another. Then machine-gun fire was directed at them. Scores fell mortally wounded. The French soldiers on Shameen, hearing the gunfire, joined with the British in peppering the demonstrators. When the smoke had cleared away, 52 Chinese lay dead along the bund, and 117 were wounded. Though Sir James Jamieson later said "several had been wounded" on Shameen he resisted all attempts at official inquiry, declaring he would not let anyone contradict what he had seen with his own eyes.

Instead of cowing the Chinese, the British action kindled new indignation. One of the most impressive strikes in all labour history then took place. In Hong Kong more than two hundred thousand Chinese quit work. Nearly the entire labouring population of the British-ruled city evacuated the place and went to Canton. In the leadership of the Hong Kong strike were outstanding Communists such as Su Chao-jen, Teng Chung-hsia, Hsian Ying, and Lo Teng-hsian. Hong Kong, usually a bustling metropolis, was like a city of the dead. Not only was the strike a severe blow to the prestige of the British, but they feared that the persistent efforts of the Chinese to make Canton the successful rival of Hong Kong might be seriously advanced.

The strike lasted for fifteen months, one of the longest in history. The special strike committee organized to conduct the distribution of the strikers on the Kwantung mainland, employment and relief of the workers in Canton and surrounding places, was the germ of the future Chinese Soviets. This strike committee was the elected executive organ of the delegate meeting, and had the following departments and institutions attached to it: (1) department of propaganda and education; (2) department for new rules and laws; (3)

construction Committee; (4) tribunal for judging strike-breakers (composed of five members elected at a delegate meeting, with a special prison in which these strike-breakers were incarcerated); (5) stores for confiscated articles; (6) a workers' guard; (7) hotel and dining-rooms. As part of the strike movement in Shanghai, Hong Kong, Canton, and elsewhere, an effective boycott was conducted against the British, then considered the chief culprit.

In December 1925 the Shanghai Municipal Council granted \$75,000 (Chinese) as compensation to the families of some of the students and labourers killed, and tried further to pacify the Chinese by accepting the resignation of a few of the police officers responsible for the slaughter of May 30. On the whole, however, the general strike movement was not and could not at that stage be a complete success, though the workers had raised the struggle for China's liberation to new heights. Allied with them were students and the urban petty bourgeoisie. But the peasantry had not been drawn actively into the struggle. And the Chinese feudal militarists were still too strong to be overwhelmed. The gains, however, were tremendous. Economic improvements were won. The trade-union movement was stronger. Imperialist prestige had been greatly impaired. And, above all, the proletariat had shown its revolutionary might, its audacity and qualities of leadership.

Here one must take stock briefly of the nature of the anti-imperialist struggle of 1925 in relation to the later anti-Japanese movement, after the seizure of Manchuria. The British in 1925 suspected that the Japanese, though at times targets of the anti-imperialist upsurge, deliberately refused to come into a head-on collision with the Chinese people. The British suspected that their former ally was gaining at

Britain's expense. The Japanese, they feared, were taking a long-range view envisaging the maturing of a comprehensive scheme of conquest in China—that if the British hold was weakened, Japan's dreams of hegemony in the Far East would be nearer realization. The Tokyo schemers saw, after 1925, not a united China, but a weakened British rival. And even as early as 1925, Putnam Weale, who publicized what his official administrative friends thought, taunted the Japanese for their passivity, by saying:

"The Japanese know with the Chinese that Britain is the most rock-like of all foreign powers, and so long as her determination to stand firm in China remains unaffected, the world may rage and roar but nothing will be changed. In other words, Japan recognizes that England still possesses the premier position which no one can take from her unless the ground is deliberately cut from under her feet. Inasmuch as Japanese trade and shipping aspire to that place there is an obvious moral. In the bitter struggle for existence among nations, no consideration can be all-powerful excepting the promotion of one's own interests. Japan, which in the final period of the World War came within an ace of displacing England in China, just failed to pull ahead. . . . It is necessary to repeat: Japanese policy has not radically changed but is more carefully masked to meet the new conditions"¹

The crushing boycott of 1925 gave United States trade an opportunity to forge ahead, and Japan bided its time until the rotten-ripe opportunity of 1931, to be partly prepared by inner conflict of the anti-imperialist forces of China and by the approaching world economic crisis.

Meanwhile China was facing the next stage in its march to liberty—the northern campaign for national unification.

¹ Putnam Weale, *op. cit.*, pp. 153-4, 165-6.

1925-1927—First Stages of Unity

KUOMINTANG-COMMUNIST unity was first achieved during 1925-7. After reaching an unprecedented high point in effective anti-imperialist battles, unity was violently ruptured, but not without the foundation being laid for its re-establishment on an entirely different plane and for a more specific objective. The beginnings of the destruction of the original national collaborations were already discernible in 1926, at the very first stages of preparation for the military campaign for national unification. And yet the seeds of a newer, stronger understanding were undoubtedly sown in the very split which concluded the first stage of Kuomintang-Communist unity in the latter part of 1927.

To trace the dynamic events of 1925-7 as a period complete in itself, without connection with previous and especially subsequent anti-imperialist campaigns, would lead to serious distortions of the perspectives of the Chinese people in their struggle for national liberation. Therefore, in endeavouring to evaluate the pivotal developments of the years 1925-7, one must read Chinese history not only of

that period alone, but backwards and forwards as well, particularly in the light of the later life-and-death need of national unity against Japan.

With this important historical note in mind, we set out to examine the momentous revolutionary events beginning on the eve of the northward expedition and ending with the suppression of the Canton Commune.

After the strikes of 1925 there was a brief lull in the revolutionary storm. This calm before a new and more turbulent anti-imperialist outbreak coincided with a revival of concerted efforts to crush the revolutionary organizations. With the help of the foreign powers the Chinese war lords, to preserve their positions, entered into a series of counter-revolutionary offensives.

The Shantung militarist Chang Chung-chang occupied Shanghai, and the trade unions were suppressed. In the north the British had entered into a working arrangement with Japan to subdue for the moment, if possible, the cross-purposes of the puppet Chinese militarists, for more energetic centralized efforts against all revolutionary groups. As the initial outcome of such an understanding, Chang Tso-lin, assisted by Japanese troops disguised in Chinese uniforms, attacked the rebellious detachments of Kuo Sun-lin, one of the Fengtien subordinate generals who had risen against the absolute power of the northern war lord. Kuo Sun-lin's army was decisively beaten and he was executed.

To carry the reactionary alliance further, Chang Tso-lin, Japanese agent, and Wu Pei-fu, acting for the British, merged forces against the "Reds." Both were amply supplied with money, arms, Russian White Guards, and, on occasion, Japanese troops. The most important victim of the militarist alliance was Feng Yu-hsiang, who as head of the 1st People's

army in the north had been negotiating with the Kuomintang. Feng, under threat of civil war, was forced to withdraw his troops from Peking and Tientsin. He finally marched out of Kalgan, retreating to the comparative safety and isolation of Inner Mongolia. As a result of these shifts, Wu Pei-fu was able to extend his rule to important territories of central China, within British and American spheres of influence.

In South China the imperialist-militarist plans were not so promising. Chen Chiung-ming, the Kwantung war lord, armed by and in the service of Britain, did capture Swatow at the head of a so-called anti-Red army. Yet despite British money and munitions Chen Chiung-ming failed of his most important objective, the destruction of the revolutionary centre at Canton.

Concomitant with the anti-Red campaign of the militarists, the extreme Right wing of the Kuomintang and its supporters initiated an energetic though generally covert opposition to the Communists and to Left Kuomintang members. The Rights represented the Chinese comprador bourgeoisie, the social stratum that formed the solidest link with the foreign imperialists.

At the instigation of the reactionary newspaper *Kuo-Min Hsin-Wei*, owned and edited by Hu I-sheng, brother of the inconstant though able Hu Han-min, Liao Chung-kai, the indefatigable revolutionary Kuomintang leader, was assassinated in the latter part of August 1925. In the eyes of the Right wing, Liao's most unpardonable crime was his ardent advocacy of a firmer common front with the Communists, and his dominant influence in bringing Wang Ching-wei and Chiang Kai-shek to his point of view.

When the Right wing saw the successful advance of Kuomintang-Communist unity, it was decided to supple-

ment agitation with organizational measures. Beginning on November 3 and lasting for fifteen days a conference was held in the Temple of the Western Hills near Peking by a Right-wing group. They constituted themselves a rival Central Committee of the Kuomintang. Their most vehement charge against the Kuomintang at Canton was that it had become completely "bolshevized" and that it had stooped so low as to rely for its authority on the masses of the Chinese people. The Western Hills group called for the immediate expulsion of the Communists from the Kuomintang, demanding as well the ousting of Chiang Kai-shek and Wang Ching-wei, because they were then considered to be allies of the Communists.

The temper of the Chinese people at that time could be gauged by the fact that the Western Hills group, to popularize their program, had to camouflage their reactionary designs with fervent protestations of their opposition to imperialist and militarist rule in China. Nevertheless, under the folds of the "anti-imperialist" banner of the Western Hills conference there could be distinguished the manipulating hand of the Japanese imperialists. The Right-wingers met under the protection of Tuan Chi-jui, Japan's most reliable political agent, then the nominal ruler of Peking.

After the Second Congress of the Kuomintang, held in January 1926, the Right opposition continued stubbornly to resist the agrarian demands put forward by the Communists for the purpose of winning the poor peasants behind the anti-imperialist campaign. The majority of the Kuomintang Military Council at Canton, as well as the members of the Whampoa Military Academy and the bulk of the soldiers of the six armies under the control of the Kuomintang, fa-

voured most of the Communist proposals.¹

As a result of the Shanghai, Hong Kong, and Canton strikes the reactionaries made no secret of their fear of Communist influence among the Chinese workers and peasants. Subsequent to the Second Kuomintang Congress the struggle had become very sharp between the Rights and the Lefts, the latter allied with the Communists. The Rights concentrated their intrigues in the important military centre of Canton, the Whampoa Military Academy, whose head was Chiang Kai-shek. The Whampoa cadets were then politically united in the Sun Yat-sen Society. Under Rightist pressure, the Communists and their close sympathizers were expelled from the society. They thereupon formed another organization, called the Union of Military Youth. The incipient split then spread to the army.

The Rights persistently broadcast rumours that the Communists were going to lead a coup against Chiang Kai-shek, and that Wang Ching-wei was allied with them in this plot. Chiang Kai-shek, influenced by the fabricated reports, tried to restrict the activities of the Union of Military Youth; and when this failed, on March 20, 1926 he abruptly dismissed Wang Ching-wei along with other Lefts and Communists. He arrested some of the Russian political and military advisers in Canton. Michael Borodin, chief adviser to the Canton Kuomintang government, had gone to Peking to discuss possible joint action between the southern Canton army and Feng Yu-hsiang.

When they heard of the rift of March 20, the Western Hills faction sent congratulatory telegrams to Chiang Kai-shek. But realizing that his coup at that time could not

¹ Tang Leang-li, *op. cit.*, p. 242.

succeed, Chiang decided to continue the appearance of unity, at least for the time being. On April 3 he issued a manifesto confounding the opponents of unity, declaring that anti-imperialist collaboration with the Communists would persist. And on April 16 he made a speech before the cadets at the Whampoa Military Academy professing the inseparable connection between national liberation and the emancipation of the workers in the imperialist countries.

Evaluating the attempted coup of March 20, Joseph Stalin declared: "Chiang Kai-shek's attempt of March 1926 to drive the Communists out of the Kuomintang was the first serious attempt on the part of the national bourgeoisie to bridle the revolution."¹

However, overcoming the first plots to split the anti-imperialist front, the Kuomintang, together with the Communists, in the late spring of 1926 busied itself in perfecting plans for a comprehensive military campaign to unite China by force of arms. Neither the foreign powers nor the Chinese militarists paid serious heed to the publicly proclaimed plan of the military drive. The armed forces at the command of the Kuomintang were variously estimated at between 200,000 and 400,000. And these nationalist troops were considered no match for the more numerous and superior-trained soldiers under the command of the feudal militarist allies of imperialism.

Chiang Kai-shek was appointed commander-in-chief of the Kuominchun, as the People's army was called, for the duration of the northward expedition. A number of generals were placed at the head of the various separate armies, though many of them had come over to the side of the Kuomintang from the camp of the old militarists. Some

¹ P. Miff, *op. cit.*, p. 35.

proved faithful unto death, while others required very little bribing ultimately to return to their previous posts.

Despite all shortcomings, the northward expedition demonstrated, as never before, the military genius of the Chinese people when fighting for unification and the liberation of their country. The war lords and the foreign envoys had unanimously scoffed at the prospect of such an expedition succeeding. The greater was their astonishment at its rapid successes.

Dr. H. O. Chapman, admitting his imperialist views, in his book, *The Chinese Revolution, 1925-1927*, written on the basis of his personal observations at Hankow, expressed the general amazement of the foreigners when the northward expedition swept all obstacles before it. Impressed by the new elements of the military campaign, Dr. Chapman exclaimed: "It quickly became very evident that what we were watching was a process and a method in no way resembling any of the fighting of any wars in China of the last few years, or, indeed, anything that had taken place in China since the dim beginnings of its ancient history."¹

The first drive of the campaign was directed against the armies of Wu Pei-fu. That engagement was as short as it was decisive. By October 10, 1926 the important industrial cities forming the "Y" of Wuhan were captured, adding new millions of proletarians to the anti-imperialist upsurge. The provinces of Hunan and Hupeh had joined the Kuo-mintang, supplying more troops, particularly armed peasant detachments. Though later Leon Trotsky, in his vendetta against the Soviet Union and particularly Joseph Stalin, accused the Communist International of belittling the role of the workers and peasants in the revolutionary events of

¹ p. 19.

1925-7, we find that Dr. Chapman, no friend of Communism, made the following observation:

"A study of the files of this paper [the *People's Tribune*, issued at Hankow] revealed a tremendous emphasis on the importance of two classes, of 'workers' and 'peasants,' as the foundation on which the revolution was built. . . . Even the foreign visiting delegates from the extreme left wing of their respective national labor parties, Tom Mann of England, Jacques Doriot ¹ from France, and Earl Browder from the United States of America, in their triumphal and enthusiastic two-months' lecture tour under the auspices of the Nationalist government, urged the same policy." ²

A rapid glimpse at the sweep of the armies in the northward expedition, particularly the propagandistic and organizational measures that followed its advance, is given by an anonymous Chinese correspondent, one of the thousands of Communists who accompanied the army and organized the workers and peasants in the train of the military campaign, initiating strikes for better conditions and struggles for the seizure of the land. In the heat of battle he thus describes the taking of Hanyang and Hankow, two of the Wuhan cities:

"Yesterday the advance guard of our army captured Hanyang, which contains the biggest arsenal in China. Today the revolutionary troops have already marched into Hankow. The population of these towns, particularly the workers, students, and small traders, received us with great

¹ Jacques Doriot was expelled in 1935 from the Communist Party of France for opposing the united front with the Socialists, and the People's Front. Once out of the Communist Party and pursuing essentially a Trotskyist policy, Doriot soon became an outright Fascist.

² H. O. Chapman, *op. cit.*, p. 26.

rejoicing. Everywhere leaflets and posters, conveying a hearty welcome, were distributed by the workers and peasants. On our entry the population crowded to the windows and roofs. Shouts of joy greeted us. The sound of music was heard everywhere. Groups of speakers from the political department of the army proceeded immediately to the public places, to all the temples and all the street-corners and delivered propaganda speeches. Great placards were posted on the houses bearing the inscription: 'The victory of the revolutionary troops means the victory of the revolutionary population!' 'Down with Wu Pei-fu!' 'Down with the Imperialists!'

"Tomorrow or the day after the workers' and peasants' organizations will arrange a liberation festival.

"Now a few words regarding the fights which preceded the victory! On August 27 we took possession of the fortress at Chensetchow (in Hupeh province), an important railway junction between Hupeh, Hunan and Kiangsi provinces. A ferociously bloody battle was fought here. More than 2,800 killed and wounded were left lying in the field. Wu Pei-fu received a bullet wound in the breast from his own fleeing troops. In his fury at the troops who were running away, Wu Pei-fu himself shot several high officers. Thereupon whole companies deserted him; and he found himself compelled to flee to Hankow."¹

Gravely shaken by the annihilating defeat of Wu Pei-fu, General Sun Chuan-fang, the self-styled overlord of the five provinces (Kiangsi, Kiangsu, Fukien, Anwei, and Chekiang), hastily entered into an alliance with the retreating Wu Pei-fu to ward off the menace of the advancing north-

¹ Correspondence from Hanyang, September 7, 1926, *International Press Correspondence*, 1926, p. 1084.

ward expedition. Sun's armed forces were formidable indeed. Nevertheless this belated military merger could only temporarily stave off the momentum of the northward drive.

By November 8, 1926 the entire province of Kiangsi was in the hands of the Kuomintang armies. Fukien province was completely invaded by December. Though Sun Chuan-fang's armies put up a terrific battle in the province of Chekiang, by the middle of February, this gateway to Shanghai was also captured by the victorious northward expedition. The very scope of the military successes, because particularly it served to arouse the entire Chinese population and inspire them with hope, and because, more than anything else, it won the workers and peasants, alarmed the extreme Right of the Chinese bourgeoisie.

The Communist Party, though not more than five years old, still poorly organized, burdened with opportunist leadership, showed its mettle in the northward expedition. The same Dr. Chapman we quoted before was most impressively struck by the ability and self-devotion of the Communists to the anti-imperialist revolution. "No characteristic of the disciples of Communism," he wrote, "is more extraordinary than their unwavering faith and their indomitable courage and enthusiasm."¹

In November 1926, soon after Hankow was taken, a central government was established in the Wuhan cities, in conformity with the decision of the Central Committee of the Kuomintang. Representing the Kuomintang Central Committee and co-operating with the Communists in the Wuhan government were Sun Fo, Hsu Chien, T. V. Soong, and Eugene Chen. The setting up of the Wuhan government gave impetus to the organization of the peasants and to the growth of

¹ H. O. Chapman, *op. cit.*, p. 245.

the trade unions. Hupeh province offers an example of the rise of the peasant movement. In March 1926 there were 800,000 organized peasants in Hupeh, and by May the number had risen to 2,000,000. Numerous strikes broke out in the wake of the expedition. The peasant leagues with more than 10,000,000 members began to contest for the land, to put an end to feudal oppression.

The foreign diplomats in China could hardly conceal their fury over the success of the northward expedition. The anti-imperialist mass movement, often spontaneous, swept away the British concessions in Hankow and Kiukiang. Especially the "Old China Hands" were beside themselves with anger over their "loss of face."

In September 1926, British gunboats at Wanh sien, on the pretext that a local war lord had detained several British freighters, bombarded the city, killing 360 Chinese, most of them women and children. The city of Canton was blockaded by a British squadron. After the nationalist armies captured Nanking, in March 1927, this future capital of China was gutted by a heavy bombardment of foreign warships.

The establishment of the Wuhan government, the extensive scope of the movement of the workers and peasants, the fact that the military victories were won largely by subordinate commanders and in many instances officers adhering to the Communist Party, served to foster Chiang Kai-shek's flirtation with the imperialists. Chiang had already begun to heed the appeals of the extreme Right of the nationalist bourgeoisie, who, for the time being, felt that their interests were on the side of the oppressors of China. The action of the Rights in the Kuomintang and outside, now backed by Chiang Kai-shek, served to divide China into two internecine camps with two opposing governments. The divisive process

was started in the very base of the revolution, at Canton, with the instigation of sanguinary splits among the workers. In Canton, at the behest of Chiang Kai-shek, Li Chi-sen, a militarist, provoked a riot between the so-called Mechanics' Union and the railroad workers' trade union in April 1927. The Mechanics' Union was a union organized on ancient guild lines with employers and workers united in one body. By means apparently of a jurisdictional dispute between the Mechanics' Union and the railroad workers, Li Chi-sen hoped to spread the split to the entire labour movement of China.¹

The manœuvres of the Chinese comprador bourgeoisie paralleled the efforts of the imperialists to destroy finally the collaboration of China with the Soviet Union. With the consent of the British authorities, the Soviet embassy in Peking was raided in the usually inviolable legation quarter. Besides pillaging the Russian embassy, Chiang Tso-lin arrested many who were sympathetic to Kuomintang-Communist harmony. Among them was the well-known scholar Li Ta-chao, formerly librarian of the National University of Peking. After a mockery of a trial the arrested Chinese were put to death by the barbarous, mediæval method of slow strangulation. By means of widespread terrorism Chiang Kai-shek, now frankly acting in behalf of imperialism, hoped similarly to strangle the great anti-imperialist upsurge.

Matters were now well arranged for the complete rupture of anti-imperialist unity. Chiang Kai-shek was waiting, as later events proved, only for the fall of Shanghai before definitely taking the road of dissension. On March 27, after the armed workers of Shanghai had victoriously taken over the native city, Chiang triumphantly marched in at the head of his troops. On April 11 and 12, Chiang's soldiers surrounded

¹ Earl Browder: *Civil War in Nationalist China* (1927), p. 7.

the Shanghai Workers' Union and arrested the workers' leaders. Then the Workers' Guard of Shanghai was disarmed. Those who resisted were mowed down by machine-gun fire.

Behind the scenes Chiang Kai-shek had already come to an understanding with his old foe, the Fengtien Party of Chang Tso-lin. Here was evidence enough of the consummation of an Anglo-Japanese understanding regarding China, a revival of some form of their interrupted alliance. The Japanese Foreign Office was kept busy denying the insistent reports that the old Anglo-Japanese alliance had been renewed.¹ The costly defeats of British imperialism throughout China, from Hong Kong and Canton to Hankow, Kiukiang, and Shanghai, had indisputably weakened this once supreme foreign power in China. However, Japan had come out of the revolutionary upsurge with comparatively few losses, compensated by greater prospects for the future, in view of the decline of its rival and, for the moment, its temporary ally.

The impending break-up of the first great anti-imperialist united front, as well as the retreat of British imperialism, had bred exaggerated dreams of hegemony in China in the minds of the Japanese imperialists. The ferocity of British indignation over the loss of prestige, as well as of concessions and the threatened decrease of markets, knew no bounds. Britain was ready to collaborate with anyone, on almost any terms, to beat back the revolutionary assault. And herein do we find the mainspring of the Japanese plans for the conquest of Manchuria, in the beginnings of the inter-imperialist shift of forces that were to make impossible the ultimate consolidation of Chiang Kai-shek's power, founded on the split of anti-imperialist unity.

While the brunt of the anti-imperialist offensive hit Britain

¹ *New York Times*, August 27, 1927.

almost exclusively, a more dangerous potential enemy of China was emboldened to try not only to take up the position partly lost by Britain, but to become the exclusive dominator of China. Japan, under the premiership of Baron Tanaka, had already evolved its program for the complete conquest of China, and on the very eve of the decline of the first stage of the anti-imperialist uprising, had already unwittingly laid the conditions for unity on an entirely new basis.

In fact, in July 1927 the Japanese had apparently already conceived their long-range plan for the dismemberment of China, through the severing, first, of Manchuria. Premier Tanaka, the author of the sensational *Memorial*, was within a year of this period to write down in the minutest details, in a memorandum addressed to the Emperor of Japan and acted upon fully in 1931, Japan's program for hegemony in China. During a conference on China in Tokyo in July 1927, Baron Tanaka made these significant remarks: "Japan has a special position in Manchuria and Mongolia, and this region must be kept free from disturbance. China needs a strong man." ¹ To which the Baron added that Japan was going to begin a "positive policy" in its relation with China.

Continuing the splitting tactics begun in the spring of 1927, Chiang Kai-shek's anti-Communist policies prepared the ground for Japanese invasion.

After Chiang Kai-shek's desertion in the spring of 1927, two governments existed in China: one in Wuhan, typifying the last remnant of the revolutionary anti-imperialist united front; and the other at Nanking, the camp of betrayal of the principles of Dr. Sun Yat-sen and of the solemn agreement to struggle for the liberation of China. Wuhan for a while car-

¹ *China in 1927*, extracts from the *Peking Leader*, edited by Grover Clark, p. 25; *New York Times*, July 8, 1927.

ried on as the revolutionary rallying centre. But Nanking, favoured as it was by the foreign powers, and by the extreme Right wing of the Chinese wealthy classes, soon gathered sufficient strength to destroy its rival for state power. Nanking had come to terms with the imperialists generally, while British imperialism had already tried to provoke war against the Soviet Union.

With Chiang Kai-shek strongly entrenched at Nanking, a military campaign was begun against Wuhan. A counter-revolutionary desertion in the rear of Wuhan helped Nanking. The economic blockade enforced by the help of foreign gunboats, had already done its work. Now the Szechwan troops, which entered the campaign against the Wuhan government, were allowed to penetrate the defensive lines by the desertion of Hsia Tow-yen, commander of the troops supposedly defending Wuhan.

Meanwhile in Changsha (the principal city of Hunan province) the troops of Hsuh Keh-hsiang were also thrown against the Wuhan government. Commanders in Kiangsi province then were drawn into the counter-revolutionary mutiny. Feng Yu-hsiang, who had been appointed in Chiang Kai-shek's place as commander-in-chief of the Kuomintang armies still faithful to Wuhan, was likewise swept into the militarist drive. By the middle of the summer of 1927 Chang Tso-lin's troops co-operated in the campaign against Wuhan, making the position of the government there entirely untenable. The Left Kuomintang members of the Wuhan government became frightened. They tried to quell the workers' and peasants' exuberance. They adopted stringent measures against strikes and the seizure of the land by the peasants. Finally they also deserted the united front.

The rupture of Kuomintang-Communist unity marked the

end of the great revolutionary wave and concluded the first stage of China's united anti-imperialist movement.

Facilitating the defeat of the workers and peasants, and contributing to the collapse of the Wuhan revolutionary centre, was the extreme opportunist policy of some outstanding leaders of the Communist Party, particularly of Chen Du-shu¹ and Tang Ping-shan.²

In order to try to crush, once and for all, the tremendous initiative and energy of the workers and peasants, Chiang Kai-shek entered upon a campaign of annihilation of the Communists and of the most advanced members of the Kuo-mintang. From his previous association with the Communists, Chiang Kai-shek knew that their continued activity in China would present the comprador bourgeoisie with the threat of a renaissance of the anti-imperialist revolution.

Towards the end of July, Madam Sun Yat-sen, widow of the deceased idol of nationalist China, who as a member of the Wuhan government had remained faithful to the revolu-

¹ Chen Du-shu, who more than any other member of the Communist Party of China was responsible for many of the costly mistakes on the agrarian question, because of his failure to develop more independent organization and activity of the Communist Party, and his extreme laxity in attempting to win over the officers and the soldiers of the People's Army, was expelled from the party. He later joined the small Trotskyite sect in China. In 1932, after he had been permitted to propagandize quite openly against the Communists and the Chinese Soviets, he was apprehended by the police of the International Settlement and turned over to Chiang Kai-shek. Instead of meeting the fate that Communists usually suffered, torture and execution without trial, Chen was treated as a guest. He was provided with a large sum of money for warm clothing as winter was approaching, and petitioned for a personal interview with Chiang Kai-shek.

² Tang Ping-shan deserted the Communist Party and joined the Kuomintang in return for a highly remunerative position.

tionary principles of her husband to the very end, in a farewell article written when Wuhan as a revolutionary government was crumbling into historical dust, stated her position on anti-imperialist unity—a position to which she remained true until the basis was again laid for its re-establishment on a higher plane. In the July 17 issue of the *People's Tribune* (an issue confiscated finally by the militarists), Madam Sun Yat-sen wrote:

"The workers and peasants are the basis of our strength in our struggle to overthrow imperialism and effectively to unify the country. They are the new pillars for the building of a free China. Without their support the Kuomintang, as a revolutionary party, becomes weak, chaotic, illogical. . . . At this moment I feel that we are turning away from the policy of Sun Yat-sen. Therefore I must withdraw until wiser counsel prevails."

With the campaign against the Communists and those who stood for anti-imperialist unity, went a vehement drive, inciting to lynching, against the official representatives of the Soviet Union in China. For example, the *North China Daily News* (Shanghai), daily spokesman for British imperialism in China, which during the events of 1925-7 was beside itself with rage against the Chinese people, on October 5, 1927 printed the following appeal for violence against Soviet diplomatic agents in China: "First raid the Soviet consuls. Why should the representatives of a group of murderers be allowed to work in the territory which has been leased as the International Settlement? If we can do nothing legally we should take action illegally and the more force used the better." Lest this be misconstrued, the *North China Daily News* on December 7 published a letter with more specific suggestions: "I would further urge every citizen to help the Russian

Whites by helping them to obtain arms secretly and wipe these Red swine off the map. These people know their names, but can do nothing for want of arms. Something must be done and done quickly." And armed raids were made on the Soviet consulate in Shanghai by White Russians.

The end of Kuomintang-Communist unity and the collapse of the Wuhan government did not, however, mark the conclusion of peasant uprisings. The seeds planted by the 1927 revolution sank deep roots in the countryside that could never be pulled up. However, the first great effort to revive the declining strength of the revolution met with defeat. The workers of Canton, then the most politically advanced, with the largest percentage of veteran Communist Party members, the best-organized and trained in the long series of strikes and national liberation struggles, decided on a final, heroic attempt to turn the tide.

In a valiant rear-guard action, armed workers of Canton, on the night of December 11, 1927, acting together with officers of the training regiment who threw their lot in with the revolutionary proletariat, launched an insurrection to seize power in Canton. The insurgent forces were under the command of the fearless Chang Tai-lei, chairman of the Revolutionary Committee.

For three days the Canton Commune lived. For that period a Soviet government ruled the great city of South China. In that short time, the workers, while still fighting hourly to maintain and extend their power, sought to establish a government, to raise wages, to relieve the usury-burdened people of debt, and to win the whole toiling population in and around Canton to the side of the Commune. All political prisoners were released. The nucleus of a Red army was formed in the heat of battle. But the Canton Commune could not stay

the rapid decline of the revolutionary wave. The three-day-old Soviet government of Canton was crushed by southern militarists, supported by foreign gunboats, reinforced by large numbers of troops. The ensuing slaughter was frightful. The streets were littered with thousands of bodies of insurgent workers. The Canton Commune proved, nevertheless, to be a signpost pointing to a new era of the Chinese revolution, when the Chinese Soviets would have a loud, determining voice in China's future.

Meanwhile, the end of the Canton uprising was followed by the fiercest period of suppression and reaction that China had ever witnessed.

Simultaneously, international action against the Soviet Union was the chief note of world politics. The political hostility whipped up against the Soviet Union is succinctly stated in the *Outline History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union*, by N. Popov. "The severe defeat suffered by the Chinese revolution," wrote Popov, ". . . enables international imperialism to intensify its aggressiveness towards the U.S.S.R. There began a series of raids on Soviet institutions abroad directly inspired by British imperialism, after which preliminary artillery barrage the British Conservative government announced the breaking off of diplomatic relations with the U.S.S.R. White Guard agents of the British government assassinated Comrade Voikov, the Soviet Ambassador in Warsaw, under the eyes of the Polish authorities. Following the assassination they proceeded to organize a number of explosions and murderous attempts within the U.S.S.R. This is the situation the Trotskyite opposition deemed a most favourable one for the commencement of a new attack against our Party."¹

¹ Nikolai Popov: *Outline History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union* (New York: International Publishers Co.; 1934), p. 312.

In passing, one cannot fail to note the parallel between Trotsky's attacks on Stalin in 1927 and the plottings with the Fascists in 1934-7 as exposed in the series of trials against the Trotskyites in Moscow during 1936-7.

Leon Trotsky launched his opposition to the Communist tactics in China as an auxiliary to his main attack on the building of Socialism in the Soviet Union. Between the principles and tactics of Communism and Trotskyism there had always been an unbridgeable gulf. Trotsky's adventurism and ultimate counter-revolutionary stand were particularly emphasized in his attitude towards China. Basically, Trotsky disagreed with the Leninist conception of the problems, tactics, and course of the Chinese revolution. To the fundamental thesis that the Chinese revolution was primarily a struggle for national liberation, he answered that the anti-imperialist phase was negligible. He reduced the life-and-death issue of foreign penetration to the assertion that China's goal should be realization of "customs autonomy."

To Trotsky, China was an ample ground for his grandiose paper manœuvres without regard for the intricate national and social problems of the 450,000,000 Chinese. His views on China shifted agilely to fit into his incessant opposition to Stalin's revolutionary policies. After denying the existence of feudal remnants in China, the very foundation for the agrarian revolution, he never lost an opportunity to attack the Communist parties of China and the Soviet Union, as well as the Communist International, on the peasant question. He only vaguely concealed his contempt for the Chinese peasantry. For example, when the Canton Commune was defeated, Trotsky wrote:

"Numerically, the Chinese peasantry constitutes an even more overwhelming mass than the Russian peasants; but

crushed in the vice of world contradictions, upon the solution of which in one way or another its fate depends, the Chinese peasantry is even less capable than the Russian of playing a *leading* role."

The emphasis on "*leading* role" is hardly able to pass as a theoretical excuse for this slander against nearly eighty per cent of China's population. Trotsky's attitude towards the Chinese peasantry reached a climax at the time the Chinese Soviets were formed in the agrarian districts of Kiangsi. He then joined the executioners of the Chinese Communists in labelling the armed peasants in the Chinese Red army "bandits."

He proposed the premature establishment of Soviets in China when the masses were in the very first stage of the revolution moving to oust foreign imperialism. Then, when Soviets actually were set up, Trotsky conveniently and for his own ends switched his tactics. He called the Canton Soviet (which marked the end of the first stage of the Chinese revolution and the beginning of the Soviet stage and the development of the Red army) "just one of those old Chinese dragons—it was simply drawn on paper." Both the imperialists and Trotsky were later to learn that the "Soviet dragon" in China was no myth. Trotsky fought against Soviets in China in their initial phase, proposing the calling of a constituent assembly. When the Kuomintang and the Communist Party, in the face of Japan's threat of dismemberment of China, moved towards collaboration and made possible the convocation of a national democratic parliament, the Trotskyites shouted about "betrayal of the Soviets."

After the rupture of the first stage of Kuomintang-Communist unity, with its serious consequences for China, Stalin charged Trotsky with voicing satisfaction over the defeat of

the first stage of the Chinese revolution. At the time Stalin declared:

"The [Trotsky] opposition are jubilant over the fact that the bloc with the Wuhan Kuomintang proved to be short-lived; they moreover assert that the Communist International did not warn the Chinese Communists of the possibility of the collapse of the Wuhan Kuomintang. It need hardly be shown that the jubilation of the [Trotsky] opposition only testifies to their political bankruptcy. . . . The fact that the feudal lords and imperialists in China proved at this stage to be stronger than the revolution, that the pressure exercised by these hostile forces induced the Wuhan Kuomintang to swing to the Right and led to the temporary defeat of the Chinese revolution, can be a cause for jubilation only for people infected with defeatism. As to the assertion of the [Trotsky] opposition that the Communist International did not warn the Communist Party of China of the possibility of the collapse of the Wuhan Kuomintang, that is only one of the usual slanders with which the arsenal of the opposition now teems."

In contrast to Trotsky's complete distortion of the nature of the Chinese revolution, as proved throughout its entire history, was the analysis of Joseph Stalin. Stalin stressed the fact that there is "a strict differentiation between revolution in imperialist countries, countries that oppress other peoples, and revolution in colonial, dependent countries, countries that suffer from imperialist oppression of other states. . . . In these [colonial] countries the oppression exercised by the imperialism of other states is one of the factors of revolution; this oppression cannot but affect the national bourgeoisie also [as the events of the Manchurian invasion in 1931 and after again proved]; *the national bourgeoisie at*

*a certain stage and for a certain period, may support the revolutionary movement of its country against imperialism, and the national element, as an element in the struggle for emancipation, is a revolutionary factor."*¹ (Italics mine.—H. G.)

The most carefully considered conclusions of the events of 1925-7 have been briefly stated by Wang Ming, representative of the Chinese Communist Party on the Executive Committee of the Communist International. In an article entitled: "Fifteen Years of Struggle for the Independence and Freedom of the Chinese People,"² Wang Ming said of these key events in China:

"The revolution of 1925-7 in China met with severe defeat for the following reason: (1) The forces of imperialism and feudalism proved at the given stage to be stronger than those of the revolution; (2) the treachery of the national bourgeoisie and the Kuomintang; (3) the mercenary character of the National Revolutionary Army, and the predominating influence of the landowning and militarist elements among its commanding officers; and (4) this severe defeat was facilitated in no small degree by the opportunist mistakes of Chen Du-shu and his supporters in the leadership of the [Communist] Party, and first and foremost by their shameful and criminally neglectful attitude to the winning of the National Revolutionary Army and its commanding officers to the arming of the workers and peasants,

¹ Joseph Stalin: *Marxism and the National and Colonial Question* (New York: International Publishers Co.; 1936). (Speech on the international situation delivered at a joint plenum of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, August 1, 1927.)

² *The Communist International*, October 1936, No. 10, p. 1344.

and the establishment of real revolutionary troops with a Communist backbone."

But the fact remains that in the short period of three years China had passed through the most violent and sanguinary birth-pangs of anti-imperialist unity. Though inner conflicts, aggravated by foreign interference, prevented the continuance of such united efforts and wrecked them temporarily before they had produced their fullest benefits, the relation of class forces within China was never to be the same again.

Try as they might to liquidate the revolutionary hosts awakened by the stirring events of 1925-7, the Chinese reactionaries failed utterly. Indeed, the very nature of the bourgeois campaign of national conflict and the preservation of the feudal remnants served only to stimulate the scheming of the imperialists to complete the division of China and finally to destroy it as a nation. Furthermore, the relation of the imperialist powers, their mutual conflicts, intensified by the spectre of their ultimate defeat, could never continue undisturbed in the same grooves. Both from the viewpoint of inter-imperialist relations, and as a consequence of the world economic crisis then maturing, the emergence of Japan as the major enemy in China's fight for national freedom, as the very embodiment of what imperialism means for China, was to become the controlling factor in Chinese politics.

The early years of the world economic crisis of 1929-33 were, in China, years of the deepest division and the most widespread anti-Communist terror. However, out of the sharpened class struggle was to spring a more powerful Communist movement, a new armed force, newly trained tens of millions of peasants and workers, able to withstand the heaviest attacks, destined to compel and to lead China to a newer stage of unity for national liberation.

CHAPTER VII

Kuomintang vs. Red Army

NANKING tried to erect a stable central government in China on an active political volcano. Under the leadership of Chiang Kai-shek the landowning bourgeoisie energetically sought to consolidate its power and to unify China while ninety per cent of the population was still unrelieved of ancient burdens. After the break-up of the first stage of the Kuomintang-Communist collaboration, the reign of the Kuomintang could be described as an attempt to solicit the goodwill of the foreign powers to allow China to unify as a nation and develop capitalistically. In return the Nanking government offered to prove its worthiness by employing every method known, ancient and modern, but particularly the most barbarous, to exterminate its revolutionary opponents.

The period from the end of 1927 to September 1931, when Japan invaded Manchuria, was marked by the onset and the apex of the worst world economic crisis ever known. While Nanking was busy seeking to subordinate recalcitrant provincial war lords, the Communists, retaining leadership

of the awakened peasantry, were able to form Soviets, revolutionary ruling councils, in numerous interior agrarian districts. To extend the Soviet regions they recruited and trained a large Red army.

The period from the end of the Wuhan government to the beginning of the Japanese invasion of Manchuria can be examined largely as a development of antagonistic class forces in China. The Nanking government endeavoured to liquidate its provincial rivals, only to prepare the ground for the success of the Japanese program of invasion. The stubborn revolutionary remnants of the 1925-7 period continued to expand and to resist all concerted efforts to destroy them.

One year before Japan's invasion of Manchuria, Chiang Kai-shek reluctantly admitted that the Kuomintang had failed of its political objectives. Upon his return from one of the ill-fated expeditions against the newly established Soviets, speaking at the Central Party Headquarters on October 20, 1930, Chiang said ruefully:

"It is highly deplorable that in almost all the places which I have visited of late, party members have left extremely unfavourable impressions in the minds of the people. Not only is it impossible to find a single party headquarters which administers to and works for the welfare of the people, but all are stigmatized for the most reprehensible practices, such as corruption, bribery and scrambling for power.

"The Manchus were overthrown because they constituted a special caste. But now, we who staged the revolution for the overthrow of the Manchus have ourselves come to be regarded by the people as a privileged caste. They are now cherishing towards us the same hatred and repugnance with which they looked upon the Manchus.

"The danger of such a situation can hardly be over-

estimated. Unless we quickly correct our faults, the party will meet with rapid downfall, and we shall thereby be guilty of betraying the trust confided to us by the late party leader [Dr. Sun Yat-sen].”¹

Militarist wars continued to rack the country. The old imperialist influence, modified, it is true, by the changed relation of forces previously outlined, still circumscribed the new round of civil wars. These contests too had changed somewhat in so far as they became battles among generals each of whom claimed he was as faithful to the revolutionary traditions of Dr. Sun as his opponent was treacherous.

The very first series of such civil wars, however, bore the impress of future Japanese aggression. In May 1928, forewarned of a movement of Nanking troops to oust its Chinese agent, Chang Tso-lin, from his roost in Peking, Japan transported thousands of soldiers to Shantung to block Nanking's advance. In the latter part of May 1928 the Kuomintang armies began to dominate the strategic railway lines in Shantung leading to Peking, while Chang Tso-lin's troops evacuated the ancient capital and moved on to Mukden. Distributed throughout the northern province of Shantung, 54,000 Japanese troops had orders to impede the farther march northward of the Nanking armies.

Chiang Kai-shek arrived at Tsinanfu in the latter part of May to direct the operation of his troops. It was then that Japan demonstrated its practical interpretation of Baron Tanaka's "positive policy" in China. On May 3, 1928 Japanese troops opened fire on Chinese soldiers and civilians. Several hundred Chinese were killed, including Tsai Kung-hsi, provincial Commissioner of Foreign Affairs.

¹ Kuo Min News Agency, quoted in *China Year Book*, 1931 (Chicago University Press), p. 541.

Japan's most likely reasons for staging the Tsinan incident, were enumerated at the time by the *China Weekly Review* as follows: (1) to prevent further efforts to unify China; (2) to keep a separate Chinese puppet régime in Manchuria; and (3) to prevent the fall of the Tanaka Cabinet in Tokyo. To these we may add also, in the light of later events: to prepare for the ultimate separation of Manchuria. On May 18, 1928, after the Tsinan incident, Premier Tanaka of Japan called diplomatic representatives in Tokyo together and told them that civil war would not be allowed to penetrate Manchuria. That was tantamount to saying Japan would not allow Nanking's army to bring the north of China and the Three Eastern Provinces under its central government.

The Tsinan fighting, however, failed to halt Nanking's drive to embrace Peking in its rule. By June 1928 the Kuo-mintang forces marched into Peking, formally establishing their claim to *de jure* recognition as the central government of China.

When Chang Tso-lin retreated to Mukden, the Japanese government evidently surmised that the old dictator of Manchuria had withdrawn too easily, and that though he had long been a faithful Japanese satrap, the future plans of Tokyo necessitated that he permanently retire from the Chinese scene. Thus, further preparing the ground for Japan's complete domination of Manchuria, Chang Tso-lin was assassinated.

Whatever confusion and misunderstanding there existed at that time over the death of Chang Tso-lin, hardly any doubts remained later; for it has since been well established that Chang Tso-lin was murdered at the command of the Japanese government. It had decided that the old rapacious war lord had served his day, and in the latter part of 1927

the Japanese began circulating rumours that Chang Tso-lin wished to install himself as emperor of Manchuria. To Premier Tanaka the seizure of Manchuria and Inner Mongolia was an *idée fixe*. His government, knowing that Chang was ambitious and that he still retained a trace of loyalty to his Chinese nationality, doubted that the war lord would agree to the complete severance of Manchuria from China. Certainly, if Chang Tso-lin, with his undisputed rule over Manchuria and his control of the armed hordes policing the Three Eastern Provinces, should decide to offer objections to such sweeping plans as Baron Tanaka was prematurely to propose, the obstacles might prove insurmountable for Japan. Therefore, if Japan was to conquer Manchuria, Chang had to go.

At 4.38 a.m. on June 4, Chang's special train was passing under the viaduct of the South Manchuria Railway (Japanese-owned) near Hwangkuhun station, Mukden. At the very moment Chang's car reached the dead centre of the viaduct, a terrific explosion blasted the train. Chang was mortally wounded and his most trusted lieutenant, Wu Chung-sheng, Governor of Heilungkiang province, was killed. No one else in Chang's car was seriously hurt. The clumsy efforts of the Japanese Foreign Office to blame first the Soviet Union and then Chinese opponents of Chang for the murder were failures. *Hochi Shumbun*, a Japanese newspaper, for example, was suspended because it printed news stories at variance with the Foreign Office's explanations. Reports of Reuter's, British news agency, and investigations of foreign consulates, established that the Japanese government had plotted the assassination. It was pointed out that the South Manchurian Railway, under whose viaduct Chang Tso-lin's private train passed, is permanently policed by Japanese sol-

diers. The viaduct itself is under the surveillance of a special guard-house with powerful electric searchlights playing on the bridge during all hours of darkness. The explosives, the evidence indicated, were placed by experts and detonated by means of electric wires skilfully located in a safe position away from the scene of the explosion. The ultimate fact that the Tanaka Cabinet was finally forced to resign on July 1, 1929, because of its inability to absolve the Japanese government of culpability in the assassination of Chang Tso-lin is, of course, conclusive.

It is the opinion of T. P. Kung, Chinese writer in Peiping, that the assassination of Chang Tso-lin was really the signal for the invasion of Manchuria.¹ But the plot misfired. It was too evident then that Japan had arranged the assassination. Actually, world conditions were not yet ripe for the adventure.

After the resignation of the Tanaka Cabinet over Chang's assassination, Major Kawamoto of the 9th division, dismissed because of his implication in the affair, declared in the course of a speech at Karagowa, Japan: "For us to wipe out Chinese militarism in Manchuria is merely an easy, child's game."

The Manchurian events of 1928-9 should have been ample warning to China, but the Kuomintang militarists at the moment were more intent on ensuring their respective positions in China than on proposing the unification of the country against Japanese imperialism.

In September 1928 the militarist Chang Fa-kwei, of the Kwangsi or southern faction, attempted to seize control of

¹ Mr. Kung has massed irrefutable evidence of Japan's complicity in a pamphlet entitled: *The Tragic Death of Chang Tso-lin*, a documentary survey of a prelude to Japan's invasion of Manchuria. (Published at Peiping, 1932.)

the country, under a thinly disguised demagogic "Left" program. This uprising was shortlived, however. It was followed by the more serious fighting between the southern faction and Nanking in March 1929. Again in September 1929 Chang Fa-kwei started military operations against Chiang Kai-shek's forces, but with little success.

It should be pointed out here that the new wave of militarist wars can be explained briefly as efforts of sectional feudal landlords and war lords, backed in most instances by various imperialist powers, to retain their independence of the Nanking government. The Nanking government, dominated above all by the Shanghai native bankers, looked forward to some form, however slight, of capitalist development, with the assistance particularly of Great Britain and the United States; though there remained in Nanking a strong faction favourable to collaboration with Japan as against Tokyo's two bitterest rivals in China. The southern faction were not averse to using the most extreme Left demagoguery in their rift with Chiang Kai-shek to keep the provinces of Kwangtung, Kwangsi, Fukien, Kweichow, Hunan, Hupeh, and parts of Kiangsi and Honan independent of Nanking rule. In the north, was the independent fief of Yen Hsi-shan in Shansi province; and co-operating with him at intervals was Feng Yu-hsiang, whose strength lay chiefly in Kansu, Shensi, and Honan.

After the death of Chang Tso-lin, his son Chang Hsueh-liang, popularly known as the "Young Marshal," continued to rule in the Three Eastern Provinces (as Manchuria is known in China), comprising the provinces of Kirin, Heilungkiang, and Fengtien, and the provinces of Jehol and the north and east of the important Chihli province. Szechwan and Yunnan provinces, distantly situated to the south and west, were

not so intimately involved in the civil wars and did not seriously come within the compass of the struggle until the 1933 western trek of the Chinese Red army.

The most ominous civil war was that of the combined forces of Yen Shi-shan and Feng Yu-hsiang. This conflict began in October 1929, though a temporary truce was arranged at that time. In the spring of 1930, war was resumed. Fighting was violent and extensive. Nanking's rule was gravely challenged, and though its victory over the Feng-Yen alliance increased its prestige, the cost of the battle, its duration, and the energy expended served to weaken Nanking. Taking place in the north, it also helped further to prepare the way for Japan by its exhaustive and divisive results.

Economically, the Kuomintang could show little progress. The cost of the militarist wars weighed more heavily on the people than even the old-fashioned maraudings of the Wu Pei-fus and the Sun Chuan-fangs. From sixty to eighty per cent of China's income was swallowed up by the many armies. The unfortunate people had to pay the expenses of both vanquished and victors. Besides the central government's levies, there were always the persistent expenses of the local militarists from the provincial capitals down to the hsien, or county.

The balance sheet of the country, from the few reliable indices, was not impressive evidence of Chiang Kai-shek's achievement of his dream of an independent capitalist China. For instance, the share of Chinese capitalists in coal mining, which had been 46 per cent in 1923, dropped to 30 per cent by 1928. Foreign capital, particularly Japanese and British, still controlled 72 per cent of China's coal output. In iron and steel, foreign capital by 1928 controlled 90 per cent as against 70 per cent in 1923. The important textile industry suffered

even greater inroads of foreign capital, especially Japanese. Before 1925-7, Chinese capitalists owned 50 per cent of the investment in the textile industry of China. By 1930, the percentage of foreign ownership of textile mills had risen to 80 per cent.

Famines, too, increased, with the number of those threatened with death by hunger rising to fantastic figures. The most reliable figures show the following as famine years, with these vast hordes of human beings stalked by starvation: 1927, 9,000,000; 1928, 27,000,000; 1929, 57,000,000. In the middle of 1931, to the general economic crisis was added the mounting menace of famine and the catastrophe of one of China's worst floods. The flood area of 1931, aggravated by militarist devastation, heavy taxes, and the breakdown of water control, extended from the Yellow River in the north of China to the centre of the Yangtze Valley, an area the size of New York State or Great Britain. More than 23,500,000 were trapped in the flood areas, and hundreds of thousands either drowned or starved in the havoc wrought.

To the credit side of Nanking's record very little could be recorded. China's foreign indebtedness was increased. Foreign trade improved slightly. Government income rose, but expenses soared still higher. A scholarly report on currency reform had been submitted by China's financial adviser, Professor E. W. Kemmerer, but it was safely pigeonholed in 1930. Both British and American advisers to Nanking had been appointed at handsome salaries, but with not the slightest benefit to the Chinese people. Though tariff autonomy was won in principle, in practice Japan's resistance made the new plan virtually inoperable.

Leaders of the Manchurian army, after the death of Chang Tso-lin, tried to demonstrate their loyalty to Japan by an inci-

dent against the Soviet Union—an attempt to seize complete control of the Chinese Eastern Railway in North Manchuria. By the agreement of 1924 with China the Soviet government had voluntarily agreed to having the railway placed under joint management of the U.S.S.R. and China. On July 10, 1924, Chinese militarists in Manchuria seized control of the railway. After a very brief skirmish the special Far Eastern Soviet Red army was able to force a return to the former arrangement. That the act of seizure was prompted by Japan was confirmed by Japan's readiness to go to war against the U.S.S.R., after the Manchurian invasion, to gain control of this very railway line.

Nanking, however, considered it necessary to discuss a renewal of relations with the Soviet Union after the failure of the Chinese Eastern Railway incident. On May 1, 1930 a Chinese delegation, headed by Moh Teh-hui, left for Moscow for a series of protracted negotiations that were finally happily concluded under the driving pressure of the events of 1931 in Manchuria.

Such are the highlights of the picture in Kuomintang China. But there were really two Chinas during this period, as the League of Nations acknowledged in the Lytton Committee's report on the Manchurian invasion. The other China was the successor of the 1925-7 revolution.

What was going on in the less publicized sector of China?

The Red army of China and the Soviet districts had their origin in the 1925-7 revolution. They were the inheritors primarily of the anti-imperialist agrarian revolutionary phase of that uprising.

When in the middle of 1927 the Kuomintang ended its initial alliance with the Communists, a number of army commanders, especially those at the head of the most militant

peasant detachments of the Kuomintang armed forces, refused to submit to Nanking's orders. For example, in Nanchang, Kiangsi province, two military commanders, Yeh Ting and Ho Lung, at the head of two thousand men of the famous "Ironsides" division of Chang Fa-kwei, rebelled. At about the same time, Chu Teh and Mao Tse-tung, regimental commanders in the Hunan army, deserted the Kuomintang ranks and fled to the mountains with a thousand men. Fang Cheh-ming, the Communist peasant union leader, withdrew from Wuhan when the anti-Communist terror began and with an armed body of men, made his way to Iyang in eastern Kiangsi province.

At first these separate groups operated more or less independently and were poorly organized. Later Yeh Ting and Ho Lung attempted to force an opening to the sea. They attacked the port of Swatow, Kwantung province. The attempt was seriously defeated. It was then decided to establish a territorial revolutionary base among the peasantry near by, and the first Soviet district was founded in the Heifeng and Lufeng areas of Kwangtung province between the cities of Canton and Swatow.

In September 1927 Yeh Ting secretly went to Canton to help plan the December uprising. When the Canton insurrection was defeated, proletarian army contingents joined the Red armies.

The destruction of the Canton Commune was followed by a drive against the Soviet districts at Heifeng and Lufeng. The Canton militarists feared the existence of a base for the agrarian revolution so close to the former base of the nationalist revolution. The most remarkable feature of the Chinese Soviets from the very first inauspicious beginnings was their ability to survive and grow with each apparently mortal dis-

memberment. Cut to bits and scattered, the separate fragments took root in the fertile social soil of China.

To spread out and connect with the peasant movements in other parts of the country, it was decided that the armies under Ho Lung should move westward across Kiangsi to Hunan and Hupeh provinces. For its ability to move swiftly through China, over provinces ostensibly under the control of the Kuomintang and native militarists, the Red army later became famous. Thanks to the help of the peasantry, Red partisans and subsequently the Red army had little difficulty in moving rapidly and secretly.

In the early part of 1928 the Red army groups were reinforced by detachments under Peng Teh-hui, another regimental commander from Hunan. After breaking away from the Kuomintang army, Peng Teh-hui joined forces with Chu Teh and Mao Tse-tung.

The Red army was not organized into a compact fighting force until 1929, when a series of widespread peasant uprisings throughout China greatly facilitated the development of the Soviet districts. Throughout 1927-8 the revolutionary partisan groups under Chu Teh and Mao Tse-tung operated in Kiangsi, Kwangtung, Kiangsi, Fukien, and Honan provinces. Ho Lung's army, which had moved into the northwest area of Hunan and Hupeh, had established its base around the Hung Lake area.

The positions of the Soviets and the Red army were not then fixed, and efforts were constantly being made to capture some large city to become the centre for a future central Soviet government, another Canton for a new Soviet expedition of unification. Peng Teh-hui and Chu Teh, after the failure to capture Swatow in the spring of 1930, made an

unsuccessful attempt again to take Nanchang, Kiangsi province. Failing in this effort also, they then moved towards Changsha, capital of the province of Hunan.

On July 28, 1930, after an uprising within the city itself, the Red army captured Changsha, a city of more than 500,000 inhabitants. The city was held for five days, but when a superior army aided by foreign river gunboats was sent against the revolutionary army, it was decided to withdraw rather than attempt to hold the city against overwhelming odds. Though the objective in taking Changsha failed, new proletarian recruits were added to the Red army, as well as valuable military supplies and equipment.

By this time it was evident even to its most reluctant opponent that the Red army had grown tremendously from its early period when it was considered a negligible partisan force. Ho Lung, with more than twenty thousand men, had extended the Soviet regions in western Hunan and in Hopeh to become a threat to the Wuhan and Yangtze central area. The continued militarist war of the Kuomintang generals, first between the south and Nanking, and later with the north, aided in the advancement of the Soviet districts in Kiangsi, Fukien, and elsewhere. The most serious contest between Nanking and the Yen-Feng coalition in the north took place when the Soviets were establishing their basis for a stable central Soviet government in the Fukien-Kwangsi area, as well as substantial Soviet districts in Honan, Hupeh, and Anhwei provinces. In scores of less important sectors Red army partisan groups operated, springing up as the outgrowth of peasant insurrection, led by Communists or adherents of the Chinese Soviets. "The Soviets," declared Mao Tse-tung, later President of the Central Soviet Government,

"have grown up out of irregular warfare and by the consolidation of many isolated and small districts." ¹ Wherever the Red army appeared and could hold out against the Kuomintang forces, there it found conditions for the successful establishment of Soviet areas and the carrying out of the agrarian revolution.

The Red army under Chu Teh and Mao Tse-tung, concentrating chiefly on the mountainous border of Kiangsi, Fukien, and Kwangtung, occupied a number of towns which served as key centers for a large contiguous Soviet district. Some 11,500 square miles were comprised within the Soviet area early in 1929. By 1930 there were nineteen Soviet districts, each with one to four hsiens (counties). The total armed forces embraced in fifteen army corps numbered 100,000 men. The 4th Red army, then the most important armed force, had grown from an original group of 5,000 to a force of 35,000, mainly as a result of defeats inflicted on the local militarists and the Kuomintang armies sent against it.

By general admission, even of some of their bitterest foes, the leaders of the Red army of China were among the most remarkable men in the country's centuries-old and hero-filled history. The two outstanding figures of the Chinese Soviets are Mao Tse-tung, the first President of the Chinese Soviet Government; and Chu Teh, commander-in-chief of the Chinese Red army.

Mao Tse-tung was one of the founders of the Communist Party of China. He fully lived up to his own code of morals for a Communist. "To be a Communist," he said, "is not merely to belong to a political party. We are not political in-

¹ *Red China*, report of President Mao Tse-tung on the progress of the Chinese Republic (New York: International Publishers Co.; 1934).

trigüers. We are the party of the toiling people who are cruelly oppressed; we are the party of revolution which is sweeping all that is rotten from the face of the earth. Death is only the physical exit from life. And if a man, the more so a Communist, can bring some good by dying, by his brains and his courage, then he should not think twice about it. He must boldly and proudly fulfil the will of the party and the people. A party that lives for the interests of the people, which suffers with them and fights to make them happy, is an invincible force. There is no force that can conquer the party of the Communists—the militant vanguard of the toiling masses.”¹

Mao and Chu were trained and hardened in the severest school of Chinese labour conditions. Mao stoically bore every indignity, rebuff, and misfortune in his dogged efforts to establish Communist groups. Chu grew up politically in the 1911 revolution and matured in the fire of the events of 1925-7.

Mao's spirit was well reflected in the men he trained in the Red army. *Taven-Pao*, a leading Kuomintang newspaper, reported the examination of a Chinese Red army man in regard to the characters of Mao Tse-tung and Chu Teh and the attitude of these men. I quote from this interview because it gives a brief description of the impression the Red army leaders made on their men:

“This soldier looks about 35. He was taken prisoner in the central Red region, in Kiangsi. He was calm and confident during the interrogation. An officer asked him to give information about the forces of the Red army. The soldier refused to reply. Persuasion had no effect upon him either. The whole of his reply boiled down to ‘many.’

¹ “Mao Tse-tung, Leader of the Toiling People of China,” by H. Special supplement, the *Communist International*, January 1936.

"In reply to all the remaining questions, he said: 'I don't know.'

"The only question he was willing to answer was that about the Red army commanders. Here is his reply:

" 'Yes, I know both Mao Tse-tung and Chu Teh. And I know Peng Teh-hui. Mao Tse-tung is our chief leader. He heads the government, the party, and the army. He is a very kind and simple man. He always talks in a way that even the most backward people can understand. It is difficult to tell in words of his authority and popularity. At his call, the whole of the people will follow to the ends of the earth. He always cares for others and never thinks of himself. He is very ill, is always coughing and pale. However, during campaigns he sleeps on the ground alongside the Red army fighters, and eats what they do.

" 'When clothes and boots are brought to him from the supplies, he gives them away to the Red army fighters or somebody else. When the fighting took place near the Yuidu, he lay on the ground, I saw it myself, and fired from his rifle. And then he stood up and was the first to go into the attack. All the others followed him. That time we won the battle. Then, with the stretcher-bearers, he helped to pick up the wounded men. When the prisoners were brought in, he talked to them for several hours. Afterwards he gave orders for all prisoners to be released, except the officers. There were 600 prisoners but not more than 100 of them left him, and the others asked to join our units.'

"The prisoner was once more asked to tell of the conditions, the location and forces of the Reds. Again he refused to reply. The officer then said that he would be shot, and the prisoner replied:

" 'Well, what of it? I have heard the words of our leader,

Mao Tse-tung, who said that a man who is afraid of death while fighting for the cause of the people is a contemptible coward. I am a Communist.'"¹

While Mao Tse-tung came from a poor Hunanese peasant family, Chu Teh was a coolie who through tremendous force of will and courage was able to enter and graduate from the Yunnan military school. Many legends have become part of Chinese folklore concerning Chu Teh. One of them, magnificent in its artless simplicity, follows:

"He came from the farthest mountains. He stands higher than the highest tree. His hands send forth floods of invincible flame, destroying the enemy. And his enemies are the enemies of the people. When he looks around him, he sees for a distance of a hundred li on all sides at once. Nothing can hide from his fearless gaze. His army is countless: the whole of the people follow him. And even the foreigners flee in terror from our country to save their lives. He is a simple, kindly man, although there are none to equal him in strength, courage, and wisdom. He sleeps in the mountains and in the fields, and the whole of the people keep watch over him. He awakens and once more leads the people onward, ever onward. There is no force that can restrain him. He marches throughout the whole of our land, liberating all the poor, the destitute, the good people. He is loved in Fukien, Kiangsi, Hupeh, Hunan, he is loved everywhere. He was born of our people, and the people have given him a strong and simple name—Chu Teh."²

The capture of Changsha by the Red forces strikingly convinced Nanking that the revolutionary remnants of the 1927 expedition no longer consisted of small scattered bands that

¹ Ibid., p. 60.

² Ibid., p. 62.

could be ignored. For the extending scope of Red military activities was integrally connected with wide peasant uprisings as well as violent signs of renewed strike movements in the industrial centres. The truth about the military initiative of the Communists could no longer be destroyed by silence or denials. The Red army of China had become an ineradicable power in Chinese politics. No question of China's future could be answered thenceforth without taking it into account.

The *China Year Book* of 1931 for the first time takes note of the existence of the Red army, reporting the formation of the fifteen army corps by the latter part of 1930. "The Red menace had become so serious," the editors of the *China Year Book* declared, "that General Ho Ying-ching, chief of staff of the government forces, was placed in command of the anti-Communist operations."

Therefore, soon after the capture and loss of Changsha the first of six anti-Communist military expeditions was sent against the Soviet districts in Kiangsi, Fukien, Hunan, Hupeh, and Anhwei. Nanking was well aware that neither the silver bullet of bribery, intrigue, nor hope of protracted negotiations could play a part in the defeat or temporary negation of the Communist forces. Either they were to be drastically defeated or the war must go on to the bitter and very uncertain end. Nanking knew that in no way could this new campaign be undertaken in the fashion of the militarist wars.

The first anti-Communist campaign was organized by the Kuomintang Central Executive Committee at its plenary session in November 1930, soon after the termination of the civil war between Nanking and the Feng-Yen alliance. Twenty Kuomintang army divisions, numbering 130,000 men, were mobilized against Red army formations not ex-

ceeding 45,000 in the regions attacked. Realizing that the population in and surrounding the Soviet districts were whole-heartedly with the Red armies, the Kuomintang anti-Red war began with a shower of propaganda dropped from the skies. Aeroplanes scattered hundreds of thousands of leaflets urging the people to betray the Red army and offering \$50,000 (Chinese) for the heads of the Soviet leaders. By this time almost the entire province of Kiangsi was Sovietized.

Throughout nearly the entire period of the campaign—namely, from December 1930 until February 1931—Chiang Kai-shek's generals reported glowing success against the Reds. Foreign observers, however, were not so easily convinced. The British-owned *North China Daily News* on January 16, 1931 disappointedly reported: "There has been no advance against the Communists in Kiangsi. The Red danger is increasing." After more field dispatches claiming victories by Nanking, the *North China Daily News* on January 17 declared: "According to the latest news the plunderers are becoming stronger and more active every day."

The first anti-Communist expedition was defeated. The Red army came out of the contest stronger and equipped more modernly. Superior Kuomintang army divisions were craftily misled and waylaid in the mountains by means of all sorts of stratagems. Skilful anti-imperialist propaganda judiciously distributed among the expeditionary forces persuaded many of the Kuomintang rank and file to desert. The majority of the local population invariably assisted the Red army by guiding the pursuing troops. At one time during the first expedition the Red army took twenty thousand prisoners. The whole 18th division, together with the divisional commanders, was captured. The 50th division was virtually annihilated before it had realized what had hap-

pened. Instead of being serious opponents, the Kuomintang armies had actually served as the munition supply trains of the Red army.

At the disastrous conclusion of the first anti-Red drive the Nanking government was squarely faced with the fact that it had an entirely different army to deal with from any ever before in its history. The spirit of the Red army was that of the 1925-7 northward expeditionary force, plus the experience of the 1927 betrayal. The listless fighting of the disinterested rank-and-file soldiers in the internecine militarist wars between the Kuomintang generals was replaced with the ardour of workers and peasants fighting for the unification of China and its liberation from the rule of landlords and usurers and from foreign imperialism.

By March 1931 a second anti-Communist expedition was ready to take the field. Under the command of the Minister of War, Ho Ying-ching, the second expeditionary army numbered 200,000 men, in twenty divisions. The field of operations included Kiangsi, Hupeh, Hunan, and Fukien provinces.

But the mountainous territory in the Soviet regions proved a fatal battlefield for Ho's forces. Near Tangku the Red army entirely destroyed two divisions of the government's 5th army, disarming them and rendering them useless for future attacks in this campaign. Chu Teh, in command of the Red forces at Ningtu, swiftly brought about the retreat of the famous 19th route army. With the surrender of Nanfeng to Red troops, Chu turned his course eastward, where, on the border of Fukien province, he captured two regiments of the 56th division.

Overwhelmed by the unexpected tactics and successful and rapid movements of the Red army, Chiang Kai-shek sought

an excuse for his defeats in the independence movement of Canton and lack of co-operation from the south. Chiang declared that the establishment of an independent government in Canton injured the morale of the government forces and inspired the Communists in their struggle.

To overshadow his defeat in the second anti-Communist campaign, Chiang Kai-shek immediately made preparations for a third campaign, which was begun in the autumn of 1931 and continued up to the time of the Japanese invasion of Manchuria. But the third campaign fared no better than the previous two. The *China Year Book* (1931-2) ¹ summed up the results in these words: "Although the government issued strict orders for the suppression of the Communists, the government troops in Kiangsi failed to make much headway. On the contrary, they were defeated time and again, resulting in the killing of General Hu Chu-yu in action, the execution of General Chang Huei-tsan by the Communists, and the annihilation of a portion of General Pin Fan's forces."

Thus ended three of the six anti-Communist expeditions. The banner under which the Red armies fought at that time is described by Mao Tse-tung in these words:

"The Chinese Soviets and their Red army have grown out of the development of the agrarian revolution, which liberates the masses of the peasants from oppression and exploitation by the landlords and the Kuomintang militarists. The principle of Soviet land policy is completely to wipe out feudalistic oppression and exploitation. . . .

"In the Soviet districts this revolution has wiped out all the remnants of feudalism. The millions of peasants, awaking from their long slumber in the Dark Ages, confiscated all the land from the landlords and the rich peasants, abolished usury

¹ p. 542.

and heavy taxation, swept aside all who opposed the revolution, and built up their own government. This is the fundamental difference between the life of the rural districts under Soviet rule and of those under the Kuomintang. . . .”¹

Internal strife, originating primarily from Nanking’s futile efforts to stamp out the spreading sparks of the unquenched Chinese revolution, the Kuomintang’s endless concessions to imperialism, its bonds with the most backward feudal remnants, as well as its crass and unlimited corruption, helped to clear the way for the most audacious attack ever to be made on China’s integrity. Foreign domination and the ambitious schemes of imperialist powers anxious to carve out of this great and disunited nation the economic substance for their own capitalist operations were soon to create the historical conditions demanding a change of class relations if China were to exist as a nation.

The aim of the Kuomintang as epitomized by Chiang Kai-shek’s policy of trying to “unite” China by waging war against the Communists and making concessions to the imperialists—whose appetites grew with eating—resulted in a severe setback to China’s struggle for national liberation. There were then two conceptions of how to unify and liberate China. One, advocated by the Communist Party of China, led to the growth of the Chinese Soviets and the Red army and to the achievement of the most democratic and progressive social measures China had ever known. The other, tried by Chiang Kai-shek after the 1927 break, stressed suppression of the revolutionary forces and conciliation of those who would dismember China. In the years following 1927 up to the time when the Kuomintang, under the pressure of events, was forced again to consider establishment of Kuomintang-

¹ *Red China*, pp. 22-3.

Communist unity with an anti-Japanese program, the Communist Party had alone continued the anti-imperialist traditions of the 1925-7 period. The Communists, resisting the Kuomintang's attempt to annihilate the Soviets and the Red army, succeeded in creating new and powerful forces which could ultimately undertake the task of bringing about a national united front against Japanese imperialism.

To the deplorable inner conditions created by the Kuomintang's efforts to pull itself up by its own feudal and comprador-bourgeois bootstraps were to be added the most violent inter-imperialist antagonisms. The world crisis was to be the breeding ground for the most grotesque plans of Japanese conquest of China. The imperialist samurai of Japan were ready for a daring coup at China's expense, an explosion that was to be felt throughout a world already shaken by a shattering economic crisis.

CHAPTER VIII

Manchuria: The Great Demarcation

EVENTS of ancient Chinese history are dated by the reigns of great emperors or by the epochs of the foremost philosophers. In modern China they date from periods of foreign invasion or national revolution. The event that has, by far, had the greatest effect and still holds every promise of decisive consequences for the future of China, and of the nations with close relations to China, was the invasion and seizure of Manchuria in 1931, and the subsequent acts of aggression, by Japan. The Manchurian invasion, future historians will have added occasion to note, became the greatest political line of demarcation in China's relations with foreign powers, for the Japanese offensive, more than anything else, awoke the country to a realization that her future as a nation was at stake.

Japan had long premeditated the invasion of Manchuria. If the pretext for the conquest of Korea was the claim that Korea was "a dagger pointed at the heart of Japan," the ex-

cuse for the seizure of Manchuria was that this Chinese territory was "Japan's life line."

I have already briefly traced some of the preparatory phases of Japan's course for ultimate domination of China, particularly the period during the World War up to the close of the revolutionary events of 1925-7. The Tsinan incident and the assassination of Chang Tso-lin were carefully placed stepping-stones indicating Japan's future path. Japan's golden opportunity arrived when its competitors for hegemony in the Pacific were convulsed by the severest economic and financial crisis in world history. For instance, Henry L. Stimson, United States Secretary of State at the time of the Manchurian invasion, remarks in his book *The Far Eastern Crisis*¹ that Japan had purposely chosen what was perhaps the most critical moment of the economic panic for the United States and Great Britain, to begin its world-shaking action in Manchuria. "The impact of the European financial crisis," said Mr. Stimson, "was already shaking the stability of our own banking structure in America." This economic crisis, of unprecedented magnitude, had, moreover, particularly heightened the competition between the United States and Great Britain. Each of the two largest industrial and financial powers strove to maintain her dominant world financial position as well as to gain mastery in the drive for the dwindling world markets. The battle to shunt financial losses during the economic catastrophe was naturally much severer than the usual competition to obtain profits in less critical periods. In this situation, it certainly must be admitted, the Japanese strategists picked the most propitious moment to act.

¹ New York: Harper & Brothers; 1936.

The ambition of the Japanese military was expressed without the slightest ambiguity by General Honjo, Japanese military commander in Manchuria. Not more than six weeks before the Japanese army invaded Manchuria—on August 3, 1931—General Honjo in a memorandum to the Minister of War, Minami, urgently wrote:

"In order to strengthen the position of our country and its powers, it is necessary immediately to take advantage of the difficult world economic position, as well as of the circumstance that the Five Year Plan in the Soviet Union has not yet been completed and that China is not a united country. All these factors must be utilized for the purpose of the more intense occupation of Manchuria and Mongolia and for realizing the active aims of the former Siberian expedition. The unity of China, the existence of the Soviet Union, and the penetration of America in the Far East, all this does not accord with our interests. If we desire to prevent the penetration of America in the Far East, we must strengthen our defensive power and obtain our full material independence. Before we go forward against America, our troops must take up a decisive position in China, occupy the Far Eastern region of the Soviet Union, and secure these countries for ourselves. The influence of America in the Philippines must be destroyed and this group of islands brought under our control. . . ."¹

Added to the world situation, conducive to a stroke of adventure in China, and to the inner conditions of Japan which compelled some distracting move, was the accessory state of affairs in China. The Kuomintang at the moment of Japan's invasion of Manchuria was engrossed in the third

¹ Quoted in *War in China*, by Ray Stewart (New York: International Pamphlets).

anti-Communist expedition. In July and August 1931, objectively complementary to Japan's bold scheme, there was organized an offensive by Feng Yu-hsiang against Chang Hsueh-liang, son of Chang Tso-lin, who had succeeded to his father's position as ruler of Manchuria. Feng's forces made a threatening advance on the Peiping-Tientsin area. Countering this move, Chang Hsueh-liang transferred more than 40,000 of his 200,000 troops to the civil war battle region. Japanese agents were also unusually busy at this time, instigating one Chinese militarist against another. It is not entirely clear what hand they had in precipitating the Feng-Chang combat; but the Chinese press at the time did flatly charge that the Japanese representatives encouraged anti-Nanking factions in Canton to intensify their separatist efforts just prior to the Manchurian incident.

A brief comment on the stakes involved in Manchuria would be helpful here. The Three Eastern Provinces are to Japanese capitalism a veritable "life line." The success or failure of the Manchurian venture determines the future of Japanese imperialism. Bound up with the fate of Manchuria is the question of the next World War, certainly its Pacific phase. Inextricably connected with the Manchurian events are Japan's preparations for war against the Soviet Union, as well as the problem of war against Japan's chief Pacific competitor, the United States. As later events emphasized, not only is the whole future of China involved in the outcome of the Manchurian and subsidiary issues, but Japan's relations to Britain, Germany, Europe, Australasia, and the American continent, particularly the United States and Canada, are conditioned by the seizure of Manchuria. Japan's invasion of Manchuria brought Japan's army to the very border of the Soviet Union and of the Mongolian People's

Republic; and it created an entirely new basis for her relations with Britain and the United States on the one hand, and Germany and Italy on the other.

Manchuria comprises 382,000 square miles and has a population of more than 30,000,000, of which fully ninety-five per cent are Chinese. Its resources are immense and its economic potentialities unequalled in the Far East. A great possible granary and cattle range for starving China, Manchuria dominated by Japan would become a raw-material reservoir for Japanese industry. Manchurian coal, iron, oil, timber, leather, wool, cotton, and other such raw materials are of particular importance to Japan, not only because of their relative abundance but because of their proximity to Japan in the event of war. The rich, fertile fields of Manchuria, the millions of acres of virgin soil, its vast available cheap labour power, to Japan are so many pawns of empire.

Given the slightest knowledge of Japan's development as a capitalist and imperialist nation at the expense of China, it is not surprising to find her attempting completely to control Manchuria. In fact, the plans for the severance of Manchuria could not be concealed. Like the Purloined Letter, the intention was so obvious as to be overlooked by some of the most scrutinous observers. The scheme had been prepared in such detail, and with such daring, that the basic document outlining this project, compiled by Baron Tanaka, chief author of Japan's "positive policy," was looked upon askance, as too fantastic to be anything but a forgery. Yet only if the accomplished deeds of history themselves can be considered forged can we convincingly argue that the Tanaka document, exhaustively foretelling Japan's invasion of Manchuria, is spurious.

Premier Tanaka presented his now infamous *Memorial* to

the Emperor of Japan of July 25, 1927, when the grandeur of his vision had been inflamed by the plight of Japan's imperialist competitors in China as a result of the revolutionary events of 1925-7. The document since has had a very interesting history. It is one of those instruments that every diplomat uses to obtain an accurate analysis of Sino-Japanese events; and yet when pressed, all refuse to affirm its authenticity. Of course, the official Japanese spokesmen vehemently repudiate it. The Tanaka *Memorial* first came to light in China in the autumn of 1929, shortly after the death of Baron Tanaka. Though the League of Nations has denied its "genuineness," the records of the League itself are the best proof of its authenticity. The American press, while recording its existence, at first remained neutral regarding its reliability. On May 15, 1932, however, the *New York Times* published "both sides" of the issue, adducing more proof of the authenticity of the Tanaka plan of Manchurian conquest than refutations. Generally speaking, it must be pointed out that all the major moves of Japan in China have been premeditated and plotted almost in blue-print fashion. Certainly it cannot be denied that a reading of the Tanaka *Memorial* will show that since its discovery, in 1929, it has been adhered to with remarkable faithfulness in the general scheme of Japanese invasion in Manchuria and Inner Mongolia and in the designs against the integrity of North China. Its still more ambitious proposals are yet to be realized.

In his *Memorial* Baron Tanaka declares that the new field of adventure embraced territories three times the size of Japan proper. He goes to great pains to describe the unrivaled natural wealth of Manchuria. The Baron says that Japan gained a foothold in South Manchuria as a result of its successes in the Russo-Japanese War of 1905, and had

erected a monster trust, the South Manchurian Railway, together with a vast network of banks, warehouses, steamship lines, mines, ironworks, etc. Out of the more than \$1,000,000,000 Japan had invested in China at the time Tanaka wrote his pæan of conquest in 1927, Japan had \$750,000,000 invested in Manchuria, with fifty per cent of this sum in the gigantic, all-powerful, semi-government body, the South Manchurian Railway Company. "It is veritably the largest single investment and the strongest organization of our country," declared Tanaka. The company had the same powers then in South Manchuria that the Japanese Governor-General had in Korea.

Baron Tanaka then deplored the Japanese diplomatic defeats following the World War. His paramount complaint is directed against the Washington Conference of 1922, when the United States destroyed the Anglo-Japanese alliance and sponsored the Nine-Power Pact which recognized the integrity of China, including Manchuria, and advanced the aims of the United States—the desire to win the greatest share of the Chinese markets through the "open-door" policy. The Baron's accusation was taken up with more fervour by virtually all official Japanese spokesmen since the Manchurian war. For example, Dr. Inazo Nitobe, in his American speeches during 1932, insisted that all such treaties as the Washington Conference Nine-Power Treaty, the Briand-Kellogg pact, if they interfered with Japanese hegemony in the Far East, were to be considered as proverbial scraps of paper. The same theme was followed by General Nobuyoshi Muto in August 1932, when he was appointed Japan's Plenipotentiary Extraordinary to the puppet state of Manchukuo, which the Japanese army had created in Manchuria, and commander of the Kwangtung garrison in Manchuria. It was

further emphasized by General Sadao Araki, War Minister of Japan, the leading military figure in the Manchurian invasion.

Premier Tanaka, however, stated the Japanese position with unabashed clarity:

"The Washington Conference had reduced our special rights and privileges in Manchuria and Mongolia. . . . The very existence of our country is endangered. Unless these obstacles are removed, our national existence will be insecure and our national strength will not develop. Moreover, the resources of wealth are congregated in North Manchuria. If we do not have the right of way here, it is obvious that we shall not be able to tap the riches of this country."

The Tanaka document contains the best published political analysis of the strategic military and economic importance of the railway system of Manchuria, as well as the future aims of Japanese imperialism with regard to them. "Transportation," wrote Premier Tanaka, with his customary bluntness and transparency, "is the mother of national defence, the assurance of victory and the citadel of economic development." China, he said, had then only 7,200 to 7,300 miles of railroads, 3,000 of which—constituting more than two fifths of the whole—were in Manchuria and Mongolia, within Japan's easy grasp. He added that more were needed, at least five to six thousand miles, to be connected with strategic Japanese centres leading from the interior of Manchuria and Mongolia to various Manchurian and Korean ports which would become Japanese strongholds. But above all (and this is significant for the events which followed in the Manchurian war), Premier Tanaka said: "It is a pity that our railroads are mostly in South Manchuria, which cannot reach the sources of wealth in the northern parts." Hence the

northward drive and the designs on the Chinese Eastern Railway, then jointly owned by China and the Soviet Union.

As a remedy for the lack of railroads in the north of Manchuria, according to Tanaka, Japanese military strategists would proceed as follows: "By pretending to check the southern advance of Soviet Russia as a first step, we could gradually force our way into North Manchuria and exploit the natural resources. . . ."

The problem of mastering China, the Baron was well aware, was not purely a Sino-Japanese issue, for in his *Memo-rial* to the Emperor he states the basic issues thus:

"In the future if we want to control China, we must first crush the United States just as in the past we had to fight the Russo-Japanese War. . . .

"The Nine-Power Treaty is entirely an expression of the spirit of commercial rivalry. It was the intention of England and America to crush our influence in China with their power of wealth. The proposed reduction of armaments is nothing but a means to limit our military strength, making it impossible for us to conquer the vast territory of China. On the other hand, China's resources of wealth will be entirely at their disposal. It is merely a scheme by which England and America may defeat our plans. And yet the Minseito [Party] made the Nine-Power Treaty the important thing and emphasized our *trade* rather than our *rights* in China. This is a mistaken policy—a policy of national suicide. England can afford to talk about trade relations only because she has India and Australia to supply her with foodstuffs and other materials. So can America because South America and Canada are there to supply her needs. Their spare energy could be entirely devoted to developing trade in China to enrich themselves, but in Japan her food supply and raw materials de-

crease in proportion to her population. If we merely hope to develop trade, we shall eventually be defeated by England and America, who possess unsurpassable capitalistic power. In the end, we shall get nothing."

The most prescient statement in the entire document, after the conquest and the dangers of conflict with other powers are outlined, is the warning made by Tanaka:

"A more dangerous factor is the fact that the people of China might some day wake up. . . ."

With this brief preliminary we pass on to the actual conquest of Manchuria and its manifold consequences.

However carefully drawn its comprehensive plans for invasion, Japan's pretexts for their execution have most often been transparently crude. The invasion of Manchuria was hardly an exception. That the blowing-up of a piece of track of the South Manchurian Railway, near Mukden, on September 18, 1931, was the flimsiest excuse for the incursion into Manchuria was widely acknowledged outside of official Japanese circles. Henry L. Stimson throws a revealing sidelight on the premeditation of the attack. He begins his book *The Far Eastern Crisis* by relating the extremely strange coincidence of the departure from Washington of the Japanese Ambassador to the United States, Katsuji Debuchi, twenty-four hours before Japanese troops began to tighten their mailed grasp over hapless Manchuria. Ambassador Debuchi's subterfuge for departure, as expressed to the then Secretary of State Stimson, was a triennial leave, to begin September 17, 1931. The reader of Mr. Stimson's book is left with the ineradicable impression that Ambassador Debuchi was in a hurry to get away, being fully apprised of what was coming and anxiously desirous of escaping the consequent diplomatic furor.

Most convincing, we believe, in destroying the Japanese claim of "provocation" in the South Manchurian Railway explosion is the fact that on the very same afternoon, several hundred miles away from Mukden, and acting obviously in accordance with prearranged orders, Japanese troops simultaneously occupied such strategic centres as Antung, Changchun, and Newchang, while Mukden was being taken under control by the Japanese army. Within forty-eight hours of the military coup in Mukden on September 18, 1931, not only was the whole of South Manchuria in the grip of the Japanese military, but several Chinese-owned railroads were seized, and more than a hundred thousand Chinese soldiers disarmed and dispersed. Japan's case against China, justifying the seizure of Manchuria, was taken seriously in none of the chancelleries outside of Japan. Besides charging the usual violation by China of the unequal treaties, the main events listed by Japan to vindicate her deeds are generally given as follows:

1. The alleged kidnapping and execution by Chinese soldiers, on January 27, 1931, of Captain Shintaro Nakamura, a Japanese military agent who had been plotting and intriguing with Mongolian princes.
2. A Korean-Chinese riot, in July 1931, over the digging of a ditch in rice lands of disputed ownership, eighteen miles from Changchun, Manchuria, in which the Japanese charge that rights of Japanese subjects (Koreans) were violated.
3. The subsequent anti-Chinese riots in Seoul, Korea, beginning July 4, 1931, in which hundreds of Chinese lost their lives.
4. The widespread and effective anti-Japanese trade boycott in China which followed the Seoul events.
5. Lastly, Japan's claim that Chinese soldiers blew up a

section of track of the South Manchurian Railway at Liutaikou, near Mukden, September 18, 1931.

The methods and diplomacy of Japan's invasion of Manchuria were used as a model by Mussolini in his later war against Ethiopia, but in the latter instance the matter of pretext was reduced to a ghastly absurdity. The Japanese *casus belli* were no more valid than Mussolini's later claims against Ethiopia in 1934 in the spurious dispute at Wal-Wal over the demarcation of the boundary between Ethiopia and Italian Somaliland. World public opinion was generally convinced soon after the actual invasion of Ethiopia that the Italian pretexts for invasion were deliberately manufactured. The technique developed by Japan in Manchuria and borrowed by Italy against Ethiopia became so patently fraudulent that many who were inclined to accept the genuineness of Japan's grievances against China were later constrained to be less gullible.

Japan's movements in Manchuria were swift. By October 1931 the Japanese armed forces had advanced to Tsitsihar, capital of Heilungkiang, the northernmost province of Manchuria, several hundred miles north of the South Manchurian Railway. Though there was sporadic and at times heroic resistance by scattered bands of the remnants of Chang Hsueh-liang's armies, who either did not or could not retreat from North China, Japan soon established her rule over the greater part of Manchuria.

Regardless of the discordant diplomatic result of Japan's attack on Manchuria, her intensive drive northward towards the Soviet border was a hopeful and desirable turn of events for Britain and the United States. With the people at home clamouring for relief, with the banking crisis threatening the very foundations of the existing order in these countries, both

the London and the Washington governments, at the time, saw saving advantages in a likely Japano-Soviet war. For the Hoover government it held out the inviting prospect of killing two birds with one stone, a threat to the Soviet system and a distraction—probably a ruinous one—for its Japanese competitor. The Japanese militarists, however, felt they had their hands full in attempting to subdue Manchuria and facing the danger of an aroused China; and they warily avoided the pitfall of extending the northward march to a war against the Soviet Union.

It was not, therefore, until Japan decided to strengthen its domination in southern Manchuria and along the Great Wall of China, when, more specifically, its troops had pushed down to Chinchow and Shanhaikwan, that the interests of these powers clashed sharply.

Secretary of State Stimson exhaustively describes the energetic efforts of the United States government to reach an agreement with Britain for joint measures to hinder Japan by invoking the Nine-Power Treaty. The very factors which prompted Japan to execute her plans of conquest were also productive of intensified antagonism between the United States and Great Britain, making impossible, for the time being, any concerted action against a common competitor and a common threat. England's failure to join in invoking the Nine-Power Pact against Japan's invasion of Manchuria encouraged the Tokyo militarists. As subsequent events showed, the invasion of Manchuria as a prelude to further attacks on China was an encouragement to Fascism and a powerful stimulus aggravating the dangers of a new world war.

The invasion of Manchuria confronted the harassed Chinese people with unprecedented jeopardy to their national

integrity and their hopes of national liberation. It is only natural, therefore, that the most fervent anti-Japanese agitation should manifest itself in Shanghai, where the conscious political élite of China reside, where are found the most concentrated group of the Chinese proletariat, students, intellectuals, petty bourgeoisie, and political leaders. Besides, Japan, too, was deeply aware that her complete preoccupation in Manchuria and North China, which resulted in stirring the witches' cauldron of inter-imperialist antagonisms, undermined her position in Shanghai and the Yangtze Valley. It was consequently inevitable, and not a blunder, as the more sensitive Japanese publicists apologetically insist, that the Manchurian war should have been extended to include the vicinity of Shanghai.

Shanghai is the most vital trade artery through which the foreign powers bleed China, for it is the principal base of operations for the penetration of the Chinese markets. Fifty-seven per cent of China's imports and thirty-one per cent of her exports pass through this modern industrial city on the Whangpoo. Most of the foreign interests in China, particularly industrial, banking, shipping, and commercial, centre in Shanghai. Next to Manchuria, Shanghai has the largest share of Japan's investments in China. Shanghai, too, is the citadel of all the conflicting imperialists.

The boycott movement against Japanese goods and services had grown by leaps and bounds, especially in Shanghai. Therefore, to crush what was undeniably developing into serious national action for the salvation of China against Japanese invasion, the Japanese decided not only to teach the Chinese of Shanghai a lesson but to bolster the Manchurian action by a thrust at the very gateway of central China.

Commenting on the Shanghai war, K. K. Kawakami, fore-

most Japanese publicist in the United States, in his book *Japan Speaks on the Sino-Japanese Crisis*,¹ writing after the consequences of the hostilities had become disastrously different from what the initiators expected, apologetically declared: "Whatever the official explanation, whatever the extenuating circumstances, Japan's single-handed intervention in the Shanghai area is a blunder of the first magnitude."

The exceptional fact about the Shanghai political atmosphere after the Japanese military moves in Manchuria was not that there was so much anti-Japanese sentiment but that there were surprisingly few anti-Japanese incidents. If the Japanese version is to be believed, then the Shanghai war was started because one Japanese Buddhist monk who passed the San Yue Towel Company was killed by a group of textile workers, though Japanese *ronins* (gangsters), in retaliation, had burned the factory to the ground and killed several Chinese.

As a matter of fact, the Nanking government abased itself in its eagerness to remove all cause for trouble in Shanghai with the Japanese authorities. The Kuomintang central régime had been reorganized with Wang Ching-wei as the nominal head (later proved to be leader of the pro-Japanese faction in the Chinese government) when Chiang Kai-shek, to save face, had temporarily withdrawn, though retaining his grip on the government apparatus, particularly the army.

In the crisis of Nanking's rule and the subsequent inner militarist intrigue, the 19th route army of Fukien province was transferred to the Shanghai area; and the presence of this intrepid force had the most important bearing on China's future. The 19th route army, it will be recalled, had been

¹ New York: The Macmillan Co.; 1932.

employed in the unsuccessful venture of the third anti-Communist expedition.

Though on September 21, 1932, a few days after the first anniversary of the Manchurian invasion, Mayor Wu Teh-chen of Greater Shanghai had fully agreed to every one of the degrading demands of the ultimatum submitted by the Japanese authorities in connection with the San Yue Towel Company incident, still abject capitulation did not save Shanghai from its bloodiest experience.

The Japanese Consul General at Shanghai, it is true, had declared himself fully satisfied that Japan's demands had been sedulously complied with; but he evidently was not entirely apprised of the plans of the military. Admiral Shiosawa, commander of the Japanese fleet in Chinese waters, then took charge of the affair where the diplomatic authorities left off. He ordered the Chinese authorities forthwith to withdraw all Chinese troops from admittedly Chinese territory in Chapei. The command was the signal for Japanese action.

On January 28, 1932 the Japanese military made their thrust at Chapei and the Shanghai area. Had they been forewarned of the political consequences and of the nationalist repercussions of the magnificent defence that China was to make, it is extremely doubtful whether Japan would ever have undertaken the attack. China's response to the Shanghai war was the beginning of the serious unification of the entire nation against Japanese invasion. Few in China at the time realized what the effect of the shock would be. And while the Chinese of the entire world responded to the appeal for funds to aid the defence of Shanghai, it was only afterwards that the most important and lasting steps towards national unity were taken.

For these reasons the Shanghai war deserves more detailed description than has been given here to other battles. On January 28, two thousand Japanese marines, assisted by a motley group of armed Japanese business men, merchants, *ronins*, and numerous shady characters marched to Chapei confident that mere show of strength and terrorism would be sufficient to allow them to pass. Small parties were dropped off at alleyways and side streets and began firing indiscriminately at every Chinese they saw.

As usual, the Japanese accused the Chinese of opening hostilities. But even the well-known *North China Daily News* of Shanghai, which could scarcely conceal its support of the general Japanese objective of "teaching a lesson" to the Chinese, said on February 11, 1932: "The intentions of the Japanese were well known. At 8.30 that night [January 28] there was not a newspaperman in town that did not know that something was up; not one of them that did not know that somewhere between 11 p.m. and 2 a.m. the next day the Japanese would move into Chapei." Furthermore, the League of Nations Committee in Shanghai, composed of Italian, German, British, Spanish, American, Norwegian, and French consular representatives, in its first report admitted that Japanese marines and armed Japanese civilians had been mobilized at Naval Landing Force Headquarters on January 28, for the express purpose of an attack on Chapei.

To defend Chapei, the 19th route army had already taken up defensive positions, concentrating especially on the Northern Railway Station. The first Japanese offensive was met with a resounding rebuff. The Japanese forces, after a furious battle, in which the general population of Chapei took part, finally gave up their attempt. Having suffered severe losses, the Japanese attackers retired to their defensive lines in

Japanese-controlled Hongkew. They left behind them at least two hundred Japanese casualties, a cost they never intended to pay. Exasperated at their failure, they began to set fire to all Chinese homes in their path.

The importance of the initial reverses of the Japanese attack was attested to by one of the most stubborn enemies of Chinese independence, the die-hard British imperialist H. G. W. Woodhead. On January 30, 1932 Mr. Woodhead wrote in the *Shanghai Evening Post and Mercury*: "The check suffered by the Japanese had undoubtedly been a grievous surprise to them. It was a surprise, but a joyful surprise to the Chinese, who have tried to exploit their initial success by systematic sniping, which has been carried on far behind the Japanese defence lines on the Hongkew boundary. So that, on the one hand, we have a nation which prides itself on its military and naval powers smarting under an unexpected reverse; and on the other, a nation accustomed to defeat and humiliation at the hands of foreign armed forces exuberant over what has been magnified into a great victory."

The Shanghai war lasted until March 2, 1932. It spread rapidly, extending along a front of twelve miles, from Chapei to Woosung—that is, from the Shanghai banks of the Whangpoo to the mouth of the Yangtze River. Before its conclusion the Japanese had concentrated a huge army of 100,000 men, 40 war vessels, hundreds of field guns, tanks, and scores of fighting planes. The Chinese defence forces consisted of 30,000 men of the 19th route army and 12,000 of the 87th and 88th divisions of the Nanking armies and of the salt-tax regiment.

Chiang Kai-shek withheld the military support at his command in the Shanghai area from the defending forces. Nevertheless, the resistance of the Chinese armies in the

fight against a foreign power was unprecedented in the annals of China's history. The Chinese defenders planted themselves in the conglomerate maze of ditches that made up the battlefield, becoming almost part of the very soil they were defending, and they proved to be equally unyielding. The heroic and stubborn defence of the Chinese created a severe military crisis for Japan. Admiral Shiosawa was replaced in the naval command by Rear Admiral Uyenatsa. Lieutenant General Uyeda gave way to General Shirakawa.

Thwarted in their first sallies, the Japanese resorted to the most frightful punishment of the civilian population of Chapei, a foretaste of Madrid and Guernica. The city was savagely bombed from the air, again setting precedents for Mussolini and General Franco. Thousands of Chinese non-combatants in Chapei and in the country and villages all the way to Woosung at the mouth of the Yangtze were brutally bayoneted or shot while trying to escape from their homes set ablaze by Japanese incendiaries. The ferocious disappointment of the arrogant Japanese militarists over the unexpected defence of the Chinese—a defence which tapped the deepest national sentiments of the Chinese throughout the world—was assuaged by atrocities against the civilian population, including the deliberate bombardment of refugee camps.

The Chinese soldiers firmly entrenched in the mud and ditches of the Whangpoo shore fought and lived through the most withering barrages aimed at them from ship, air, and land batteries. The Japanese military machine was bogged down, dismayed, made ridiculous.

Actually, the 19th route army was never defeated by the Japanese along the Whangpoo. But the Nanking government was able to prevail upon Generals Tsai Ting-kai and

Chiang Kwang-nai, leaders of the Fukien defenders of Chapei, to sound the retreat. Either the Shanghai fighting had to be transformed into a national war of liberation—a situation that Chiang Kai-shek was not at that time ready to meet because he was bent on continuing his campaign against the Chinese Red army, and because the pro-Japanese faction at Nanking was still strong—or an honourable retreat had to be negotiated. Moreover, the military sabotage inflicted by the Nanking militarists on the defending armies had aided the Japanese. For instance, Liuho, a village in the rear of the defenders, to the north on the Yangtze River, was left unguarded, and Japanese troops had landed threatening to envelop and annihilate the Chinese armies. Ammunition was withheld, and the Japanese were able to obtain some of the most important plans of the defending army.

In the early morning hours of March 2, 1932, motorcycle dispatchers rode along the Chinese trenches shouting the order for retreat. Up to that moment the Japanese armies had not broken the Chinese defence lines. The Chinese troop commanders were reluctant to believe the official message. But the top command insisted. Some soldiers who refused to retreat were disarmed. A few were shot by their officers. Still others, retaining their rifles, hid and remained behind while the main body retreated. They fought to the last man.

The casualties at Shanghai were higher than in the entire fighting in Manchuria up to that time. The Chinese lost 4,274 dead in the thirty-three days of fighting and suffered 9,830 wounded, with 625 missing. The Japanese War Office never published complete figures, but claimed that they had lost only 385 men and officers—obviously a gross understatement.

On the Chinese side, however, the military casualties were

comparatively the smallest loss. The principal battlefield, purposely chosen by the Japanese command, was the most densely populated Chinese areas; the war zone was inhabited by 814,084 civilians. The population, especially in Chapei, was subjected to repeated incendiary air bombardments and devastatingly heavy military fire. As a result, more than 6,000 men, women, and children were killed, 2,000 were wounded—and, most significant of all, 10,000 were reported missing! From all accounts, the “missing” were civilians who were either buried in the ruins of their huts or slaughtered like cattle.¹

So horrifying were the atrocities committed against the Chinese non-combatants that foreign residents of Shanghai, generally unsympathetic to the Chinese anti-imperialist struggles and for the most part comprising employees of foreign concerns, men hardened to maltreatment of colonial natives, could not remain mute. I do not propose here to catalogue the Japanese efforts to frighten 450,000,000 Chinese into accepting the loss of Manchuria, but a few illustrations are imperative. For example, I quote below portions of a letter written by Hans Krenn, a resident of Shanghai, published February 3, 1932 in the *Shanghai Evening Post and Mercury*, an American-owned daily newspaper:

“The streets were strewn with dead bodies. Yelping hungry dogs were tearing them apart. . . . We shot to scare them but the dogs did not stay away. We saw dark figures creeping up to a house and set fire to it. When the Chinese who lived there ran from the smoking house they were shot down in their tracks. I saw four bodies slump to the ground as they left the doors. There were men, women, and children.

¹ *Japan's Undeclared War* (Shanghai: Chinese Chamber of Commerce; 1932).

A Chinese shopwoman who lived across the street started to leave her shop, her baby in her arms, when she was shot down. The next day she was still alive, her baby clinging to her. Chinese servants in one of the houses in the Terrace ran out and picked her up. She was carried into one of the houses and given attention. . . . When Chinese attempted to remove the bodies of the dead, they were assailed with rifle and machine-gun fire from the Japanese. They were forced to leave the bodies to rot in the street and be torn apart by the dogs."

From the copious eyewitness reports of Japanese barbarities comes the following, a first-hand description of the war at Kiangwan, written February 22, 1932 by T. O. Thackery, then editor of the *Shanghai Evening Post and Mercury*:

"The entrance to my favourite stand [at the racecourse] is blocked with corpses, fresh corpses, newly made before my eyes. . . .

"There are women and children among them; women shot through the back, their padded coats run through with military sabres; children whose bodies are riddled with bullets; men garbed as peasant farmers heaped grotesquely about, their wounds soaking the ground.

"They are not garbed as soldiers—not even the women and children—so I suppose they must have been snipers, officially. I suppose so because my very dear friends at headquarters and the Japanese Legation assure me—are at pains to point out to me, that the Japanese army and navy are not making war on civilians, nor upon Chinese peasants—nor upon the Chinese government, nor upon government troops—but merely the 19th route army from Canton. . . .

"It is difficult to ask them now.

"The houses are burned; I saw them burned, with neat

precision, not a wasted match, nor an extra piece of kindling.

"And they? Their corpses sweeten the ground beneath the judges' stand; one whose body was soaked in oil and now lies charred beneath the officials' tower will till no crops again; they lie in little heaps along the grass before the stands, where, on that Race Day recently, the children played and chased elusive butterflies.

"And as I walk the top rail, scuffling through the glass which crashed from rifle-butt attacks upon the upper tier, a tragedy of Peace—for remember this is not a war—unfolds beneath my eyes.

"An infantry company just preparing for its duty in the hand-to-hand fighting on ahead in Kiangwanchen, pauses to watch the drama with me; I above and they below. The flames from burning farm-huts throw a curtain of red behind new captive groups of those who fled the fire.

"An officer turns one of the peasant-garbed group away, to face the sun. His shining sabre flashes, up to its hilt in the human sheath; the body falls; a second takes its place, and once again the sabre finds its pulsing scabbard.

"And now, a diversion; the next, a tall and likely lad, is flung unbound face down, upon the two who clutch the panting earth in death; and as he falls, a volley from six officers' revolvers make a minor outline on his back and courses up his spine. The volley dies, the pistols now are empty, the jerking figure on the ground is still and another takes his turn. I leave for fear is on me now; the sunshine goes; my feet are lead."

In the aerial bombardment the Japanese pilots not only wiped out Chapei but aimed especially at Chinese textile plants competing with the Japanese. The property loss was

extremely high, the Chinese Chamber of Commerce placing it at \$1,483,461,854 (Chinese).

In the truce signed after the retreat of the Chinese armies, the Japanese made certain of a stronger military position, of humiliating conditions for the further subjugation of China. But though the superior Japanese army seemed to be master of the situation after the Shanghai war, something had happened to China that never left it the same. There was indignant disappointment with the retreat. The conditions of the peace were shocking to the Chinese and irritating to the imperialists competing for hegemony in Shanghai.

If the Japanese expected an abatement of the anti-Japanese movement in Shanghai as a result of the war they were to be disappointed, for besides a general strike of more than a hundred thousand textile workers in Japanese mills lasting for the duration of armed hostilities, the entire student body of Shanghai was quickened into political consciousness. The anti-Japanese boycott in Shanghai took on more violent forms, with students becoming the heroes of the hour by bombing the shops of Chinese violators of the boycott.

While for some time there was an apparent slackening of the anti-Japanese movement, it was only a surface phenomenon. The resistance to Japanese invasion had reached a new historical high point. There was only a short lull before it gathered new strength and new methods of struggle from the experience in Shanghai. The Shanghai war, taken together with the continued resistance of the partisan troops in Manchuria, more than anything else created a feeling of national pride. That feeling went through an incubation period.

Chiang Kai-shek and the other Nanking leaders did not

comprehend then that a national transformation had taken place in China. Time and further political developments were required to bring this change to fruition. While the seizure of Manchuria marked a new period of invasion and dismemberment of China, the Shanghai resistance revealed an unprecedented fighting spirit on the part of Chinese everywhere.

The attitude of the other imperialists with regard to the significance of the Shanghai events is well expressed by Henry L. Stimson, when he says:

"Upon foes and friends alike, the long courageous defence [at Shanghai] had produced effects which were as fundamental as they were unexpected. Japan was only too ready to withdraw from a situation which was giving her nothing but embarrassment; and China, according to all advices, was for the first time in the history of the Republic thrilling with a national feeling of courage and unity."¹

Japan, clearly, was put on the defensive before the entire world. The conquest aggravated antagonism between the competing foreign interests in China and had an important effect on the League of Nations, then considering China's protest against Japan. The Shanghai war especially had a bearing in marking Japan as China's chief imperialist adversary, making it possible as well as desirable for China to negotiate and manoeuvre with the United States and Great Britain. The anti-imperialist struggle was becoming exclusively an anti-Japanese campaign.

Yet before this unity, which even the Secretary of State in the Cabinet of Herbert Hoover observed emerging, was to become a national reality, the Nanking government was to

¹ *The Far Eastern Crisis*, p. 132.

make its most concerted attempt to destroy the Chinese Soviets and the Red army. This very attempt, however, paradoxically enough, helped to engender the conditions which ultimately put Nanking face to face with the inevitability of re-forming the ruptured Kuomintang-Communist unity.

While the last shots were being fired in the Shanghai area, the Japanese hastened to set up a new government in Manchuria, as a step to the ultimate transformation of the Three Eastern Provinces into a virtual colony. The technique had already been fully developed and legally tested in the history of Korea after the Sino-Japanese war. An "independence" movement that publicly bore the label "Made in Japan" was engineered. This was quickly followed by the erection of a new state, Manchukuo—Manchu-land—with a cut-and-dried government installed by Tokyo. Henry Pu Yi, the last bearer of the title of Manchu Emperor, was invited to become "chief executive" of the new state of Manchukuo. He was later dubbed "Emperor Kang Teh." The Japanese looked forward to the reign of Kang Teh as a hopeful one for the re-establishment of the Manchu dynasty, revived by the blood and iron of Japan, ruling over a China completely subjected to Japanese genius.

Meanwhile China's appeal to the League of Nations against Japan's invasion of Manchuria, though entirely futile in evoking redress, did have important international consequences. China's protests to the League led finally to the withdrawal of Japan from that body, a step that was followed later by the resignation of Fascist Germany. This purged the League of two leading potential aggressors; and though it did not save China nor give it any substantial hope of reparation from Geneva, it did serve to widen the gap between the ag-

gressor powers and those who desired, for their own preservation, the maintenance of the *status quo*, particularly in colonial relations.

Later the Soviet Union was able to join the League of Nations, having entered into a pact for mutual assistance with France, seriously hampering Japan's plans for war simultaneously against China and the Soviet Union, as well as ultimately against the United States. Moreover, on December 13, 1932 the Nanking government re-established diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union, healing a breach that had been instigated by Britain in 1927. The resumption of diplomatic ties between China and the U.S.S.R. was repugnant to the Japanese militarists.

By its invasion of Manchuria, Japan had clearly violated Article X of the Covenant of the League of Nations. It had, moreover, run afoul of Article II of the Pact of Paris, and into the bargain had repudiated its commitments under the Nine-Power Treaty which obligated all its signatories "to respect the sovereignty, the independence, and the territorial and administrative integrity of China" and "to provide the fullest and the most unembarrassed opportunity to China to develop and maintain for herself an effective and stable government." By its violations Japan simultaneously strained its relations with the leading signatories, especially the United States and Great Britain. Yet Great Britain was not ready to collaborate with the United States for joint pressure on Japan to ensure the enforcement either of the League Covenant or of the Washington Conference treaties. Under British prompting, however, the so-called Lytton Commission was set up for the purpose of investigating China's complaints and, on the basis of British needs and the requirements of propitiating the other powers involved, of striving to find

some conciliatory solution that would neither help China nor hurt Japan.

The resulting report of the Lytton Commission¹ can be described as an effort on the part of Great Britain to compromise with Japan over the invasion of Manchuria. The various facets of Britain's evident policy contained such contradictory aims as attempts to conciliate Japan, placate its other rival, the United States, and keep the Tokyo government within the League of Nations by granting it certain substantial concessions in Manchuria just short of complete recognition of her conquest.

It was not then the temper of Japan to compromise, however. Furthermore, the pressure on the part of the United States and China forced a complete rupture between Japan and the League of Nations over the adoption of the extremely mollifying Lytton Report. The plans of Japanese aggrandizement were far beyond what the other interested powers were ready to accede to.

In fact, around the discussion of the Manchurian issue before the League of Nations Assembly there developed a practical united front of the smaller nations who had reason to fear similar treatment themselves at some time or other at the hands of the bigger aggressive powers surrounding their territories. They rightly regarded the fate of China as a warning of the perils to their national independence. The stand of the Latin American nations, of Czechoslovakia, Turkey, Ireland, and Austria, to mention some of those insisting on adoption of the Lytton Report, can well be understood.

When the League had spoken—not at all harshly against

¹ *Report of the Commission of Inquiry, League of Nations*, No. c-663, M 330, 1932, VII, Chapter III, Part I.

Japan, for its conquests were left intact—nevertheless, on March 27, 1933, Japan gave notice of her withdrawal from membership of the League of Nations. And thus a new situation had been created in the League, demonstrating that the Manchurian events were a turning-point not only specifically for China, but in the relations of the world powers.

While the diplomatic battle was going on at Geneva, resistance to Japan's control continued stubbornly in Manchuria. Remnants of the army of General Ma Chan-shan persisted in guerrilla fighting long after the general himself had fled for safety over the Soviet border. These armed detachments of the former units of Generals Ma Chan-shan, Su Ping-wen, and others were and many still are scattered over the country. They roam about seeking an opportunity to hamper and molest the Japanese and Manchukuo mercenary troops. At times they seem to disappear, but only because they become lost in the population, remaining potentially one of the greatest menaces to the consolidation of Japanese rule. When occasion arises they will certainly spring up again, dig up their buried arms, and go into action. Describing the permanent character of the anti-Japanese volunteers in Manchuria, a writer in the *China Weekly Review* of June 15, 1932 stated:

"For the development of events has taken such a course that many countrymen of Manchuria take up arms regardless of whether they are swayed by generals or not, and go to fight the Japanese expeditionary forces. The lack or absence of arms or munitions does not stop them. They forge swords and spears, and form themselves into military units, elect a leader from among themselves, and go to battle."

Peasant groups, for example, under the leadership of Wang Teh-lin, continued guerrilla fighting long after Japan an-

nounced that all resistance had been "crushed." The spirit of revolt will undoubtedly continue to live among the thirty million Chinese of Manchuria and will some day be the most potent force in preventing the Japanization of the Three Eastern Provinces. Hundreds of thousands of Chinese peasants living peacefully and apparently unconcerned over the political future of their country actually only await the day and the signal to rise up against the Japanese overlords.

In the early part of 1933 the combative quality of the Chinese armies was again tested in the defence of Chahar province. The Chinese gave a splendid account of themselves, though forced finally to retreat before superior forces. Under the leadership of General Sung Cheh-yuan the 29th army held back the Japanese advance to the Great Wall. Japan began to realize that every further step of invasion was becoming more difficult, and the armed opposition of the Chinese, though defeated, left China stronger and potentially more capable of continuing her resistance.

When Japan had reached that stage in the Manchurian invasion when she considered it incautious to continue further without consolidating her position, on May 31, 1933 she compelled the Chinese government to sign what is known as the Tangku truce. The pact closing the first phase of the invasion of China by Japan, marked by the creation of Manchukuo, was signed on board a Japanese battleship anchored at the little town of Tangku, on the coast a few miles to the east of Tientsin. Actually, the Tangku truce was preparatory to the further invasion of North China. The agreement created a strip of Chinese territory between Manchukuo, Jehol, and a portion of Chahar and North China, as a "*cordon sanitaire*" which could be used by the Japanese as a base for their future plans to attack North China.

The Tangku armistice was signed under the threat of Japanese guns. Its actual conditions were never made public, though even the official communiqué for public consumption was met with the gravest misgivings by the Chinese people. The Peiping branch of the Military Affairs Committee declared that the terms of the Tangku truce were as follows:

1. Chinese troops to be withdrawn to a line extending from the sea, thence running westward slightly to the north of Tientsin, thence to the north of Peiping, and then northward to the Great Wall, but not including Kalgan. (This area was known as the "demilitarized zone." The "demilitarization" feature applied in practice exclusively to the Chinese.)

2. No Chinese troops from the south or west will be permitted to cross this line in the direction of the Great Wall, and Chinese troops are to offer no provocation to the Japanese.

3. Japanese troops, in order to ensure faithful observance of these conditions, are permitted to use airplane reconnaissance or other means, and the Chinese forces must provide full facilities and protection.

4. The area between the line of demarcation and the Great Wall is to be administered by Chinese police.

5. The armistice is to be effective from the day of signature.

Though Wang Ching-wei insisted that the Tangku truce referred strictly to military matters, the majority of foreign observers, as well as the most informed Chinese, insisted that secret conditions further humiliating China were included in the agreement. The rumour was never downed that ultimate recognition of Manchukuo by Nanking was one of the terms. Wang Ching-wei, in an official statement explaining the terms, blamed the entire matter on the "Reds." "Due to the disturbance of the Red bandits in various parts of the coun-

try," he said, "as well as other hindrances, reinforcements could not be dispatched in time [for the battle preceding the signing of the truce], thereby rendering it impossible to carry out the whole military plan."

With the Tangku agreement in their pockets, the Japanese militarists believed they had another concealed weapon to use when the proper time came to continue the process of adding as much of the rest of China as they considered judicious to the already acquired Manchukuo.

In the early days of the Manchurian events Japan discovered the longest lever with which to move Nanking away from efforts at the unification of China and to stave off that day foreseen by Baron Tanaka when "China might wake up." Chiang Kai-shek at that time proposed to the Kuomintang the thesis that no serious anti-Japanese action could be undertaken unless the Communists in the Soviet areas were annihilated. "Destroy the enemy within in order to defeat the enemy without," was his slogan. The Japanese militarists found it convenient for their plans to observe that Chiang Kai-shek made his most determined attempts to destroy the Red army of China when Japan most desired an extension of fighting, on whatever pretext, among Chinese. The Japanese government followed the unalterable practice of including in all of its negotiations with the Chinese government, at every new phase of the advance into China, proposals providing for common action against "Communism" as a common danger. The Tokyo government, savagely brutal to China in all other respects, became most considerably concerned in this regard. It insisted on foisting itself on the Kuomintang as a partner to wipe out the Red army of China and the Soviet territories. The shrewd Japanese strategists knew that here was Nanking's Achilles' heel.

A continuation of war against the Chinese Soviets must necessarily preclude the possibility of national unity against the Japanese invader.

In fact, the more steadily Japan thrust her way into China, it seemed, the more energetic became Chiang's design to crush the Red army and the Soviets in China. The anti-Red expeditions increased in organization and striking-power. Up to the end of 1934, six anti-Soviet campaigns had been carried out at a huge cost in lives and money to China. With the conclusion of its sixth and final unsuccessful expedition to destroy for ever the Red army of China, the Kuomintang had spent more than \$1,000,000,000 (Chinese).¹

On November 7, 1931 the First Congress of the provisional Soviet government of China was opened at Juikin, Kiangsi province. The Japanese invasion of China was the foremost topic of discussion, and the Nanking government was bitterly assailed for its war against Chinese when it should have been fighting the Japanese invaders. The Congress hailed the defeat of the third anti-Communist war. It was reported that the Soviet districts then embraced 300 counties and counted a population of 10,000,000. Realizing that its work was only of a tentative nature, awaiting further victories of the Red army and the consolidation of larger territories as a step towards the eventual unification of China within a Soviet state, the First Soviet Congress nevertheless, besides adopting a model constitution, passed a number of important laws dealing with land, labour, economic policy, and the rights of women.

Soon thereafter, however, the Kuomintang government began the fourth anti-Communist campaign, coincident with the Japanese invasion of Shanghai. The previous costly failures of Nanking dictated the increased scope of the prepara-

¹ *The Manchurian Review*, January 12, 1935.

tions for the fourth attempt. In the fourth expedition 500,000 soldiers were massed. For a while Chiang Kai-shek even obtained the co-operation of the hostile Cantonese generals, although a few defeats made them utterly unreliable allies for Chiang. The fourth anti-Red campaign was fought on a much wider front than the previous ones; nevertheless it likewise ended in a stinging defeat for the Nanking government. It resulted in the enlargement of the Soviet areas and the improvement of the military equipment of the Soviet defenders.

Without much delay, therefore, Nanking launched its fifth expedition against the Chinese Soviets in June 1932. From a military point of view, Nanking began to realize that it could never conquer the Red army of China by arms alone. The history of the 19th route army was too telling to be overlooked. In the war against the Soviet districts the 19th route army was disastrously defeated; yet the same 19th route army wrote an undying record of heroism in the fight against the militarily superior Japanese in and around Shanghai in the spring of 1932.

Nanking, therefore, decided that along with its military campaign must go a semblance of a socio-economic program, particularly a promise of agrarian reform. Nanking hit on the idea of establishing a so-called Rehabilitation Committee with promises to the peasants in any of the districts won away from Soviet rule that the land question would receive careful consideration, and that the peasants would not be driven back to the inferior status they occupied before the Soviets gave them land and riddance from usury, and freedom from oppressive taxation and militarist rule. The military preparations, furthermore, were more ambitious than ever before. Chiang Kai-shek mobilized the major portion of his army,

some 700,000 soldiers, for the fifth attempt to extirpate the Soviets. Meanwhile the Japanese had reinforced their troops in Peiping, Tientsin, and Shanhaikwan, in North China, while the Japanese soldiers at Chinchow numbered above 50,000 preparatory to further invasion of North China.

The fifth anti-Communist campaign gave rise to a paradox. Partial victories of the Kuomintang helped to transfer the entire base of the Soviet areas to more inaccessible regions of greater political importance in the face of Japan's drive into North China. Thus these initial victories of Chiang Kai-shek laid the foundation for the ultimate defeat of the entire program for annihilating the Red army. To illustrate:

In the middle of 1933 the 4th Red army, surrounded by numerically superior forces of the Kuomintang, succeeded in breaking through the ring of opposing armies. The Red army in this area could not re-establish its original Soviet base. Yet the efforts to crush the 4th army failed. It therefore began a northward march with Szechwan province as its objective, presaging an entire change in the strategy of the Red army and the Soviet districts. Here was the first trend of what was to become not only a changed relation within China but a complete shift of the national attitude towards Japan. The 4th Red army defeated all of the local armies in its path and evaded the pursuing force, finally establishing itself in the northern areas of Szechwan.

Gathering thousands of new recruits from the landless and oppressed peasantry, coolies, and workers in its path, the 4th Red army arrived at its destination larger and stronger than it had been in its previous base. Comparatively unmolested, because Chiang could not afford to change his plan of campaign against the Central Soviet area in Kiangsi province, the 4th Red army was able to establish a new strong

centre in northeastern Szechwan. Thus a new Soviet base was founded in inaccessible regions safe from the aims of Nanking's anti-Red campaign.

The first northward orientation of a portion of the Red army was coupled with a significant appeal to the Chinese nation. In January 1933, from its headquarters in Juikin, Kiangsi, the provisional Chinese Soviet government made its first comprehensive offer to all groups within China for united action against Japan. The Red army directed an appeal to the Kuomintang government, to all military leaders, and to all political leaders and groups of China—an appeal that was ultimately to be the cornerstone of a new national unity. These first proposals of the Communist Party of China, barely mentioned in the foreign press at the time and buried by official silence in China, contained the nucleus of the future successful policy of national unity. The most important section of this appeal read:

"We declare before the whole Chinese people: The Red army is prepared to enter into a fighting alliance with any army, or with any body of troops, against the Japanese invasion. Our conditions for such an alliance are: (1) immediate cessation of the offensive against the Soviet districts; (2) immediate granting of democratic rights—freedom of organization, speech, press, and assemblage; (3) immediate arming of the people, and the formation of armed volunteers for the fight for the independence and unity of China."¹

Perhaps one of the greatest blunders of Chiang Kai-shek was during this period to order the 19th route army, after its return to its native province, Fukien, to go to war against the Red army in Fukien and Kiangsi provinces. Though the 19th route army had been weeded of "undesirables"—that is,

¹ *International Press Correspondence*, 1933, p. 91.

of soldiers who in Shanghai had imbibed too deeply of anti-Japanese propaganda—still it became evident that the heroes of the Shanghai war were useless for war against the Chinese revolutionists.

Fukien province, from the viewpoint of anti-Japanese sentiment, holds an unusual position. It is situated on the south coast of China facing Formosa, a Chinese island which became a Japanese colony after the Sino-Japanese war of 1894-5. Fukien is also near the Philippine Islands. It will be recalled that one of the Twenty-one Demands provided that Japan be given naval bases in Fukien. And such a naval station would be invaluable to Japan for a future war against the United States as well as to establish Fukien as a jumping-off place for the conquest of South China. Japanese business interests as military agents have concentrated their attention on Foochow and Amoy for many years. After the invasion of Manchuria they intensified their activity.

However, there was a medley of imperialist intrigue involved in the Fukien civil war of 1933-4. British and American interests were desirous of ousting the Japanese from their dangerous hold in Fukien as well as of making impossible their further entrenchment.

The 19th route army leaders, such as Tsai Ting-kai, Chen Ming-chu, Chiang Kwang-nai, were honestly anti-Japanese and hoped to establish a new Kuomintang revolutionary base for a continuation of such action as the 19th route army had exhibited in the Shanghai war. Fukien also has long been one of the most rebellious of the Chinese provinces. Anti-Japanese sentiment was rife. The cunning Japanese agents in Fukien saw in the prospects of a civil war of the magnitude required to contest for control of the central government the possibilities of destructive fighting of Chinese against Chinese.

Whatever the conscious objectives of the 19th route army leaders and whatever the aims of Chiang Kai-shek in ruthlessly destroying his rival, the effect could be only a general weakening of China. We shall see later how Japan utilized in South and North China her ability to distort genuine anti-Japanese sentiment into internecine civil strife which threatened to result in the self-destruction of the Chinese factions.

Thereupon the 19th route army set up its own revolutionary anti-Japanese government. The Red army in Fukien and Kiangsi took advantage of the strife to arrive at a tacit understanding with the Fukien generals that they would refrain from attacking each other in view of the fact that Chiang Kai-shek was then in the field with his most ambitious project to destroy the Chinese Soviets and its Red armies.

The Nanking government was fully aware of the grave threat that faced it in the Fukien revolt. Chiang moved immediately to crush the uprising. Partly by bribery, partly by swift military action, a much easier matter than attacking the Communists, Chiang Kai-shek by January 1934 was able effectively to crush his Fukien opponents. Meanwhile Chiang Kai-shek's government had been strengthened by the \$50,000,000 wheat and cotton loan of the American government. With the Fukien movement crushed, its leaders went abroad. General Tsai Ting-kai, commander of the 19th route army, came to the United States, where he made some noteworthy declarations for Chinese unity. General Cheng Ming-chu went to London, where he became an active participant in the movement for unity against the Japanese.

However, the events at Fukien only temporarily held off the sixth, last, and most concerted anti-Communist expedition. Chiang Kai-shek's government emerged from the contest with Fukien stronger and more than ever the master of

Kuomintang China, though Canton remained semi-independent, and the authorities at Kwangsi, Kweichow, and Szechwan still ruled unhampered by the Nanking government.

Now Chiang Kai-shek, with the experience of five disastrous anti-Communist expeditions behind him, with a replenished treasury, thanks to American aid, with the confidence that his rear in Fukien was strengthened, set out to execute his most serious military move against the Chinese Soviets. He mobilized the most highly trained and best-equipped army in China. He put a gigantic expedition into the field, numbering more than 700,000 men, not only led by the most experienced Chinese generals, but assisted by a staff of foreign military specialists, headed by the German General Hans von Seeckt, temporarily at odds with the Nazis, but later a member of the German general staff under Hitler.

With his sixth anti-Communist campaign Chiang Kai-shek wrote decisive Chinese history, but not as he had intended it should read. The results were disappointingly contrary to those he had set out to achieve. The Nanking Generalissimo, moreover, was to learn, not without salutary effect for the 450,000,000 Chinese people, that the Chinese Red army was like quicksilver; it could be squeezed out of one place only to slip through the fingers and move swiftly on to another. The world was about to witness a spectacle of military skill, heroism, and dogged determination that was to amaze the enemies of the Chinese Soviets.

The great trek of the Chinese Red army from the south to North China was to demonstrate to the most stubborn disbelievers in the power of Communism in China the indestructible nature of the proletarian-peasant detachments of the Chinese national revolution.

CHAPTER IX

The Red Trek and National Defence

THE loss of Manchuria, Jehol, most of Chahar, and sovereignty over other large areas of North China, brought the prestige of the Kuomintang government to its lowest ebb. To make Nanking's position more disturbing, the economic crisis, which showed definite signs of diminishing in other countries, as late as 1934 had become palpably worse in China.

The Nanking government was still under the ægis of the pro-Japanese faction within the Kuomintang, or, more accurately, under the domination of that Kuomintang clique which insisted that peaceful submission to Japan's demands was the lesser evil.

Chiang Kai-shek's attitude towards Japan, influenced by Wang Ching-wei on the one hand and the Peiping Military Council and Huang Fu on the other, can best be summed up by quoting a résumé of it in the *China Weekly Review* of July 28, 1934, in an article by Chen Fu-sheng entitled: "Some Thought on Shaking Hands with Tokyo War Lords." Mr.

Chen wrote: "To ignore Japan's demands will invite further complications in our relations with Japan; to yield to some of her demands while detrimental to the interests of China may ease the strained relations and thus give China a breathing spell. 'Of two evils, choose the lesser one.' So long as the Red menace is not eliminated and national defence has not been built up, China, unable to make effective military resistance, has no alternative but to compromise. . . ."

Such "compromise," actually a euphemism for capitulation and submission to Japan, was wholly unacceptable to the Chinese people; and Chiang Kai-shek, unable to answer the political attacks made against him and to still the mounting murmurs of the Chinese populace, sought to swerve public attention by a preposterous effort to turn back the tide of Chinese life to Confucian culture of the feudal period with a thin modern veneer. The more Chinese nationality was threatened with extermination, the more Chiang pleaded for a retreat to ancient precepts. The "New Life" or "Return to Confucius" movement was an attempt, by regulating the customs and morals of the people, to influence their political thinking and to keep them away from what Nanking then considered the baneful influence of the Communists and anti-Japanese agitation.

While Japan was making headway territorially against China to the north near the Great Wall, the Chinese industrialists were continuing to lose ground to the Japanese textile-mill owners in Shanghai. In the latter part of 1934, Chinese owned 92 cotton mills with 1,742,754 spindles, while the Japanese-controlled mills, though numbering only 41, had 1,803,484 spindles. The fear was frankly expressed in Chinese industrial circles that continued encroachments of Japanese capitalists in the textile field would lead to the ex-

tinction of Chinese ownership. Thus the invasion of Manchuria and North China was affecting not only the territorial integrity of China but the whole economic life of the country; and this accounted for growing anti-Japanese sentiment among all social strata in China.

To offset the insistently mounting pleas for a firmer policy to resist a Japan made more audacious by its successful aggression, the Nanking government determined once and for all to destroy the Red army of China as proof that it was not slack in its efforts to "unite" the country. The consequence of this was a complete reversal of the military strategy of the Red army and a deep-going change of the political tactics of the Communists. But before relating one of the most amazing military feats in all Chinese history, a phenomenon that completely baffled the Kuomintang generals, it is necessary to trace the rising curve of the anti-Japanese movement.

Under the pressure of the more aggressive endeavours of Japan, the anti-Japanese movement gained new adherents among wider circles of Chinese of the most divergent views and classes. The anti-Japanese spokesmen appeared vociferously articulate, not only because more intellectuals, writers, journalists, and politicians were entering the enlarging group hostile to any further capitulation to Japan, but the new adherents were of a prominence which guaranteed them liberties denied to less fortunately situated workers, peasants, and students.

On August 2, 1934, three thousand prominent Chinese men and women, from almost every walk of life, headed by Madam Sun Yat-sen, the widow of Dr. Sun Yat-sen, in a sensational public appeal called for a halt to any further submission to Japan. The document, widely published and commented upon in the Chinese as well as in the foreign press,

was entitled: "The Basic Program of the Chinese People for a War against Japan." Among the signers were many prominent scholars, writers, professors, intellectuals, bankers, labour leaders, peasants, merchants, and students.¹

Endorsing the proposal for a national war of liberation against the Japanese intruders, the Basic Program enumerated six points as suggestions for a plan to save China's integrity, as follows:

1. Mobilization of all land, naval, and air forces for a war against Japan. The writers of the appeal declared that China had the largest standing army in the world, more than three million men and officers. The armed forces consumed a large share of China's wealth, they argued, and had done precious little to defend China's independence.

2. Rallying of the whole people. Under this point were elaborated means of enlisting the widest number of Chinese in various ways for active defence of the country.

3. Arming the whole body of people. It was urged, under this head, that all weapons in the arsenals of China should be distributed to the anti-Japanese volunteers recruited by the general appeal to the people.

4. Financing of the war against Japan. Confiscation of all Japanese-owned enterprises in China was recommended, as well as sequestering the fortunes of those Chinese found guilty of betraying their country to the Japanese.

5. A national council of the Chinese people for armed self-defence, to be elected by delegates of the workers, peasants, soldiers, students, and merchants.

¹ Such well-known names in China as Liao Ching-kai, Dr. S. L. Chang, Professor Chen Chi, Ma Siang-peh, Pei Yuan-ti, Wong Chao-se, General Li Tu, and Chang Li-tu were among the endorsers of the appeal.

6. Alliance with all enemies of Japanese imperialism. A proffer of friendship was made to all peoples, nations, and allies who would assist in the fight to liberate China from Japanese invasion.

Savagely assailed by the Japanese press, both in China and in Japan, the Basic Program received considerable comment in the British and American press in China. The *China Weekly Review*, in its issue of August 11, 1934, said editorially:

"After castigating the present national government for its alleged policy of non-resistance, the leaders of this group [the 3,000 endorsers of the Basic Program] issued a six-point program including the confiscation of Japan's, 2,000,000,000 yen investments in China. This proposal, combined with the launching of a holy war, may sound fantastic, but it is a fact that the blocking of the Japanese invasion here [in Shanghai] in 1932 was due to the unity of all classes of the Chinese in the common cause. If similar unity of the entire nation could be achieved there would be no question of China's ultimate victory over the Japanese invaders. While it is true that China is deficient in military strength, this is not the chief element of China's weakness, which is, in simple terms lack of national unity, a point well emphasized in the manifesto."

Without speculating far afield one can safely venture to say that this judgment of the American-owned *China Weekly Review* represented more than editorial opinion. Such views rang with more than an echo of official American opinion of military and diplomatic representatives in China.

The appeal for national unity to achieve China's liberation, originating from what may be considered Left Kuomintang spokesmen, had a parallel expression from the Right. That

is, the Right from the point of view of social program, but who in this crisis, as Chinese, recognized that their country's fate rested first of all in successful defeat of Japan's ceaseless assaults on China's sovereignty.

On September 8, 1934 Hu Han-min, veteran Rightist Kuomintang leader, protesting against repeated postponement of the Fifth Kuomintang Congress, in a circular telegram jointly signed by twenty members of the Central Executive Committee and the Central Supervisory Committee of the Kuomintang, by indicting the Nanking government for its failure to resist, enhanced public discussion of China's disgrace.¹

Addressed to all members of the Kuomintang in China and abroad, the southern Kuomintang leaders declared:

"Since the Japanese invasion of Manchuria on September 18, 1931, the highest military authorities of the country have constantly followed a policy of non-resistance and, by placing complete reliance on the League of Nations, have succeeded in losing four large provinces. At the Fourth National Congress of the Kuomintang a resolution was passed ordering all provincial authorities to defend every inch of territory that Japan might attempt to seize, and furthermore it appointed General Chiang Kai-shek to lead an army north to recover lost territory. Not only has no effort been made to recover Manchuria and Jehol, but the 19th route army received no assistance in its courageous defence of Shanghai; the agreement for the demilitarization of the Chinese-

¹ Among the signers of the Hu Han-min telegram were such important southern governors and military leaders as General Li Tsung-jen, General Pai Tsung-hsi, Hsiao Fu-cheng, Teng Tsah-ya, Lin Hih-chung, General Chen Chi-tang, Chow Lu, Lin Yan-kai, Mayor Liu Chi-wen, and others.

controlled areas in Shanghai was signed, and the Tangku truce was signed by a staunch friend of Japan, General Huang Fu, an agreement which led eventually to through railway traffic and postal communications [with Japanese-controlled territory]. Furthermore, by putting the new import tariff into effect, China was exposed to the charge of submitting herself to the position of a second 'Manchukuo.' This suicidal policy places a great strain on the past record of our party, and the passing of a resolution for a strong policy of resistance as a means of saving our country should be the foremost task of the delegates. . . .

"It can be truthfully said that the government has had absolutely no foreign policy since the Japanese invasion of Manchuria in September 1931. The government has declared that it is resisting the invader on the one hand, and carrying on negotiations on the other. In reality, resistance has been mere empty talk while negotiations have consisted in giving in to Japan's every demand. When Japan issued her famous 'Hands off China!' statement, every government issued a special statement of repudiation, while our government was as silent as an autumn cicada. . . . The only way to preserve China intact as a political entity is to have a strong foreign policy. . . ."

Whatever could be said of the Nanking government's weak-kneed submission to Japan's depredations and endless demands, the Kuomintang rulers could not be charged with hesitation in their prosecution of the campaign against the Chinese Red army and the Chinese Soviets. The first effect of popular criticism, emanating from such divergent elements, was not to correct the Kuomintang's foreign policy but to drive Chiang Kai-shek to save face by seeking a substantial victory against the Chinese Communists. For that

purpose the sixth anti-Communist expedition, temporarily side-tracked by the Fukien rebellion, was renewed with vigorous efficiency. Every regiment of Chiang Kai-shek's army of more than 700,000 troops with 300 modern American and Italian airplanes, was employed in a comprehensive military plan to annihilate all Chinese living under the Red flag, Chinese whose primary political appeal was in harmony with the declarations of Madam Sun Yat-sen and Hu Han-min—namely, for Chinese unity against the Japanese invaders.

Thus Chiang Kai-shek relentlessly pursued his war for the extermination of the Red army. In October 1934, with the object of surrounding and crushing the Central Soviet Regions, the Nanking Generalissimo went to the dangerous extent of withdrawing two important divisions from North China and transferring them to the Kiangsi battlefield. The Nanchang military headquarters assigned the 74th Shantung division under Lieutenant General Li Hang-chang, attached to the 3rd route army under General Han Fu-chu (Chairman of the Shantung government), and the 72nd division, under Lieutenant General Li Sheng-ta, subordinate of General Yen Hsi-shan, to service in the anti-Communist campaign in Kiangsi.

Two important events illustrate how the draining of China of troops for the purpose of war against the Chinese Communists stimulated Japan's aggression.

In the first place, the Japanese delegation at the preliminary London naval negotiations unequivocally demanded naval parity between Japan and the United States. Together with Japan's naval negotiations went an attempt to procure recognition of its political supremacy in China. In order to win Britain away from collaboration with the United States, the Japanese admirals offered Britain a 5-4-4 ratio as compared

to the 5-5-3 capital-ship ratio of the Washington Naval Conference; the highest figure in the proposed revision was dangled before the British delegation, while the 4-4 ratio was to apply to Japan and the United States. Failing in its London manoeuvres, the Japanese Cabinet completely repudiated the Washington naval understanding, leaving itself free to engage in the most competitive race in naval building the world has ever seen.

In the second place, the Japanese prepared for further action in North China. As a preliminary, more raids were carried out on the Soviet-Manchuria border. Attempts were made to encroach on the territory of the Mongolian People's Republic. Japanese planes daily engaged in reconnaissance flights over the Kuyuan district of North China. Fresh detachments of Japanese soldiers were sent to Dolonor, Inner Mongolia. Furthermore, Japanese army commanders refused to withdraw their soldiers from the so-called "demilitarized" zones that had been invaded.

And it was in this atmosphere that the strongest concentration of Nanking armies launched their greatest assaults on the Central Soviet district in Kiangsi and Fukien.

The Central Soviet government had held its Second Congress at Juikin, Kiangsi province, in January 1934. Because of the requirements of defence against the sixth anti-Communist expedition, the Congress had reduced the duration of its sessions from the scheduled twelve to seven days. Present were more than 800 delegates and 1,500 guests from every section of the Soviet territories. A population of more than 50,000,000 was represented.

Mao Tse-tung, President of the Soviet government of China, delivered the key address, expounding the social achievements of the Chinese Soviets despite incessant warfare

against the more highly trained and better-equipped troops of the Kuomintang, which had the benefit of foreign technical aid and military consultation. President Mao, in the course of his speech, reiterated the Communist appeal to all sections of the Kuomintang for unity of all Chinese factions against the Japanese foe.

"On April 14, 1932," declared Mao, "the provisional Soviet Central government formally declared war on Japan and issued mobilization orders. The Soviet government and the revolutionary military council have more than once announced their readiness to conclude an agreement with any army unit of the Kuomintang for joint anti-Japanese and anti-imperialist military operations under the following conditions: Immediate cessation of the offensive against the Soviet districts; guarantee of civil rights for the masses; arming of the masses and the creation of anti-Japanese volunteers."

Though this call fell on deaf ears in Nanking, persistent criticism of the Kuomintang and clamour for united action against Japan's destruction of China's integrity had moved widely separated factions nearer to each other.

In the meantime, news reports from Szechwan to the Central Soviet Regions indicated that the 4th Red army had made important advances in establishing itself in this remote region. The Kuomintang forces under General Tien Sung-yao were defeated and ten thousand rifles captured. Additional Soviets were founded in the districts of Nankiang, Patzung, and Tunkiang. The original 20,000 fighters who had gone northward from the former Hunan-Hupeh Soviet areas in 1933 had grown to an army of more than 40,000. Besides the addition of peasants to the enlarged army, iron and salt miners were recruited in the new regions.

In the Central Soviet base, in Kiangsi, threatened with

complete encirclement by Chiang Kai-shek's superior armies, the Red army commanders decided upon the most drastic change in their strategy. It was planned to abandon the entire Central Soviet region, to move the major body of the Red army and its auxiliaries across nearly the entire width of China and then up to North Szechwan, Kansu, Ningsia, Suiyuan, and Shensi, a total distance of more than three thousand miles. Surrounded as they were by a gigantic armed concentration of more than 700,000 men with the most up-to-date war equipment, confronted with the gruelling prospect of a march through territories ruled by hostile local war lords, a terrain virtually without roads, completely lacking railroads or any modern facilities for transportation, assured of the support of only a few organized allies on the way, the plan of the Red army was in all probability the most daring recorded in Chinese military history.

The chief objective of the trek was to transfer the living forces of the Chinese Soviets to a region more inaccessible to the enemy, to a territory more easily defended against greater armed opponents than Chiang Kai-shek even then had in the field; and to place the Red army in a position to be capable of acting as the anti-Japanese vanguard of the Chinese people in the event of any further drastic invasion of North China by the Japanese.

From a military point of view the feat of the Red army of China ranks with Napoleon's and Hannibal's crossing of the Alps into Italy. I believe when the facts are sifted and the episode is adequately treated, the trek of the Red army of China traversing three thousand miles through twelve provinces,¹ crossing twenty rivers, many of them treacherously

¹ Fukien, Kiangsi, Kwangtung, Hunan, Kwangsi, Kweichow, Szechwan, Yunnan, Sikang, Chinghai, Shensi, and Kansu.

raging torrents with banks jutting up to a thousand feet, will in time take on the glamour of its historical precedents. Certainly the marching conditions of the Red army of China were infinitely more difficult than those of their historical antecedents. The Chinese fighting men marched over treeless plains in the blazing heat of the tropics and over snow-capped mountains in freezing temperatures. The trek lasted for eight and one half months, with the Red army pursued night and day by Chiang Kai-shek's more mobile troops with fleets of modern trucks supported by hundreds of fighting planes. Not only did the Red army have to face its pursuers in repeated battles but in each province it had to make war on and defeat the local armies.

No wonder that the breath-taking accomplishments of the Red army of China astounded its enemies, who theretofore had called their foe "Red bandits." No wonder Chinese leaders on the opposing side like Chan Tin-fu, a prominent Nanking government official, could regard this epical trek of the main body of the Red army from Kiangsi to the northwest of China not only as proof of the prowess of the Red army but as irrefutable evidence of the invincibility and "the greatness and power of the Chinese nation."

It was only after a thorough discussion that the leaders of the Communist Party of China, the commanders of the Red army, and the officials of the Central Soviet region finally decided on so gigantic an undertaking. It was recognized that the Red army in Kiangsi could not overcome the military superiority of the Kuomintang; or, at best, this could be achieved only at the greatest cost to the Red army and to China. Moreover, taking into account the necessity of national defence against the dismemberment of China, it was decided that the transfer of the main fighting forces to the




Soviet Districts to 1934



Red Areas 1937



Red Army Trek 1934-35



northwest of China was the best tactical alternative to remaining and fighting to retain the established Soviet area.

To begin with, in the summer of 1934 soon after this stupendous piece of strategy was decided upon, while trying to impress the Kuomintang armies with the idea that the fight for the retention of Kiangsi would be continued with greater ardour than ever, the most minute details were worked out to ensure the success of the trek.¹

To distract the attention of the Kuomintang commanders, who were busied tightening their iron ring around the Kiangsi Soviets, a series of diversive movements was worked out. The strategic plan was to strike at opposite narrow sides of the ellipse that generally described Chiang Kai-shek's military position around Kiangsi. To carry out this preliminary strategy, first the 7th Red army corps, together with the 10th army corps, under the leadership of the heroic figure Fang Cheh-ming, marched to the east into Fukien province. Renamed the Anti-Japanese National Revolutionary Vanguard, the aim of the new army was to cut round and strike at the foe's rear. The Anti-Japanese Revolutionary Vanguard marched well up to the Fukien-Chekiang border, succeeding in withdrawing a large body of the encircling Kuomintang

¹ A comprehensive history of the great trek of the Red army of China is still to be written. My description is taken from many eyewitness reports, a day-to-day perusal of the English-language press in China, as well as of translations from the Chinese newspapers and numerous special, confidential reports. The following articles on the trek have been published in English: "A Heroic Trek," by Shee Pin, one who took part in the march, *Communist International*, January 1936; "At the Front with the Chinese Red Army," by M. Fred, an eyewitness report, *Communist International*, July 1935; and "Toward Szechwan," By Harry Gannes, *China Today*, June 1935.

armies, weakening various links of the surrounding chain. In the fighting, Fang Cheh-ming's column ultimately was cut off from the main body of the Anti-Japanese Vanguard. Fang was captured. Though offered high posts in the Kuomintang and plied with every form of bribery, Fang Cheh-ming heaped scorn and contempt on his captors. He was finally executed. In a brilliant and inspiring political testament smuggled from prison, he exhorted his comrades to continue the fight to victory.

The next step in the strategy of preparation for the trek was the action of the 6th Red army under the command of Hsiao Keh. Stationed usually on the Kiangsi-Hunan border, this army struck out in a westerly direction, or one directly opposite to that of the 7th army, thereby forcing a huge widening—and consequently a weakening—of the Kuomintang armed circle. Fighting its way through heavy concentrations of troops under the leadership of the Kuomintang war lord Ho Chien, the 6th Red army gained its objective of joining forces with the 2nd Red army, under Ho Lung in Hunan province. Ho Lung's army had marched eastward simultaneously with the 6th army's move westward into Hunan. Ho Lung, to assist in joining forces with Hsiao Keh, attacked Ho Chien's troops to the rear.

Then, to keep the Kuomintang troops in Kiangsi from pursuing the 6th army and harassing the latter, the 3rd Red army, under Peng Teh-wei, moved into the territory vacated by the 6th army and continued to hold that ground while Ho Lung and Hsiao Keh successfully achieved their merger.

The Kuomintang generals were still in the dark about the ultimate plans of the Communists. Meanwhile the main body of the Red army was being drilled for the march. Thirty thousand volunteers were recruited to supplement the armies

left in Kiangsi. They underwent stern training during the summer and autumn of 1934. The training was of a special nature to fit the army for the strategy of its march. By November 1934, preparations were completed.

The central Red army was divided into three columns, a right and left wing, with the largest column in the centre. In the middle of December the order to march was given. *En masse*, the Red army like a bolt of lightning attacked the Cantonese troops beyond the Taiyuling Pass on the Kiangsi-Kwangtung border. The aim of this move was to open a wide back door for the exit of the expedition and to deliver a costly warning to the Cantonese to convince them of the inadvisability of joining forces with the main Kuomintang armies in pursuit of the Red army. The Cantonese, under General Chen Chi-tang, fought a defensive and retreating battle. As much alarmed over the danger of the Nanking army's invasion of Kwangtung province as over further reverses at the hands of the Red army, the Cantonese generals did not pursue the Red army, which had now successfully broken through the Kuomintang's chain of bayonets.

When it realized that the intended prey had flown, the Kuomintang army moved westward to head off the Red army. The Nanking troops lay in wait in the most desolate parts of Hunan province, expecting the main body of the Red army to follow the route of its 6th army. In preparing a trap for the Reds, the most likely routes were denuded of all forms of life and food. Chiang Kai-shek expected the Red army to take the flattest and easiest terrain and thereby march to its doom. The Red army, however, successfully eluded the worst pitfall at the very outset of the trek. Chiang Kai-shek was left waiting and disappointed. By a series of zigzag movements and adroit attacks and retreats the Communists

marched through a corner of Hunan and then turned sharply south into Kwangsi. And after following a snake-like path they finally reached the province of Kweichow. Here the expedition rested. Half of the trek was over.

To mislead both the Kuomintang pursuers and the local provincial troops, the Communists would make a feint at important cities, striking out as if to capture them; and when the Kuomintang armies had concentrated for their defence, the Red army would wheel and continue its march. Elaborate preparations would be made to cross rivers at most convenient points, only to attract the foe on the opposite bank; and then by quick, forced marches a previously selected secret crossing would be forded without hindrance. The Red army was skilfully able to conceal its movements and to give battle only at previously selected positions most favourable to it.

The Red army moved at the phenomenal speed of from thirty to thirty-five miles a day. After a hundred days of marching, the main body found itself well within Kweichow province in an advantageous position to continue its trek with less opposition. All along the route new recruits were enlisted. Losses in battle were more than made up from the countryside. Indeed, when the main column of the Red army originally left Kiangsi, it consisted of 80,000 men, only 50,000 of whom were fully armed. By the time the trek reached Kweichow the entire 80,000 were fully armed with weapons taken from defeated regiments of the pursuing Kuomintang troops.

The most difficult problem was crossing the Yangtze River; for both sides recognized that negotiating this greatest stream of China meant realization of the success or failure of the march. A highly complicated series of manœuvres was undertaken, and for a time it appeared as if Chiang Kai-shek

would prevent passage of the Red army over the river. However, the seizure of important military topographical maps from the Yunnan general staff immensely assisted the Chinese Red army in choosing the most suitable spot for the final and successful attempt.

More obstacles were encountered in crossing the Changsa River, which at the spot chosen runs through a narrow gorge in Szechwan province, with steep banks rising above a thousand feet on each side. The Red army chroniclers say that it was at this point where they made their crossing that the legendary hero of the war of the Three Kingdoms suffered defeat because of his inability to get his army across the raging stream. The Red army did not meet this sad fate. Under an airplane bombardment and a hail of machine-gun fire, the crossing lasted nine days and nights. The casualties were surprisingly small. The Red army then covered the historical tracks of another ill-fated expedition in Chinese history. It safely crossed the route where Shi Ta-kai, commanding general of the retreating Taiping army, perished on the banks of the Tatungho, in his flight from Nanking to Szechwan.

In their trek, the Communists accumulated some remarkable experiences. Their prestige was raised not only with the Kuomintang pursuers, but particularly among the peasantry, the coolies, the small merchants, and the toiling population generally in the territory through which they passed.

All along the way, the Red army judiciously carried on Communist propaganda, stressing especially anti-Japanese agitation and the proposals for united anti-Japanese resistance. In its long march the army came in contact with three national-minority tribes, and instead of meeting the hostility that the Kuomintang expected, the Communists were able to

set up friendly relations. The tribes encountered were the Yao Tsi in Kwangsi, the Mao Tsi in Kweichow, and the Man Tsi in Sikang and Szechwan.

At Tatsienliu took place the historic contact and union of the main body of the Red army of Kiangsi with the 4th army, which marched from its base in northern Szechwan to Sikang. At that time the Red army, increased in strength by its victorious trek, controlled a huge semicircular territory in north-west China from Sikang to Shensi provinces.

When the main columns of the Red army had reached their goal, there still remained vast and widely scattered Soviet regions and armed Red partisans in other sections of the country. Though the bulk of the Red army had successfully made the march to Szechwan, the Kuomintang was never able completely to eliminate the Soviets in Kwangsi. The locations of the smaller Soviet regions are as follows: (1) in the mountainous region of the Kwangtung-Fukien border; (2) along the Hunan-Kiangsi border; (3) along the northern Fukien and southern Chekiang border; (4) along the western Anhwei and southern Chekiang border; (5) along the southwestern Honan and northern Hupeh border; and (6) in southern Shensi.¹

For the Kuomintang there were some unexpected important by-products of the successful Red army trek. First of all, the Nanking government troops were placed in closer proximity to the Cantonese, which later had the result of sharpening the antagonism between the Central government and the southerners, though the struggle ended, finally, in greater unity of the Kuomintang.

¹ As described in an interview of Anthony Billingham, with Chu En-lai, vice-chairman of the Chinese Soviet government, *New York Times*, March 21, 1937.

Drawn into the war against the Red army were the militarists of Szechwan (General Liu Hsiang), Kweichow (General Wang Chia-Lieh), and Yunnan (General Lung Yun), who theretofore had retained a greater measure of independence of Nanking than the other somewhat autonomous generals. None of them had actively co-operated in the previous drives against the Red army; but when their territory was invaded they were forced to co-operate with Nanking—an alliance which they could not drop at will and which led to their greater subordination to Nanking's rule.

It is necessary briefly to sum up the results of the trek in regard to the still undefeated Red army and the virtual end of the sixth anti-Communist expedition (the last of its kind), as well as the political significance of the tremendous shift in the territorial base of the Red army:

The Red armies, formerly scattered and divided over extensive and disjointed territories were, for the first time in their history, largely concentrated and consolidated, with more than 250,000 fighting men under one general command.

The new territory won was eminently more suitable for resistance to large-scale attacks. The cost to Nanking to transport a huge army across this three-thousand-mile area to meet a stronger and united Red army was not only prohibitive but much less likely to be supported even by the anti-Communist faction. In fact, Nanking early gave up its ambitious projects and went into a defensive battle to prevent the more rapid spread of the Soviets in their new territory. The Red army could not be surrounded. It could be attacked from only one direction—that is, from the east. To the west and north it had its back to a friendly territorial wall.

Thus the entire Red army was now distributed in contiguous territory, located in the most strategic position to resist

further Japanese invasion. Not only was it now possible to appeal more convincingly for united Chinese resistance to Japan, but the location of the Red army of China made possible joint action of the Mongolian People's Republic and the Soviet Union in the event that Japan's planned war against China and the Soviet Union was carried out.

And in this general position, still continuing its fight to strengthen its base and consolidate its newly won position, we leave the Red army for the moment.

The Chinese Wall Pushed South

ITALY'S invasion of Ethiopia cast a shadow over China. The combination of circumstances in Japan and in China favouring renewed Japanese attacks on North China's sovereignty was thus accelerated by European squabbles over Mediterranean and East African conquests. It was not purely coincidental that the Italian dictator's demands on Haile Selassie's government paralleled Japanese ultimatums to Nanking with regard to North China. Benito Mussolini's confidence in preparing for the Ethiopian war, the boldness of his diplomatic manoeuvres at Geneva, were largely inspired by Japan's successes in Manchuria; and therein we observe an effect of the seizure of Manchuria in turn becoming a cause, this time of further Japanese encroachment on China's territorial integrity.

When it became evident to European chancelleries, in the summer of 1935, that Mussolini would certainly go to war to seize Ethiopia, Great Britain gathered its warships in the seven seas—especially the important squadron in the Far East—and concentrated them in the Mediterranean, and in

the Red Sea, near Suez and Gibraltar. The release of British naval pressure in the China Seas was not overlooked by Japan for a moment. She took full advantage of the occasion and became more provocative towards China. Indeed, in anticipation of Mussolini's march into Ethiopia (and in all likelihood with advance information of the event, because common action at Britain's expense was desirable at the time for both Japan and Italy), the Japanese military authorities in North China in the spring of 1935 again resorted to the procedure of heaping demands, in rapid succession, upon Nanking. With these additional demands went threatening movements of Japanese troops into positions of vantage for the armed invasion of North China, beyond the Great Wall.

There were other causative factors involved in Japan's new aggressive actions. One was international: the rise of an armed Nazi Germany held out the prospect of a new ally. The other, even more important, was domestic: grave political and economic crises were maturing in Japan itself, the Fascist-military cliques clashing with government ministers, and financial difficulties provoked by the Manchurian invasion stirring up discontent among the masses. To divert attention from the gloomy situation at home, the Japanese army officers in China pointed to the rosy prospect of further conquest in China.

On May 30, 1935 the Japanese authorities presented fourteen demands to the Nanking government with respect to the status of North China, and on June 9 another six demands were added. These combined conditions had for their object the preparation for the economic and political severing of North China from Nanking's control.¹ The creation of an

¹ "The more fundamental disappointment to Japan is the fact that Manchuria does not produce at present and probably can never be

autonomous North China extending from the Great Wall to the Yellow River was envisaged by the Japanese general staff as a necessary stage in the creation of a buffer state between Manchukuo and China proper. The purpose of such a scheme was threefold: namely, (1) to prevent collaboration of China and the Soviet Union in the event Japan went to war against the U.S.S.R.; (2) to reap valuable economic advantages, to make up for the failure of the economic hopes in Manchukuo because it was found that the cost of invasion temporarily exceeded the profits extracted; and (3) to weaken the rule of Nanking in order to make it more dependent upon Japan.

Neither the full text of the demands nor their secret annexes were published in the Chinese or Japanese press because Nanking was reluctant to broadcast the nature of the shameful conditions that Japan expected it to accept. The general purposes of the demands, however, can be outlined.

Economically, Japan was seeking to extend its railroad traffic into North China in order to drain the trade of this territory into Manchukuo. Japan, furthermore, had its eyes on the coal resources of Hopei, Chahar, and Shansi, the iron resources of northern Hopei and Chahar, the oil fields of

made to produce some of the things which Japan vitally needs, notably cotton and wool.

"But all this will be changed if North China can be brought into an economic bloc with Manchukuo and Japan. Then the stream of Shantung and Hopei coolies, the labour they bring to development of Manchuria, and the money they take to their motherland will become an exchange process within the same economic bloc, contributing to the object of common prosperity. For Japan it will not matter how much her invested capital in Manchuria may be drawn to North China, for there too Japanese capital is needed for development." Dr. S. Washiō in the *Japan Advertiser*, quoted in the *China Weekly Review*, July 20, 1935, p. 250.

Shansi, the cotton and wheat of Hopei, Shantung, and Shansi, and the exclusive control of future development of such Chinese ports as Chinwangtao, Tsingtao, and Taku, the last two mentioned being the seaports of Tientsin.

Politically, to achieve these aims, Japan demanded among other things the dismissal of the chairman of Hopei province, General Yu Tsueh-chung, and of Chang Tin-gao, mayor of Tientsin, and the transfer of all troops under the direct control of Nanking or belonging to divisions under generals formerly owing allegiance to Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang. Supplementing these major political demands were such points as abolition of the political training centre of the Kuo-mintang; curtailment of virtually all Chinese political action and agitation, especially the least semblance of protest against Japan's seizure of Manchuria and preparations for the severance of North China.

While Nanking was considering these demands, for three consecutive days several hundred Japanese soldiers, with tanks, armoured cars, and trench mortars, demonstrated outside the Governor's office in Peiping and fired several blank shots with mortars. The military demonstration was extended to Mongolia. A Japanese major flew to the headquarters of the leading Mongol prince of Inner Mongolia and demanded, among other things, the right to establish an air field and a wireless station, and the establishment of a political and military alliance with Japan.


The Chinese government's response to the Japanese demands was revealingly described by Dr. C. C. Wang in the London *Asiatic Review*, and reprinted in the *China Press*, August 30, 1935, as follows:

"As soon as these demands concerning Hopei province had been complied with, new demands were put forth, this time

by Colonel Takahashi, assistant military attaché at Peiping, insisting upon China's compliance with all the demands not only in fact but in writing. This final demand drove away General Ho Ying-chin, acting chairman of the Political Council at Peiping. . . .

"Thus within a fortnight the Japanese army accomplished by demands and threats the phenomenal feat of dismissing all the important officials, including the governors, of two provinces with an area about twice the size of England, Scotland, and Wales, and a population of about 40,000,000, the removal of the provincial and central Chinese government troops from the two provinces, the extension of the demilitarized area, the abolition of the Kuomintang, and the right to construct airdromes and wireless stations at several strategic points."

Justifying the acceptance of the Japanese conditions, Wang Ching-wei, as president of the Executive Yuan and concurrently Minister of Foreign Affairs, presented contradictory arguments. While prefacing his official interview at Nanking, on June 20, with Rengo, the Japanese semi-official news service, with the statement that "These concessions did not necessarily indicate China's cowardice," Wang was quick to add in his most conciliatory style that China could supply Japan with natural resources and that "through the application of appropriate policies the two nations should be able to work side by side to mutual advantage." The issue involved was not the discussion of mutual relations between two nations at peace. Wang was deferentially soliciting Japan's goodwill after Japan had already seized the Three Eastern Provinces, Jehol, and part of Chahar by a series of undeclared wars and, what is more, at that very moment was planning to gain suzerainty of the whole of North China, embracing a population of 100,000,000.



Wang Ching-wei's role as the most ardent Japanophile in the Nanking government was countered by a vigorous campaign among important officials of the Kuomintang. The president of the Executive Yuan, realizing that even Chiang Kai-shek was being influenced by the strengthening anti-Japanese group in the Kuomintang executive, decided on dramatic manœuvres to prevent the crystallization of a dominant anti-Japanese faction. Having on his side both Japanese pressure and the stubborn reluctance of a majority of the Kuomintang officialdom to announce a firm policy of resistance to Japan, Wang handed in his ministerial resignation in the early part of August. This action was in the nature of a bluff, to prevent further criticism of his capitulation to Japan and to instill uncertainty into the anti-Japanese camp, especially among those who still wavered between his own conciliatory policy and the growing appeal for national unity and struggle. Rengo, the Japanese news agency, declared that Wang himself believed his resignation was the best way to fight the vigorous campaign of opposition that had been initiated against him and to defeat the group "openly advocating a return to the policy of co-operating with the Soviet Union"; which is the Japanese official manner of saying the policy of the re-establishment of national unity, this time on an anti-Japanese platform.

In the latter part of August, Wang withdrew his resignation, having gained a victory over the anti-Japanese faction. The victory consisted in abruptly swerving Chiang Kai-shek from his hesitating steps in the direction of national unity. Again the Japanese press reported that the conflict between Chiang and Wang had been "happily solved." The Japanese War Office publicly reported that the terms of the reconciliation between Chiang and Wang, and the withdrawal of the

threat of resignation by the president of the Executive Yuan, were agreeable to the Japanese military. The Tokyo War Office announced that the conditions of the Chiang-Wang reconciliation were: that irresponsible (read: anti-Japanese) criticism of the government by Kuomintang Party leaders be prohibited; that the power of the Executive Yuan (that is, of the pro-Japanese Wang Ching-wei) be extended while dissenting party and government members be prevented from handicapping the administration of the government; that the power of the Central Political Council (of the Kuomintang) be reduced so as to prevent it from interfering with the affairs of the Executive Yuan; that the policy towards Japan, as well as China's financial program, be settled as soon as possible and efforts be made to solve disputed questions between Japan and China and to facilitate Sino-Japanese economic co-operation.

The latter conditions can easily be recognized as the usual Japanese public formulation of the demand for the recognition by Nanking of Manchukuo and the independence of North China.

In the meantime, the Seventh Congress of the Communist International, which had been held in Moscow during the latter part of July and the month of August, had placed the question of China's struggle against Japanese invasion in the forefront of its consideration as one of the most important issues in the world campaign against the danger of a new imperialist war and against the peril of the extension of Fascism. The new tactics of establishing the broadest anti-Fascist People's Front, and the national front in colonial countries against imperialism, had special meaning for China because of the new threat of a Japanese invasion in North China and because of the shift in the geographical position

and political tactics of the Chinese Red army and the Chinese Soviets.

Both Wang Ming, Chinese member of the Executive Committee of the Communist International, and Georgi Dimitroff, Secretary of the International, devoted considerable time and attention at the Seventh Congress to the political situation in China and Communist strategy for a united national front. Dimitroff summarized the decisions of the Seventh Congress of the Communist International with regard to China in an article on "The Fifteenth Anniversary of the Communist Party of China," in which he said to Chinese Communists:

"And now it [the Communist Party of China] is exerting all its efforts to solve its most important historic task at the present stage: namely, that of becoming the pioneer in establishing a united front against the Japanese plunderers, and of uniting the now divided forces of the Chinese people for the salvation of China against dismemberment and enslavement.

"The efforts of the Communist Party, directed towards putting an end to the civil war in the country, and towards establishing collaboration with the Kuomintang and all other political groupings and armed forces of China in the organization of resistance to the Japanese marauders, meet the sympathy, endorsement, and support of all friends of the Chinese people throughout the whole world."

The decisions of the Seventh Congress of the Communist International had a profound effect on the entire Kuomintang leadership, influencing Chiang Kai-shek to the extent that he considered it necessary to declare his views on the new policy of the Communists. Wang Ming tells of Chiang

Kai-shek's response to the Communist proposals for a national front in China, and how the Nanking Generalissimo sought to stave off popular expressions of sympathy with the Communist appeal.

"Chiang Kai-shek was forced to make the open admission," writes Wang Ming, "that the policy of the Communist Party of China is a correct one and cannot be left out of account. After receiving reports about the Seventh Congress of the Communist International, Chiang Kai-shek called a special meeting of his closest supporters, at which he had to make the statement that the Chinese Communists have now really begun to defend their national interests, and that, therefore, they have to be reckoned with and negotiations must be begun with them. At the same time, however, Chiang Kai-shek undertook the following manoeuvre: he declared that the Communists wanted to form a united front with all parties and with all troops—with the exception of those led by himself, Chiang Kai-shek, and that is why he had to fight against the Communist Party of China and the Chinese Red army."¹

The Communist Party of China branded these manoeuvres as in reality a rejection of the proffers of national unity and excuses to continue Chiang Kai-shek's collaboration with Wang Ching-wei and capitulation to Japan.

On August 1, 1935 the Central Committee of the Chinese Soviets and the Central Committee of the Communist Party published a most important declaration to the Chinese people, appealing to every stratum of Chinese for the consummation of the one absorbing end—unity of all Chinese to save the

¹ Wang Ming: "The Struggle for the Anti-Japanese People's Front in China," *Communist International*, Vol. XIII, No. 6 (June 1936).

country from Japanese invasion.

The appeal ¹ began by pointing to the danger of the amputation of North China from the rest of the country by Japan's new drive. Peiping and Tientsin, Chinese cities with a history and culture thousands of years old, it was declared, and Hopei, Shantung, and Shensi, provinces famed for their vast natural riches, and Chahar and Suiyuan, key strategic provinces, were all threatened. Besides, it was stated, the Peiping-Mukden, Peiping-Hankow, Tientsin-Pukow, and Peiping-Suiyuan railways, which linked the economic centres of the country, were already in the grasp of Japanese militarism.

"We are face to face with the direct question," declared the appeal. "Either we resist the Japanese offensive, which means life, or renounce resistance to foreign invasion, which means death. In this connection, the struggle to organize resistance to Japan and to save our fatherland has long since become the sacred duty of every citizen, of every son and daughter of our fatherland."

The capitulating officials and Chinese traitors were mercilessly castigated. Submission to invasion and to Japan's humiliating demands with regard to North China were scathingly condemned. Retreat before Japan was branded a "national disgrace." The fate of Ethiopia was held up as a warning to China. The appeal declared that the overwhelming majority of the Chinese people would not submit to national annihilation. "In this connection," continued the manifesto, "in the present grave situation when the national existence itself of the Chinese people is being threatened, the Soviet government and the Communist Party of China once again make a sincere appeal to all our native people: Regardless of

¹ For the full text of the appeal see the *Communist International* (British edition, January 1936; U.S.A. edition, February 1936).

the differences of political opinions and interests that exist between the various classes and sections of the population, and regardless of the hostile actions which have taken place between the various military units in the past and are taking place today, all must act, in view of Japanese aggression, as one man, and recognize the great truth of our most popular national slogan: "To fight jointly against the enemy without, in spite of strife within."

Declaring that if the Kuomintang ceased its military attacks on the Red army of China the latter would be ready to unite with all other Chinese armed forces for resistance to Japanese invasion, the proposal was made that a Chinese united People's government be established for national defence, comprising all shades of political opinion, including the Communist, and granting democratic liberties to the Chinese people as the best means of rallying them to resist the danger confronting the future of the national existence. To achieve this end the following program was urged:

1. Armed resistance to Japanese expansion and the return of all occupied territories.
2. Assistance to those who are starving, capital repairs to river beds and river dams to combat floods and droughts.
3. Confiscation of all the property of Japanese imperialists in China and its transfer to a fund to cover the cost of the war against Japan.
4. Confiscation of all the land, rice, grain, and other property in the hands of all national traitors and Japanese agents, and their transfer to a fund to help the unemployed, the poor, and those participating in the anti-Japanese struggle.
5. Abolition of all unbearable taxation and requisitions—regulation of financial policy, the monetary system, and the whole national economy.

6. Increase in wages and salaries, and an improvement in the material conditions of the workers, peasants, army men, and intellectuals.
7. Democratic liberties and the release of all political prisoners.
8. Universal education free of charge, and the provision of work to young people finishing their studies.
9. Equal rights for all nationalities inhabiting China, and the defence of the freedom of person and property, and of the right of domicile, and the right of every inhabitant of China itself and of Chinese emigrants abroad to pursue their occupations.
10. The establishment of contacts with all the masses of the people whose attitude towards Japanese imperialism is hostile (with the Japanese toilers, with the Koreans, with the people of Formosa, etc.) for the purpose of joint struggle against the common enemy. The establishment of an alliance with all nations and states who support or sympathize with the national struggle for the liberation of the Chinese people, and friendly relations with all powers and nations who observe benevolent neutrality towards the military operations carried on between Japanese imperialism and the Chinese people.

Efforts at suppression failed to keep this appeal from wide discussion among influential liberal groups and even in army circles. With skill and persistence the Communists on every occasion reiterated their proposals.

In pursuit of its objective, the Japanese army permitted but little pause in the presentation of its demands and in military manoeuvres to make them acceptable. In October the Japanese commanding staff in China initiated its most serious plans, after its success earlier in the year, to establish beyond all question its domination of North China and Mongolia.

The Japanese "New China Policy," inaugurated simultaneously with the outbreak of the Italian war against Ethiopia, came hard upon the withdrawal of Wang Ching-wei's resignation as president of the Executive Yuan and concurrently Minister of Foreign Affairs, a move that had been accomplished with the submission of Chiang Kai-shek to Wang's Japanophile conditions, already mentioned. Five days after Wang had publicly denied that any new set of demands had been presented to the Nanking government, the entire Japanese and Chinese press was filled with various versions of the new demands themselves. The new conditions, no longer denied by Wang, concerned Japan's insistence on the autonomy of North China. Besides, Japan demanded the curbing of China's foreign policy, especially at the time Nanking was negotiating with Great Britain to alleviate the currency crisis and to gain British financial aid.

Japan, to prevent Nanking from manœuvring with either Britain or the United States, insisted on discontinuance of negotiations with Sir Frederick Leith-Ross, British financial adviser then in China. Recognition of Manchukuo was again pressed. Dismissal of Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang and withdrawal of his troops from Shensi and other points in the northwest was specified because Japan was fully aware that Chang's army of former Manchurian soldiers was becoming less and less anxious to fight the Communists and more and more insistent on furthering the unity movement as the only hope of seeing their native provinces again.

A series of demands was included for the economic and financial dependence of North China on Japan. China's resignation from the League of Nations and demilitarization of the five coastal provinces, Kwangtung, Fukien, Chekiang, Kiangsu, and Shantung, were broached. To these demands

were attached conditions to curb growing national unity and to enforce a lion-and-lamb alliance between Nanking and Tokyo "against Communism."

For example, the third point in the "three-point program" handed to General Chiang Tso-pin, Chinese Ambassador at the Japanese capital, read: "A program for a common front of China, Japan, and Manchukuo designed to prevent the spread of Communism in China." From its phraseology, this demand can be recognized as similar in wording to the later German-Japanese pact of November 25, 1936, ostensibly against the Communist International, but generally denounced in the United States and Britain as a Nazi-Japanese war alliance against the Soviet Union and for the division between Germany and Japan of British and American colonies in the Far East. The anti-Communist proposal submitted to Nanking was elaborated in the report of Nippon Dempo, a prominent Japanese news agency, published in the *Japan Advertiser* (Tokyo) of October 21. Nippon Dempo stated:

"Close surveillance will have to be kept over the Nanking government because of its pro-Soviet line [that is, the alleged policy of rapprochement with the Soviet Union] and its policy of 'befriending distant neighbours in order to antagonize near ones,' despite its outward willingness to encourage Sino-Japanese economic co-operation. If it [Nanking] takes the wrong step, it must be corrected. Opportunity should be taken of the improvement of the situation in South China [where one of the recurring and deliberately fostered crises at Swatow had just been 'adjusted'] to promote still further improvement though the recent anti-Japanese outbreak at Swatow showed that caution is still necessary."

Such was the politically charged atmosphere in which the

frequently postponed Fifth Congress of the Kuomintang was convened at Nanking on November 1. The feeling against Wang Ching-wei within the anti-Japanese faction of the Kuomintang ran high. Public expression of it was subdued because of Nanking's fear of goading the Japanese. On the first day of the Congress, before the delegates had got down to business, a sensational and dramatic attempt was made to assassinate Wang Ching-wei. A group of assassins, supplied with Kuomintang press passes, who had been admitted after extraordinary scrutiny, fired three bullets into the body of the president of the Executive Yuan. Wang survived his serious wounds, but he was forced to retire from active participation in the government for many months. The assassins were considerably careful to concentrate their fire at Wang Ching-wei, though the gunmen had an opportunity of hitting other important Kuomintang officials. The shooting took place when the group of assassins, posing as newspaper photographers, were in the act of focusing their cameras on a group composing nearly the entire Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang.

The first outcry made by the Kuomin News Agency, the official press bureau of the Kuomintang, was that the attempt at assassination was the work of Communists. Later investigation, however, pointed to certain Kuomintang officials; and the matter was never satisfactorily carried through. The Japanese chauvinist press interpreted the attempt as an affront to Japan.

Meeting under the pall of a new Japanese threat to create a puppet state of Suiyuan, Shansi, Chahar, and Hopei provinces (to be known as the Northern Autonomous Administration of the Republic) embracing a population of more

than 100,000,000 Chinese, the Fifth Congress of the Kuomintang, at least publicly, avoided the life-and-death issues of China's sovereignty.

Japan had marched deeper into China and was threatening its most devastating move since the grave days of September 1931, but the Fifth Congress of the Kuomintang only marked time.

Of this period Dr. Lin Yu-tang, associated with the *China Critic* and famed satirical writer, declared that the hopeful optimism and joyful idealism of the year 1926 had turned to cynicism and disillusionment in 1935.

Though the attempted assassination of Wang Ching-wei, and the ensuing excitement, temporarily delayed Japan's schemes in North China, there were other important impediments to hastier action on the part of the Japanese military. The Ethiopian war fostered the tendency of closer co-operation between Britain and the United States in the Pacific. Both had already shown a measure of collaboration at the London naval conversations in the latter part of 1934. While the United States remained diplomatically silent, it did not hesitate to prepare its fleet and naval bases in the Pacific, especially its Aleutian Islands and Alaskan vantage points, for the eventuality of war with Japan. The alleviation of the economic crisis in the United States prompted greater attention to the Far Eastern scene, even if a stronger policy was not formally expressed. Britain began to exhibit less willingness for endless compromises. Japan's ambition of proclaiming a protectorate over North China seriously injured special British interests in this area.

An important barrier, if not the most important element in restraining Japan externally, was the effective peace policy pursued by the Soviet Union. The success of Socialist con-

struction in the Soviet Union, and her increased importance in international affairs, gave great weight to the Soviet's efforts to maintain world peace. Japan could never feel free to penetrate China, as it would like, so long as at its rear along the Manchurian border the Soviet Union was effectively preparing to defend itself against a double-headed war that the Japanese military conceived as necessary for the conquest of China. The sale of the Chinese Eastern Railway by the Soviet Union—as a pledge of its strong desire to maintain the peace of the Far East—and its proffer of a non-aggression pact to Japan served to impede Japan's aggressive plans. Besides, the Franco-Soviet mutual-assistance pact, the Soviet Union's participation in the League of Nations, its utilization of every obstacle that could be put in the way of war, were helpful counter-moves to the thrusts of the Japanese military in the Far East.

Moreover, further hindering if not stopping Japan's aggressive schemes was the violent agrarian crisis in Japan. The impoverishment of the peasantry, especially in the chief agricultural regions of the northwest provinces, had reached devastating dimensions. The miserable state of the Japanese peasantry can partly be grasped from the official report of six prefectures in the crisis-ridden region, that twenty-five thousand daughters of peasants had been sold "as factory hands, geishas, prostitutes, or domestic servants."¹

A well-known Japanese economist, Kodzima Seitsi, deploring the plight of Japan on the eve of the militarists' new drive into North China, wrote:

"Today Japan is faced with an economic crisis. . . . The conditions of the people and especially of the peasantry are becoming worse, and social discontent is growing. Inflation

¹ *Japan Times*, October 1, 1935.

has reached its height, and its further development is threatening. The government and the capitalists will find it worth while to realize that if this is not stopped, a time may come when nothing will be of avail. With a sharp change in the economic situation, the discontent of the people and the unrest may change into Communism.”¹

Nevertheless, towards the latter part of November the Japanese militarists made a daring attempt to sever North China through the creation of an “autonomous” movement headed by a group of the most corrupt Chinese militarists, most of them remnants of the pro-Japanese Anfu clique of the unsavoury days after the death of Yuan Shih-kai. With the support of the Japanese, Yin Yu-keng, administrative commissioner of the Luantung demilitarized zone, on November 25 proclaimed the “autonomy” of Eastern Hopei province. He announced the establishment of the so-called East Hopei “Autonomous Government.” The Japanese military immediately threw its protecting cloak around Yin Yu-keng. At the same time a number of the most opportunist Chinese politicians, expecting the return of the Nishihara-loan days, when they could swill the lavish graft of Japanese corruption, attempted to set up an autonomous movement in the Peiping-Tientsin area. The Nanking government took no immediate steps to ward off the danger. Yin Yu-keng, who had already gone over to the camp of Japan, was demonstratively “dismissed.” The Peiping branch of the Military Affairs Committee was abolished. A group of new officials was appointed. But nothing was done against the aggressor or to arouse the people to the danger that threatened their country.

¹ Quoted by E. Yolk: “Japanese Aggression in China,” *Communist International*, Vol. XII, No. 23-24 (December 20, 1935).

As in 1919, when China was humiliated by the Paris Peace Conference, in the even graver threat that menaced China in 1935 the students again sounded the alarm. This time, however, conditions were far more favourable for the success of the warning of the self-sacrificing young scholars of harassed China.

Japan is the Enemy

THE creation of the East Hopei Autonomous Government under Yin Yu-keng required Japanese penetration into territory where the largest group of Chinese students are concentrated—namely, in and around Peiping. For Japan and China this was of exceptional importance in more ways than one. In China conditions were ripening for a new anti-imperialist outburst, this time with exclusively anti-Japanese objectives; and in Japan was maturing the worst political crisis in the history of the island empire.

The Peiping students, it will be recalled, were the first to protest against China's victimization at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919. Their demonstrations at that time were symptomatic of a national awakening. China's students throughout her recent history have performed a special political function. They have heralded with startling accuracy every new phase of China's battles for national liberation. There are distinct reasons for this phenomenon. The students are the most sensitive national barometer of an important stratum of China's population. They are the sons and daughters of the

petty bourgeoisie, native industrialists and bankers, small and large landowners, professionals, and government officials. Besides being the inheritors of a long tradition of anti-imperialist struggles, the Chinese students are in an excellent position through their concentration in large numbers to discuss the dangers facing their country and to raise the alarm. The newest Japanese threat, which reached to the very threshold of their largest universities in North China, was not only a general hazard to China. It was a concrete and immediate peril at their very class-room doors.

While the May 1919 students' demonstrations, arousing China against the transfer of the German Shantung concessions to Japan, were sensational and dramatic, they were shortlived and to a great extent spontaneous. The anti-Japanese students' actions of 1935-6 were better organized, with a well-defined objective, and were, moreover, connected with a rapidly rising anti-Japanese movement throughout the country. The students' movement of the latter part of 1935 and the early months of 1936 followed years of Communist agitation for national unity and had the advantage of the existence of a number of organizations for national salvation as well as of the sharper definition of the pro- and anti-Japanese factions in the Kuomintang government. More important still, anti-Japanese sentiment among the population generally had transmitted to the students the courage to risk many grave perils.

In Peiping at the time the Japanese began to threaten the extension of the so-called East Hopei Autonomous Government to the whole of North China (from Manchukuo and its satellite provinces down to the Yellow River) there were more than 13,500 college students and 26,000 secondary-school students. The Tokyo government had been incessantly prod-

ding Nanking with the three-point program of Koki Hirota, Japanese Foreign Minister. The points enumerated by Hirota in September 1935 were: insistence (1) that China co-operate with Japan and Manchukuo; (2) that Nanking abandon its alleged policies of playing off one foreign country against another; and (3) that it stop all anti-Japanese movements and start a sterner campaign to check the so-called Communist menace in the Far East.

The sixty colleges and schools in Peiping and the twenty-eight educational institutions in Tientsin were transformed into centres of political unrest and agitation. A Students' Association was formed for the special purpose of conducting anti-Japanese propaganda to thwart the new Japanese-engineered effort to extend the "autonomy movement" to the rest of North China. The students had established organizational contacts with a number of other organizations professing similar aims.

On November 1, 1935, the students of eleven Peiping and Tientsin secondary schools and colleges appealed to the Nanking government to permit greater liberty of the press, freedom of speech, and protection against illegal arrests of students. They urged particularly the declaration of a foreign policy based on the principle of struggle for national liberation against Japan's unceasing penetration. The patriotic appeal of the students was answered by renewed arrests. But in spite of all interdictions the students increased their activities. Numerous demonstrations, mass meetings, pilgrimages to the villages, fraternization with soldiers, were carried out. The action of the Peiping students awakened a responsive chord among their fellow-students in Shanghai, Canton, and Wuhan.

The most spectacular demonstration of this period was that

held on December 9, 1935, in Peiping. Some four thousand students, marching in the bitter cold, braved hose lines, police clubs, and the threat of rifle and machine-gun fire to express publicly their protests *en masse*. Hundreds were arrested and scores badly beaten; but the marching lines refused to break up until their heroic deeds had been carried far enough to convince China and the rest of the world that the nation was deeply resentful. The slogans carried on banners and lustily shouted by the shivering students adequately proclaimed their aims. Here are the main ones:

"Against the anti-Communist autonomous movement!"

"Against the foreign policy of selling out the country!"

"Stop the civil war immediately!"

"Declare war against Japan immediately!"

"People! Arm yourselves!"

"Protect North China by arms!"

"Down with the traitors!"

"Down with the traitor Yin Yu-keng!"

"Long live the Chinese nation!"

"Struggle for the freedom of our country!"

"Confiscate the property of the traitors to relieve the calamitous suffering of the people!"

"Against moving troops to the south!"

"Against heavy taxes and surtaxes!"

"Against the Japanese robbers who have arrested the Chinese people!"

"Down with the three principles of Hirota which Nanking has apparently accepted and which will certainly result in the complete colonization of China by Japan!"

Later, pursuing their prearranged plans, the students seized railway locomotives and entire trains in an effort to reach Nanking with mass delegations to lay their demands before

Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. Unable to quell the students' protest, after repeatedly failing to browbeat the demonstrators, Chiang Kai-shek decided to permit small official delegations to visit Nanking. Students from Canton, Shanghai, Peiping, Tientsin, and other educational centres went to the capital. After being lectured on the inadvisability of disturbances, and the need for obeying the ancient laws of filial respect, the students were urged by Chiang Kai-shek to abandon their anti-Japanese agitation and to return to their studies.

In support of their demands, however, the students had called a strike in Peiping lasting from December 10 to January 20. In Tientsin the strike lasted from February 1 to the 24th, thus keeping up the general agitation over a longer period than ever, under the leadership of the students. Towards the latter part of February the students in East Hopei, under the very mouth of Japanese cannon, went on strike in protest against the introduction of new textbooks revised to suit the Japanese and Manchukuoan authorities.

Fraternization of students and soldiers in the latter part of February had an important part in winning over the fighters in the army of General Sung Cheh-yuan, commander of the 29th army and concurrently chairman of the Hopei-Chahar Political Council. General Sung had won a reputation as a national hero as a result of the battle of Hsifengchow, but all but lost it by his terrorism against the students. Sung dispatched his "Big Sword Squad" to disperse the students during the height of the movement in Peiping, but the students were able to counteract his deed.

In Wan Fu-lin's 53rd army the soldiers cheered the students. They shouted anti-Japanese slogans. Also, according to observers, when the students urged the soldiers of the north

country to "fight your way back to your old homes" and "remember your families in Manchukuo," some of the soldiers actually wept and enthusiastically answered by affirmative cries.

The actions of the students were not isolated phenomena or temperamental outbursts of excitable young patriots. The demonstrations derived their motive power from deep reservoirs of national sentiment. They were expressive of underlying trends towards national unity. Among the undeclared allies of the students could be counted such sectors of the population as the following: thousands of military students in Whampoa and other military academies who under the stress of the Japanese invasion revived the traditions of 1925-7;¹ a number of Kuomintang officials who had been won over by the Communist arguments for a national front against Japan; many local organizations of the Kuomintang in the various provinces which did not wait for a central understanding but had already participated in anti-Japanese activities; many officers, including leading generals in the Kuomintang army, who began to express themselves in favour of unity; and, besides, nearly the whole of the Chinese people who had been aroused to a greater or lesser degree against Japan. Thus, favouring the students were the proletariat, shopkeepers,

¹ "One hundred fifty-six former graduates of the Whampoa Military Academy at Canton published an open letter addressed to General Chiang Kai-shek. The importance of this letter resides in the fact that these officers graduated from Whampoa ten years ago before the northern expedition was launched from Canton. Trained under Chiang Kai-shek, who was then the president of the academy, they formed part of the officer cadres of the Kuomintang armies during the northern expedition, and have since been counted among Chiang's closest personal *adherents*."—"Chiang Kai-shek's Whampoa Cadets Accuse," *China Today*, December 1936.

factory-owners, journalists, lawyers, and other classes. The 19th route army had organized an important section of the anti-Japanese movement, a branch of the National Salvation Association. Scores of similar anti-Japanese groups were formed throughout the nation. General Chen Ming-chu of the 19th route army openly declared himself in favour of collaboration with the Red army of China. This was symptomatic of the growing popularity of the Red army because of its avowed anti-Japanese orientation. That the Red army became most popular with the troops led by Chang Hsueh-liang, which had been driven out of Manchuria by the Japanese invaders, was later to be of determining significance.

Expressive of the agitation for national unification was the action of Chang Tai-yen, venerable scientist and prominent Chinese politician, who circulated a telegram throughout China condemning those who opposed anti-Japanese co-operation with the Communists. Perhaps it was indicative of the higher political level of the period that Professor Chang so staunchly declared himself for national unity when in 1925-7 he had been conspicuous for his unrelenting opposition to any dealings with the Communists. There was also Chang Nai-chi, prominent politician and journalist, vice-president of the Industrial Bank of Chekiang, who had the courage publicly to criticize the Nanking government for waging war against the Communists instead of collaborating with them for a joint offensive against the Japanese invaders.

At this period of the emergence of a more formidable anti-Japanese movement in China, we must turn our attention to a critical political situation that had developed in Japan itself. Japan was undergoing a political crisis of the most violent nature, whose repercussions in China were tremendous.

The military Fascist clique in Japan had done everything

it could to ensure itself a victory in the national elections of February 20, 1936, to extend the strongest "positive policy" of penetration into China and the intensification of all war preparations. To the amazement of the Japanese reactionaries, the outstanding feature of that election was the marked trend against Fascism. The Minseito Party, which emerged as the dominant political factor, had avowed its opposition to Fascism during the election campaign. Japanese labour made an exceptionally good showing, returning the strongest bloc in its history. The proletarian parties registered a popular vote of more than 650,000 which was twice the number of ballots ever before received by the combined labour political groups. Only one openly Fascist candidate and four Fascist sympathizers were elected. The election proved to be an emphatic expression of lack of confidence in the provocative policies of the Japanese military.

Incensed by the popular opposition to militarist rule, a group of Fascist officers on February 26, through a series of assassinations of government ministers and an army coup, attempted either to seize power or to force the government to resign and to accept a cabinet based not on any semblance of popular choice but on recommendations of the Fascist factions of the army. In the slaughter of government ministers on February 26, the following important government leaders were killed: Korekiyo Takahashi, the eighty-two-year-old Finance Minister; Admiral Viscount Makoto Saito, Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal; General Jotoro Wantanabe; and Colonel Denzo Matsuo (who was assassinated because he was mistaken for his brother-in-law, Premier Keisuke Okada). For three days Tokyo's central district was the scene of warlike negotiations between the insurgent officers and spokesmen for Emperor Hirohito. Though several of the in-

surgent leaders committed suicide and others were sentenced to death, and though the uprising was ostensibly quelled, it did not entirely fail of its purpose. A compromise favouring a continuation of the original policy of the invasion of Manchuria was agreed upon. The bloody February coup marked a pause in Japan's schemes for the invasion of North China. But it was an interim so important that future investigators may be able to say that, in hesitating, the Japanese military was ultimately lost. Japanese apologists for the militarists were at their wits' end to explain to the rest of the world the gory spectacle of February 26-9. K. K. Kawakami, cabling from Washington, D. C., to the newspaper *Osaka Mainichi* (March 6, 1936), declared: "Looking through the week's perspective it is undeniable that Japan's prestige as a civilized nation suffered a serious setback in the American estimate. Japan's American well-wishers find it impossible to explain or to excuse the recent Tokyo atrocities, which they had thought possible only in semi-civilized countries."

Nevertheless, after adjustments in the government personnel satisfactory to it, the Japanese military continued its North China plans. But the shock to the political life of Japan as a result of the assassinations by the Japanese militarists had given China a brief respite. Popular opposition in Japan to the methods of the military began to mount, to an extent where some disagreement was expressed even among industrial and banking circles in Japan. China, therefore, had an opportunity to make full use of the delay caused by the critical conditions in Japan. The greater the departure from the Japanese official policy of war against China, the more favourable became the conditions for national unity in China.

In the middle of April it was announced by the Japanese newspaper *Yomiuri Shimbun* that the Japanese army general

staff would hold a conference on China. On April 16 *Yomiuri Shimbun* published the points to be discussed, which in themselves give a well-rounded picture of the scope of the objectives of the Tokyo militarists after the February events. The seven topics of discussion were listed as follows:

1. The Japanese army has reasons to believe that the attitude of the Nanking government towards the pact of mutual assistance between the Soviet Union and Outer Mongolia, and particularly the national government's protest to Russia were "made-up" jobs and that China actually has a secret treaty with the U.S.S.R. The Japanese army requires a "clarification of the truth" about these matters.

2. In consideration of the effect on North China of the occupation of Shansi province by the forces of the Central government in connection with the anti-Red campaign, it has become necessary for the Japanese army to consider the matter of demanding the withdrawal of Nanking troops from Shansi.

3. The Nanking government is now "desperately endeavouring" to unify the Chinese army, including the military training of Chinese students on a three-year plan. Nanking is also trying to popularize ideas of national defence and is developing various types of military equipment along the Yangtze River and at various ports along the coast. As these military preparations are clearly for the purpose of opposing Japan, it is necessary for Japanese army officers stationed in China to consider counter-measures.

4. Evidence is available that the Nanking government has made plans for "crushing" the East Hopei Autonomous Government by means of intrigue and bribery, particularly since the Central government's intervention in Shansi.

5. In view of the "failure" of Nanking and the southwest-

ern faction to patch up their differences, there is a possibility that the southwestern faction may form an alliance with the East Hopei régime against Nanking.

6. The Japanese army must devise counter-measures to cope with the activities of Sir Frederick Leith-Ross pertaining to loans and railways in China and also America's ambitious program involving the advance of loans and the control of China's finances. Japan must devise counter-measures to cope with the activities not only of America and Britain but also of Soviet Russia.

7. It is necessary for the army to establish a "concrete and substantial" Chinese policy in place of Koki Hirota's three-point policy, now in abeyance. The army must consider means of applying the new policy to be adopted in place of Hirota's three points.

Perceiving the Japanese plans of inaugurating a new drive into North China, the Red army in Shensi province decided to move strong combatant forces eastward into adjoining Shansi province to be in a better position to oppose any further invasion. Proposing the creation of an anti-Japanese government in China, the Red army made a special appeal to Governor Yen Hsi-shan of Shansi to join in the anti-Japanese front and to refrain from hindering the movements of the Red army. Yen Hsi-shan's reply was to order his troops to attack the advancing Red army. Rather than risk the development of a full-blown civil war, the Red army retreated across the Yellow River, which it had crossed in pursuance of its original undertaking. Its movement, however, had a lasting propagandistic effect; and the refusal of the Red army to carry on war against another Chinese army, though conditions were favourable for a Communist victory, aroused general admiration in the sincerity of Communist professions of making

concessions for the attainment of national unification.

Under these conditions the Red army leaders issued a stirring appeal to the Nanking government for the immediate cessation of all civil war in China, the calling of a peace conference, and the formation of a united front to resist the newest threat of Japanese aggression. This appeal was widely circulated in the Chinese and foreign press and could not be ignored as were previous similar declarations. Dated May 5, 1936, the appeal was signed by Mao Tse-tung and Chu Teh, for the Central Soviet government of China. It was addressed to the National government of Nanking, the Military Affairs Commission, officers and men of the Chinese army, naval, and air forces, all parties, all public organizations, all newspapers, and all Chinese "who do not want to be enslaved." The appeal scathingly denounced the government leaders held responsible for sending large forces to check the advance of the Red army to new combat positions to resist further Japanese aggression. "We now offer to equip the Red army with all necessary weapons within a period of one month to join the united front against Japan," said the appeal.¹

"We propose to call an immediate cessation of hostilities and call a peace conference in order to realize our common aim of resisting the Japanese." The appeal further argued that the movement of the Red army into Shansi was an absolutely necessary measure of national defence.

While the Red army was thus engaged in military manoeuvres and political activity to hasten national unity, reports from Manchuria told of fifty thousand anti-Japanese armed volunteers continuing a guerrilla armed struggle against the Japanese and Manchukuoan authorities. Scattered throughout the former Three Eastern Provinces were armed bands ready

¹ *Shanghai Evening Post*, May 23, 1936.

to be hammered into a formidable army to co-operate with armies in China proper whenever the signal should be given for a war of liberation. Such was the tenor of a report made by General Kung Hsien-yung in Canton, where he had come from Manchuria to attend the funeral of Hu Han-min, deceased southern Kuomintang leader. Appointed commander-in-chief of the Northwestern Volunteers in 1933, General Kung managed to get into Manchuria disguised as a peasant, and continued his work without apprehension.

Thus, beginning with the students' movement, paralleling the growth of the National Salvation League, encouraged by the persistence of the Manchurian Volunteers and the demonstrations of the Red army as well as the Communists' repeated offers of unity, the movement of national joint action against Japan received sufficient impetus at least temporarily to impede Japan's North China plans.

In the meantime, to allay the increasing opposition of Japanese business interests, the Japanese military leaders used their advantageous strategic positions in North China to bribe Japanese merchants, traders, and big business houses by offering them military protection for wholesale smuggling into China by way of northern territories dominated by the Japanese army. The extent of Japanese smuggling, of course, can never be fully known. However, The Chinese Maritime Customs estimated that while in the entire year of 1935 \$63,000,000 (Chinese) worth of sugar, artificial silk, flour, piece goods, and other commodities were smuggled into Tientsin alone, in the first three months of 1936 the value of smuggled commodities had reached the sum of \$30,000,000 (Chinese). Some Japanese trade papers put the sum still higher, estimating the total amount of Japanese goods smuggled into China at the huge figure of \$250,000,000 (Chinese).

In the six months ending February 1, 1936, the customs revenue of Hopei and Chahar had been reduced by \$8,000,000 (Chinese) and that of the rest of North China by \$20,000,000 (Chinese).

Smuggling was greatly facilitated by the creation of the East Hopei Autonomous Government. General Yin Yu-keng established a customs apparatus of his own to accommodate the Japanese with rates seventy-five per cent lower than the regular Chinese customs charges. After reaching Tientsin, the Japanese goods are usually trans-shipped to other parts of north and northwestern China.

Smuggling by Japanese commercial interests was not restricted to North China. In the south the situation became so serious that the Nanking government sent a special envoy in the person of H. O. Tong, superintendent of the Shanghai Chinese customs, to Canton to negotiate with the southwestern authorities in an attempt to eliminate smuggling. To a press correspondent in Canton, Mr. Tong declared, regarding his investigations, that Chinese customs receipts normally amounted to \$800,000,000 (Chinese) annually; but that they had dropped by \$200,000,000 (Chinese) in 1935. Mr. Tong strongly intimated that the loss was due largely to Japanese smuggling.

The Japanese military undoubtedly protected smuggling into China as a bribe of quick profits to counteract anxiety among business men in Japan over mounting taxation for military expenditures entailed by the invasion of Manchuria, the plans for invading North China, and the preparations for war against the Soviet Union and the United States.

At the same time Japanese strategists looked upon the smuggling process as a double-edged sword wielded against China: it brought great profits to Japanese business and con-

tinued to hold the support of many business men who were becoming wary of the dangers, and it served to undermine the financial stability of the Nanking government as well as contributing to a chaotic condition in the collection of the customs. Still another by-product of smuggling was to confound Japan's commercial competitors in the Chinese market.

The tension in North China, for a number of special reasons, had dangerous repercussions in South China. To explain the resulting threat of civil war that terrorized the whole country in the summer of 1936 when the Japanese military leaders on the Asian continent were fervently praying and working for such an eventuality to break up the growing national unity movement, it is necessary to enumerate a number of more or less remote causes.

Shortly after the collapse of the anti-Nanking movement in Canton in 1931, Hu Han-min and General Chen Chi-tang created the Southwest Political Council. This council functioned as a semi-autonomous government body that gave only nominal allegiance to Nanking and was itself composed of still more independent provincial governments of the south and of the west of China. Originally included in the Southwest Political Council were the provinces of Kweichow, Yunnan, Szechwan, Kwangsi, and Kwangtung. But when the Red army made its famous trek to the northwest, General Chiang Kai-shek in traversing the southwestern regions pursuing the Communists was able to attain mastery over the provinces of Kweichow, Yunnan, and Szechwan. The Nanking Generalissimo, moreover, was able to bring these provinces more or less firmly within the orbit of the Central government. Thereafter the Southwest Political Council was largely restricted to Kwangtung and Kwangsi.

Hu Han-min, as the leader of the Southwest Council, and

as an elder Kuomintang statesman, had directed the southerners' clamour against Nanking for capitulating in the face of the Japanese invasion.

In the summer of 1936 the conjuncture of a number of important events brought the issue of the historical conflict between the south and Nanking to a head. The circumstances surrounding the grave threat of a north and south civil war, when such a catastrophe would have been most opportune for Japan, must be sought in the following developments:

The Japanese had increased their intrigue in the south to counteract the growing movement towards unity in the north.

Thirty years after construction was first begun, the Canton-Hankow railway was finally completed in the summer of 1936, just before the ugly threat of civil war. Paradoxically, the steel rails which connected Canton with North China worried the southern military leaders because they saw in the completed railroad an economic weapon threatening their feudal autonomy.

In the midst of these developments Hu Han-min, strongest political figure in the Southwest Political Council, died early in the summer of 1936. His death created a crisis immediately in the Southwest Political Council, with the corrupt Chen Chi-tang, ruler of Canton, seeking to gain mastery.

The movement of the Red army to the northwest had brought the Nanking control to the very domain of the Southwest Political Council, thereby sharpening the contest for supremacy.

Taking full advantage of widespread discontent with Nanking's facile retreat before Japan's demands, those who manipulated the policy of the Southwest Political Council, in the most demagogic style, proposed war against Nanking

under the pretext of compelling the Central government to accept a belligerent anti-Japanese foreign policy. That the majority of the sixty military commanders and government officials of Kwangtung and Kwangsi who signed the anti-Japanese manifesto which served as the false banner of Chen Chi-tang were sincere in their patriotism and in their desire to combat the Japanese invader is unquestionable. However, evidence of Japanese intrigue and bribery, implicating particularly Chen Chi-tang, was overwhelming.

Not long before the vigorous anti-Japanese manifesto, Chen Chi-tang, according to the Japanese news agency Domei, had proposed a goodwill mission to Japan to establish closer relations between Tokyo and Canton. The *China Weekly Review* of June 27, 1936 reported that, according to information from authoritative sources, the Southwest Political Council leaders had concluded a loan and trade agreement with Japan, in the name of the Da Kwan Company. The agreement was signed in Hong Kong by Huang Tse-chin, Commissioner of Finance of the Kwangsi provincial government, and provided, among other things, for a \$5,000,000 (Chinese) loan from Japan. Japan, in consideration of granting the loan, was to receive valuable mining and trade concessions.

Competent Chinese opinion of the motives of Chen Chi-tang and his kind was expressed by T. S. Young in an article entitled: "Another Tragedy is Being Enacted in China."¹ In the course of his article Mr. Young charged:

"It sounds rather curious that Kwangsi military leaders should be so enthusiastic in leading this anti-Japanese expedition, when their soldiers are known to have been equipped with Japanese armaments and drilled under the tutorship of

¹ *China Weekly Review*, June 20, 1936.

Japanese military advisers. With this in view, we cannot help believing that the motive of this expedition is not so much to drive away the Japanese invaders from our country as to overthrow the Nanking régime. In this case, the Southwestern leaders have willingly played themselves into the Japanese hands and become the Japanese puppets in another form. They may play on this worn-out anti-Japanese harp, but its music can no longer capture the fancy of their intelligent audience. While our people may complain against Nanking's indefinite foreign policy, they, nevertheless, will not countenance any attempt on the part of the malcontent militarists and politicians to start any civil strife in the good name of national salvation for the sole purpose of gaining their personal ends."

That such capable southwest leaders as General Pai Chung-hsi and Li Tsung-jen and the younger officers who followed them were earnest in their anti-Japanese protestations could not overcome the fact that the entire movement was one of the most perilous attacks on Chinese unity since the Manchurian invasions; and its definite objective result instead of helping the struggle against Japan, as its spokesmen claimed, would have been to assist the Japanese plans by threatening to send the two largest armies in the country against one another.

The Chinese Communists, suspicious of the real aims of the powerful semi-feudal supporters of the Southwest Political Council, insisted that the Southern militarists prove their sincerity. In the name of the Communist Party of China, Chie Hua wrote:¹

"If the Kwangtung Kuomintang leaders are really determined to fight against Japan, then there exists no more cer-

¹ *International Press Correspondence*, 1936, p. 779.

tain means by which they can gain the full trust of the masses of the people than by granting the people unrestricted facilities for taking part in this struggle. In order to bring this about the following conditions are necessary:

"Democratic rights and political freedom for the people; freedom for the unrestricted development of the anti-Japanese movement; freedom for the self-arming of the masses of people and for the organization of armed anti-Japanese formations; instead of resisting them, to form a fighting alliance with the Red army and the armed anti-Japanese formations which are ready to offer the hand of friendship at any time to all anti-Japanese forces, as they wage the anti-Japanese war in Kwangtung and beyond its borders in Fukien, Kiangsi, Kweichow, and Yunnan. Those are the minimum conditions for a real fight against Japan and the traitors to the country."

Needless to say, these conditions were never even considered by the southern politicians whose purpose was not a popular movement against Japan.

When it appeared as if civil war could not be avoided and when the southern armies had moved into battle positions to split China wide open through its very heart, the southwest rebellion crumpled. Some officers of the southern air fleet had been won away; important political leaders deserted the southwest clique; and, above all, the Chinese people exerted a terrific pressure against internecine strife. Chen Chi-tang, carrying with him the millions in graft he had squeezed from the people of Kwangtung, fled to the safety of Hong Kong and later went to Europe. In exile he said nothing about the anti-Japanese struggle. Those southwest leaders who had made their peace with Nanking were either transferred to other posts or were allowed to retain their positions. The

whole country felt a burden lifted after the danger of civil war was definitely averted.

Briefly but pointedly summarizing the events of this trying period in the history of China, *Izvestia*, official organ of the Soviet government, in an editorial of July 29, 1936, stated:

"The issue is significant in many respects. The southern Chinese generals acted under the banner of the struggle against Japan. But their defeat in no way means the defeat of the anti-Japanese ideas by which they were allegedly led. On the contrary, the failure of this attempt to earn political capital by means of an anti-Japanese movement is explained, primarily, by the fact that the actions of South China were not directed against Japan, but directly favoured the plunderous plans of Japan. The situation was realized in time by Chinese public circles. This provocation failed, also, because in the eyes of the entire Chinese nation the anti-Japanese campaign of the southerners was revealed as a screen for the mercenary, semi-feudal provincial separation of the local military cliques, whose victory would weaken China still more and would be advantageous only for the Japanese imperialists."

The changed political atmosphere of the country, following the stormy demonstrations of the students and evident even through the clouds of the threat of civil war from the south, was especially marked by the repeated pleas from wide circles for national unification. The All-China National Salvation League (a federation of scores of National Salvation organizations throughout the country), sponsored by Madam Sun Yat-sen, Mr. Ma Hsiang-peh, Chinese Catholic leader, and scores of other prominent Chinese, which had been formed on June 1, 1936, issued on July 15 a nation-wide

appeal entitled: "Some Minimum Demands for an All-China front against Japanese Aggression." The document was signed by Shen Chun-yu, chairman of the Chinese Bar Association; Professor Tao Hing-chih, noted educator; Chang Nai-chi, vice-president of the Chekiang Industrial Bank and editor-in-chief of the influential Chinese magazine *Life Weekly*; Chow Tao-fin; and many other equally prominent persons. The minimum demands proposed were: (1) cessation of hostilities in the southwest; (2) conclusion of an armistice with the Red army; (3) the right freely to carry on anti-Japanese propaganda and agitation and organize for the salvation of the country.

Replying to the appeal of the All-China National Salvation League, Mao Tse-tung, Soviet leader, declared: "We have already adopted a decision not to confiscate the land of the rich peasants, and, if they come to us to fight against Japan, not to refuse to unite with them. We are not confiscating the property and the factories of the big and small Chinese merchants and capitalists. We protect their enterprises and help them to expand so that the material supply in the Soviet districts, so necessary for the anti-Japanese campaign, may be augmented in this way."

To dissipate apprehension concerning the question whether the many scattered guerrilla bands would abide by the decisions of the Central Soviet region, particularly the Red army groups in Hupeh, Hunan, Kiangsi, Fukien, Chekiang, and isolated districts of Shensi province, Mao Tse-tung assured the All-China National Salvation League that any agreement of unity between Nanking and the Communists would be faithfully adhered to by all the Soviet districts and every branch of the Red army. "The Soviets and the Red army belong to the people," said Mao. He concluded his letter

endorsing the aims of the League with these words: "All parties and classes in China should unite to fight Japan and the traitors of China."

Meanwhile the Japanese military, having partially repaired its damaged political fences at home, began to pay more attention to achieving some substantial military advances in China. However, being neither anxious nor prepared to risk a frontal drive into North China by way of Hopei and Shantung provinces, the Japanese command in China decided on a flank movement through Suiyuan from their Chahar base. In this more thinly populated and less protected area the purpose of Japan was twofold: first, to carry further an attempted wedge between China proper and the Mongolian People's Republic, allied to the Soviet Union; second, to strike into the north central area of China with the assistance of certain Mongol allies to extend the line of battle over a wider front.

Early in August, just before the threat of civil war had entirely cleared up, fighting was reported to have broken out at Pingtichuan, Suiyuan province, near the Chahar border. The Japanese had moved two thousand of their own troops near Changpei (Chahar). Furthermore, they stationed twenty-one Japanese war planes at Dolonor. In addition, four Mongolian airplanes "purchased" in Japan were brought to a new airdrome at Shangtu, the capital city of Japan's new ally, the Mongol Prince Teh. Assisting in the initial drive into Suiyuan were about fifteen hundred troops under General Pao Yuch-ching. A number of Manchukuoan troops from Chahar, under the pro-Japanese General Chang Hai-peng, also moved up to the Chahar-Suiyuan border. Thus Japan had massed a sizable advance guard to begin a new military drive into North China.

Politically, the ground had been prepared through the skilful intrigue conducted by the "Japanese Lawrence of Arabia," Lieutenant General Kenji Dohihara. Dohihara's plotting, a type of spadework fully described by Baron Tanaka in his famous *Memorial*, began long before the invasion of Manchuria and reached its most advanced stage just before the drive on Suiyuan. Japan's aim was to carve a new country out of this part of China to be called Mongkuo—Mongol-land—and to be set next to Manchukuo in the colonial crown of the Japanese Empire.

On June 27, 1936 (at about the time Tokyo expected that the civil war would break out between North and South China), Inner Mongolia proclaimed its "independence" from China. There 2,500,000 descendants of Genghis Khan, who conquered half the nations of the known world of his day, were placed under Japanese domination by their tribal leaders. Prince Teh Wang, hereditary ruler of the Sunnet tribes, established a government seat at Chia Pu Su, comprising territory on the Chahar-Suiyuan border. He declared himself commander-in-chief of the Inner Mongolian army. The descendants of Genghis Khan turned their shaggy Mongolian ponies towards the Suiyuan border, ready for a swift dash, under the banner of the Rising Sun imperialism, against the Chinese people.

Suiyuan was originally a part of Inner Mongolia. Following the completion of the Peiping-Suiyuan Railway in 1914, it was created a "special administrative district." In 1928 it was formally established as a province. Chinese statisticians say that Suiyuan covers an area of 920,000 square li¹ and has a population of 1,800,000. A large majority of the inhabitants of Suiyuan are Mongols. The main communications route

¹ A li is approximately one third of a mile.

is via the Peiping-Suiyuan Railway, commonly known as the Pingsui line. This railway penetrates the very heart of the province, terminating at Paotou. The railway enters the province at Fengchen, going northward from thence a distance of about forty miles. The line then turns slightly south and goes directly west of Kweisui, capital of the province, and then continues on to Paotou.

Kweisui, the main political and commercial centre, was the objective of the Japanese-inspired invasion. The larger towns in East Suiyuan, near the Chahar border, are Hsingho, Taolin, and Wuchuan, which were heavily fortified by the Suiyuan authorities at the first sign of the Japanese-directed attack.

The Manchukuo irregular forces, finally, together with the Mongol troops, numbering some 25,000 armed men, were drawn up along a straight line reaching from Changpei, Kunpao, and Shangtu in Chahar for the push towards the three important Suiyuan cities.

The people of Suiyuan, together with the people of all China, were stirred by the acute danger that threatened them. Without much hesitation they decided on resistance to the death. General Fu Tso-yi, Governor of Suiyuan, went to the Pingtichuan front immediately to take personal charge of the defence. He massed 50,000 regular provincial troops along an extended defence line running from Tumerte to Fengchen.

Responding to the danger to Suiyuan, the 29th route army at Peiping decided to prepare for action to resist Japan if the Suiyuan attack was followed or assisted by a drive into Hopei and Shantung. Current reports stated that the lower officers of the 29th route army had overruled the conciliatory advice of General Sung Cheh-yuan, commander-in-chief of the army. The rank and file as well as the majority of the officers pledged their allegiance to the anti-Japanese General Feng

Yu-hsiang, one of the leaders of the national unity faction in the Nanking government. At the same time the general staff of the 19th route army decided to work out a scheme for the defence of North China. They designated three lines of defence. The first line was set at Paoting, about fifty-five miles southwest of Peiping; the second at Shihchiachwang, about half way from Paoting to the Yellow River; and the third at the historic Hwang Ho or Yellow River, the landmark chosen by the Japanese military as their goal for the ultimate conquest of North China.

The persistence of student agitation, the continuous Communist propaganda and appeals for national co-operation, the widening influence of the All-China National Salvation League, particularly its growing prestige with leading groups of Chinese politicians, army men, intellectuals, and native business interests, encouraged the stiffening of Chinese resistance.

Hence the new military drive into Suiyuan province, launched as it was by a Japanese army command labouring under the least favourable conditions since 1931, ran into a China which felt that the time of united resistance was near. Anti-Japanese demonstrations broke out anew in many scattered parts of the country. In Chengtu, Szechwan province, two Japanese newspapermen were killed and two Japanese merchants were seriously injured in the course of an anti-Japanese demonstration of ten thousand Chinese. This unfortunate incident was a welcome pretext for the Japanese military. They bombarded the Tokyo Foreign Office with demands for sterner diplomatic action as a convenient smoke-screen for their military plans. The Japanese Foreign Office did more than insist on reparations for the murders. In the general negotiations which followed, it seemed to forget the

original pretext in its haste to press the original humiliating three points of Foreign Minister Hirota. Hardly had the Japanese journals cooled off after the Chengtu incident when the Nippon press seized upon the murder of a fifty-three-year-old Japanese druggist in Pakhoi, treaty port in Kwangtung province, as another "anti-Japanese incident." The Japanese press charged that the Japanese druggist was the victim of an anti-Japanese mob, led by members of the 19th route army. Later investigation, however, proved the murder to be one of purely criminal and not political aims.

A new spirit was moving in China. The Japanese sword this time did not go easily into yielding flesh. It struck a hard protective surface. The first series of Japan's successes were running their course. But China, first of all, was to go through her severest test before the clear road to national unification opened before her.

CHAPTER XII

A Generalissimo "Kidnapped"!

CHINA presented the world with the strangest of political paradoxes. In a country of 450,000,000 souls, where life, according to imperialist observers, is regarded as cheap and the individual counts least, the detention and threat of murder of one man created the gravest crisis of its entire national existence. Few doubted at the time that were Chiang Kai-shek assassinated during his forcible detention at Sian, Shensi province, in the fortnight of December 11-25, 1936, his death would have precipitated the most destructive civil war in the long annals of civil strife in China. And such an internecine struggle at that historical moment would have brought Japan's army flying at the heart of China when the country would have been weakest from the most copious letting of its own blood.

It was not surprising, therefore, to find that the Japanese press wishfully reported the assassination of the Nanking Generalissimo. The Japanese general staff was already preparing mobilization of the entire armed forces for the consequences of such an event before the world fortunately was

convinced that the captured Nanking leader was not in imminent danger of violent death.

The detention of Chiang Kai-shek has no precedent in Chinese history, though kidnappings were common and mutinies and rebellions the usual procedure. So intimate a participant in the events as the wife of Chiang, Madam Mayling Soong-Chiang, in her personal memoirs of the occasion, pointed out:

"What happened at Sian during the fortnight beginning December 12 last was not a rebellion as we know such politico-military upheavals in China. It had special and significant features of its own. . . ." ¹ "No question of money or increased power or position was at any time brought up. Indeed, that aspect of the usual bargaining by recalcitrant military leaders was entirely absent from this mutiny. That is why it was different from others; why it showed an improvement in political development and provides the hope that it will be the last attempt at mutiny." ²

Without an understanding of the condition that motivated the "kidnapping" and its unique outcome the incident remains baffling and inexplicable. The threads leading to the Sian incident are numerous, but they can be adequately traced by following the main strands.

To begin with, the invasion of Suiyuan, which became more pressing towards the close of 1936, had proved to be the most serious peril to China since Jehol and Chahar were added to conquered Manchuria. The Japanese Kwantung army had drawn up a series of ultimatums against further Chinese assistance to the stout Suiyuan defence. The directors of the invasion threatened that if Hopei, Chahar, and Shansi troops came to the aid of the defending Suiyuan army the

¹ *New York Times*, April 16, 1937.

² *New York Times*, April 19, 1937.

Japanese military would make Tientsin and Peiping the base of active operations against the whole of North China.

Meanwhile the capture of the strategic village of Pailing-miao (130 miles to the northwest of the Suiyuan capital, Kweihua, stronghold of the Mongol irregulars under Prince Teh) by Suiyuan troops on November 24 had an electric effect on the Chinese people. The main spearhead of the Japanese drive was effectively shattered. The gallant and successful resistance to the invasion of Suiyuan awakened nationwide enthusiasm. A spirit that had lain dormant or that had been subdued since the Shanghai defence of 1932 pervaded the nation with greater vigour than ever. The whole country from peasant, trade-union, and university organizations to the chambers of commerce in every important city of China responded financially and otherwise to the defence of Suiyuan.

Under the influence of the Suiyuan resistance and the stiffening of popular sentiment against Japan, the Nanking government dared to take a firmer stand in refusing to accept the series of oppressive conditions submitted by the Japanese Ambassador, Shigeru Kawagoe, as a consequence of the Chengtu and Pakhoi incidents. The Japanese Ambassador was constrained to end abruptly his discussion with General Chang Chun, Chinese Foreign Minister. On December 6, a few days before the detention of Chiang Kai-shek in Sian, Ambassador Kawagoe hastily departed from Nanking, after nearly three months of futile "negotiations." The Japanese Ambassador left for Shanghai fully aware that Japan's demands had been, if not rejected, at least returned with unfavourable comment. The documents containing Japan's conditions had been rather unceremoniously flung back at the Tokyo envoy. They were later returned to the Japanese embassy by a Chinese Foreign Office official. The Chinese de-

monstrative rejection of the demands was an act of such independence as Japan had never before experienced at Nanking. Commenting on the firm attitude of the Chinese government, Japanese spokesmen contended that diplomatic procedure prevents the recipient of an official document from returning it. They therefore charged China with "unprecedented insolence" in sending back the Japanese *aide-mémoire*.

Yet in the very midst of these evidences of a stronger position against Japanese arrogance, the Nanking government made a disturbing attack on leaders of the unification movement. Seven Chinese at the head of the All-China National Salvation League were arrested on November 23 in a series of lightning raids carried out in the early morning hours in Shanghai.¹ The arrests had been ordered by the Nanking

¹ Those arrested were:

Shen Chung-yiu: Sixty-three years old. Participated in the first revolution (1911), the second revolution (against Yuan Shih-kai), and the national revolutionary movement. Formerly member of Cheng-Hsueh Club. Now lawyer and Dean of Shanghai Law College. Demanded the unconditional release of Tu Chung-yuan (editor of *New Life Weekly*) during the trial in the Supreme Court. Member of the Executive Council of the All-China National Salvation League.

Chang Nai-chi: Banker, economist, and author. Studied in the United States. Formerly assistant manager of Chekiang Industrial Bank, vice-chairman of the Shanghai Bankers' Association, and chairman of Bankers' Co-operative Credit Service. Author of *Money and Currency Problems of China* (in Chinese), etc. Co-author of *Some Fundamental Conditions and Minimum Demands of Unity against Aggression*, a pamphlet of historical significance. Member of the Executive Council of the All-China National Salvation League.

Wang Tsao-shih: Returned student from the United States. Formerly professor in various universities in Shanghai. Editor of *Free Speech* magazine, suspended by the government. Now lawyer. Mem-

government. The victims were famed throughout the country as the most ardent leaders of the movement for national unity.

An international event also entered to enlarge the background of the dramatic Sian events. The signing on November 25, 1936 of the German-Japanese so-called anti-Communist pact weighed heavily against China's efforts to win back its national integrity.¹ The agreement initialed by Herr von

ber of the Executive Council of the All-China National Salvation League.

Sze Liang: Well-known woman lawyer in Shanghai. Member of the Executive Council of the All-China National Salvation League.

Tsao Tao-feng: Formerly editor of *Life Weekly*. After the suspension of that weekly by the government, he took a trip to Europe and America. Since his return to China, he has been editor of the *Masses Life* magazine, the *Life Daily Journal*, and the *Life Weekly Review*.

Li Kung-pu: Returned student from the United States. Former member of the Kuomintang. After his return to China, he became secretary of Li Chi Club in Nanking. Then assistant librarian of the Shanghai Shen Pao Circulating Library. At present he is the librarian of the Liang Tsai Circulation Library, principal of Liang Tsai Evening School, and editor of *Study Life* magazine.

Sa Chien-li: Lawyer, editor of *Life Knowledge* magazine in Shanghai.

¹ The following is the text of the published German-Japanese agreement of November 25, 1936, from the *China Weekly Review*, December 5, 1936:

"1. The contracting states agree to inform each other of the activities of the Communist International, to consult each other on the necessary measures of defence, and to carry them out in close co-operation.

"2. The contracting states will jointly invite such other states whose internal peace is menaced by the subversive activities of the Communist International to apply measures of self-defence in the spirit of the present agreement or to participate in the present agreement.

Ribbentrop, German Ambassador to Great Britain, and Vicomte Mushakoji, Japanese Ambassador to Berlin, was imme-

"3. The German as well as the Japanese text of the present agreement is to be deemed the original text. The agreement comes into force on the day signed and will remain in force for a period of five years. Prior to the termination of this period and in due time the contracting parties will come to an understanding concerning the further method of their co-operation."

(SIGNED) *Von Ribbentrop.*

Ambassador Extraordinary and
Plenipotentiary of the German Reich

Vicomte Mushakoji

Imperial Japanese Ambassador
Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary

Besides the agreement itself a supplementary protocol thereto was arrived at, as follows:

"On the occasion of the signature today of an agreement directed against the Communist International, the undersigned authorized representatives of the two governments concerned have agreed as follows: In matters concerning the exchange of intelligence bearing upon the activities of the Communist International as well as measures for the information on and defence against the Communist International, the competent authorities of the two contracting states will co-operate closely. According to the existing laws the competent authorities of the two contracting states will take severe measures against those directly or indirectly engaged at home or abroad in the service of the Communist International or promoting subversive activities. In order to facilitate the co-operation of the competent authorities of the contracting states set forth above a permanent committee will be established. In this committee will be considered and discussed all further ways and means necessary for fighting the subversive activities of the Communist International."

Von Ribbentrop

Vicomte Mushakoji

diately branded in the press of both Britain and the United States as an alliance against the interests of the United States, Britain, China, and the Soviet Union.

The imminence of the danger of a world war growing out of German and Italian invasion in Spain had hastened the signing of the so-called anti-Comintern understanding (long secretly negotiated). The signing of the pact increased the peril of a Japanese invasion of North China. For with a new East-West war alliance sealed and the peril of war more acute than ever in Europe, the Japanese plans of consolidating its North China base for a war against the Soviet Union became more urgent. Under these conditions the tension of the Chinese people who were conversant with these developments can be readily understood.

The attitude of the Tungpei (the former Manchurian army stationed in North China after being driven out of Manchuria in 1931) had an even more direct bearing on the course of events in Suiyan. The Tungpei authorities had been most persistent in pressing for a realization of the national united front. Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang, popularly known as the "Young Marshal," had been very active in endeavouring to persuade Chiang Kai-shek of the necessity of fostering the broadest and most militant national unity. In the very midst of the occurrences which have just been related the Young Marshal sent a long and urgent letter to Generalissimo Chiang appealing to him to enforce the promises of the Kuomintang that a general order would be given for armed resistance to any further Japanese invasion of Chinese territory. Under the prompting of his troops and his more articulate subordinate officers, the Young Marshal had made two special trips to Nanking to urge a policy of resistance.

The Tungpei soldiers were bound to Manchuria by a thou-

sand ties. Many of their families resided there; some of them owned farms in Manchuria; all looked to Manchuria as their homeland under the heel of the Japanese invader, and all retained the hope of returning to their loved ones and to their land.

The following correspondence from Sian, published in the *China Weekly Review* of October 24, 1936, is a vivid illustration of the anti-Japanese feeling among the fighters of the northeastern (Tungpei) army.

"It is here that the serious anti-Japanese movement in China is formulating itself—as one might expect that it logically should—among the northeastern exiles driven from Manchuria in 1931. The Tungpei army, rank and file, is now, after five years' wandering, in a high temper against the continued 'peace and order' non-resistance policy towards Japan. It is my guess that the first shot fired on the national defence front with full intent and purpose to penetrate a uniformed Nipponese bosom will come from the impatient rifle of one of these homesick, ill-cared-for, ill-equipped, desperate, but *li hai*, men-without-a-country, with or without orders. . . . Among the Tungpei people one finds that '*k'ang erh*'—'resisting Japan'—is not regarded as a great and supreme 'sacrifice,' but as a duty—and even mayhap as a pleasure.

"The 'Young Marshal,' who may be regarded as the most conservative element in the situation, has announced publicly as part of his active new anti-Japanese stand that he is 'prepared to die on the first front whenever the government gives the order.' For the first time since he lost his patrimony in 1931; Chang seems determined to fight, and is taking open leadership of the patriotic movement among his northeastern followers. I may add that he is very healthy, unscathed by any

assassin's bullet, and very busy with the superintendence of military affairs. The spirit of the new movement may be indicated by some of the phrases in recent speeches to his officers: "The northwestern army must stand on the first front for national defence, and history gives us the great mission of restoring our lost territory." "If my determination wavers, the rifle is in your hand. You can kill me at any time." "Resisting Japan is the only way out for the Chinese race." . . ."

First signs of a rebellious mood became evident when in March 1936 Nanking sent ten army divisions to Shansi to block the advance of the Red army. The Communists were seeking to move into position to help resist expected further invasions of North China. The appeal of the Red army at the time to Chiang Kai-shek and to all armed forces of the Kuomintang had a particularly profound effect on the Tungpei men, from rookie to the Young Marshal himself. On September 18, 1936, fifth anniversary of the invasion of Manchuria, the Tungpei in Sian began an active anti-Japanese propaganda crusade and extended its friendly relations with the Red army. On October 4 of the same year they had organized a Tungpei branch of the All-China National Salvation League. By late October, Chang Hsueh-liang had followed up his personal trips to Nanking with an urgent telegram to Chiang Kai-shek requesting the Generalissimo to come to Sian to explain his policy for national defence to wavering Tungpei officers.

Receipt of the news of the signing of the German-Japanese alliance on November 25 had produced serious repercussions in Sian, but Chiang Kai-shek seemed to take an attitude of benevolent neutrality towards the conclusion of this very pact that had aroused the resentment of England, France, the United States, and the Soviet Union. In fact, the speech of

Chiang on the occasion of the Nazi-Japanese agreement served to lend credence to the rumour in Sian that he had expressed some approval of the anti-Communist purpose of the agreement.¹

The Tungpei, which had come to a working arrangement with the Red army to carry into practice the slogan "Chinese do not fight Chinese" and to collaborate for national unity on an anti-Japanese platform, resented Chiang Kai-shek's apparent moves to continue warfare against the Red army. Resentment was particularly rife because the military measures undertaken against the Communists clearly were at the expense of resisting Japan's newest invasion of North China.

General Chiang Kai-shek, who knew that a truce existed between the northern armies and the Reds, sent his best-

¹ General Chiang Kai-shek in an address at the weekly memorial service at the Loyang Branch of the Central Military Academy on November 29, 1936, said *inter alia*:

"Two important events occurred last week. One of them, concerning this country, was the capture of Pailinmiao. The other, concerning the nations of the world, was the conclusion of the German-Japanese anti-Communist pact. The former tended to revive the national spirit, and showed to the entire country that if only the nation be unified and present a united front in a determined effort to struggle to the finish, we should not lose a single inch of national territory. The recovery of Pailinmiao is therefore the starting-point for national regeneration and has an important bearing on the safety of the nation.

"As to the German-Japanese anti-Communist pact, I believe that its chief aim is to make a concerted effort for the prevention of the spread of Communism. Contrary to what is generally believed, I do not think that there is any secret agreement of a deeper import, because Germany cannot entirely ignore her friendship with China and other countries. According to my personal observation, the German-Japanese pact will neither alter the relations of the two countries with the rest of the world, nor affect the general situation in eastern Asia."

—*China Weekly Review*, December 5, 1936, p. 13.

trained and best-equipped divisions of the crack 1st army into Kansu province. The Kuomintang 1st army, under General Hu Chung-nan, suffered a grave defeat. Agnes Smedley, an American author who arrived in Sian soon after the detention of Chiang Kai-shek, wrote concerning the fate of Hu's anti-Red expedition:

"General Hu marched against the Reds and in the three weeks preceding November 18 advanced eighty li into Red army territory. The Reds slowly retreated. Then on November 18, and again on the 21st, they swooped down, surrounded two brigades of Hu's crack division, and captured them with all their equipment. Some of the captives were sent back to Papa Hu to tell the other troops what had happened. The others were disarmed and read a lecture on the folly of Chinese fighting Chinese at such a time."¹

Upon receipt of news of the defeat of the Kansu anti-Red forces, reports were spread in Sian that Chiang was sending ten more Nanking divisions against the Red army.

Just a short while previous to the disturbing efforts to extend the anti-Communist drive, on October 26, 1936, the Red army command addressed another appeal to Chiang Kai-shek and to the high officers of every branch of the Kuomintang army.

The appeal declared that more than one year had passed since the Red army had urged the formation of an anti-Japanese national alliance. The danger to China of the Suiyuan invasion was stressed. "Now the three leading columns of the Chinese Red army have joined forces in the northwest. They are ready to march shoulder-to-shoulder with you to the first line of defence of the nation in a common fight against the enemy," said the appeal. "But," it continued,

¹ *The Nation*, February 13, 1937, p. 181.

"despite the alarm in East Suiyuan, which warns of imminent calamity, General Chiang Kai-shek has sent formidable forces into Kansu to attack the Red army, instead of sending them to reinforce the Suiyuan defence."

The Red army further declared its troops had been ordered to refrain from taking the initiative in attacking any Chinese army forces; they were to resist only in self-defence when attacked. They offered to return all weapons taken in battle to the Kuomintang troops when unity should be realized and when the Red army was considered part of the nation's military defence.

In October, about the time the above events were taking place, Chiang Kai-shek made a flying trip to Sian. His presence aroused the suspicion of the officers and men of the Tungpei. He upbraided them on the ground that they were not sufficiently active in the drive on the Communists. "Anyone who speaks of fighting the external enemy [Japan] a thousand li away but does not want to fight the internal enemy right before him is a traitor to the state," Chiang Kai-shek was reported to have said during the course of a speech on his first visit to Sian.¹

Thus, when Chiang went from Loyang, the Central government military headquarters in Honan province, to Sian for the second time, with a large bodyguard, his motives were impugned. Tension was further heightened during Chiang's visit by the shooting of students. Several students, sons and daughters of Tungpei officers, were seriously injured on December 9 in an anniversary celebration commemorating the actions of the Chinese students the year previous. Some six thousand students, a number of them formerly enrolled in Manchurian universities, participated in a parade, whose

¹ *China Weekly Review*, January 2, 1937, p. 149.

peaceful purpose was to present Generalissimo Chiang with the usual anti-Japanese requests. It was stated at the time, though never confirmed, that Chiang ordered the demonstration stopped by gunfire. When the students persisted in their march from Sian to Lintung, Chiang's temporary headquarters, twelve miles away, they were fired upon. The situation became so serious that Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang had to intercede to disperse the crowd and allay popular anger. Only by promising that he personally would present the students' demands to Chiang Kai-shek could he temporarily restore order.

On December 11 an emergency meeting of the commanders of the Tungpei and General Yang Hu-cheng, commander of the Shensi army, was called to discuss the crisis and to plan their conduct towards Chiang. Angered beyond the point of reason and apparently unmindful of the possible consequences of their rash act, the forcible detention of the Nanking Generalissimo was decided upon. The coup was intended to compel Chiang to listen to and accept the anti-Japanese demands.

After a brief but brisk exchange of rifle fire between Shensi-Tungpei troops and a number of Chiang Kai-shek's personal bodyguards, in which scores were killed (the heaviest casualties being on the side of the Nanking leader) the Generalissimo's headquarters were surrounded. Chiang managed to escape immediate capture by leaving through a back door. After a perilous climb into the mountains, including a thirty-foot fall into a ditch which seriously injured his back, the Generalissimo hid himself in a small cave. His associates concealed him beneath a large stone containing an inscription stating that here was once the tomb of Ch'in Shih Huang-ti, founder of the Ch'in dynasty, and builder of the

Great Wall of China. Undoubtedly it was this incident that caused Madam Chiang to remark that Sian, which was the cradle of Chinese civilization, because of the kidnapping of her husband threatened also to become its grave. Chiang's hiding place was revealed by one of his guards and the Generalissimo was escorted to Sian.

The details of the kidnapping of Chiang Kai-shek and his aides-de-camp, so mystifying before his safe release, are infinitely less important than the political repercussion of the mutiny in China and throughout the rest of the world. The Sian incident cleft deeper and wider the lines between the two chief Nanking factions. The civil peace of China hung in the balance, depending on the life of Chiang Kai-shek. While Chiang was detained in Sian, the Nanking Kuomintang faction then most conciliatory to Japan made the most serious preparations for troop movements against Shensi. Chiang in Sian was undergoing an incessant barrage of argument that he accept the demands presented to him for an anti-Japanese foreign policy and for the unification of China. The Japanese press, of course, sought to incite the sharpest conflict to deepen the threatening split. The Japanese imperialists also seized upon the issue to hurl charges and imprecations at the Soviet Union.

The Chinese press asserted that two distinct factions with two opposing plans were acting in the national emergency created by the blundering "kidnapping" of Chiang.

On the one side, there was the Japanophile group that stood for civil war against Shensi, arguing that the life of Chiang was an unimportant issue, though his death then would have made civil war inevitable. For example, one who played into the hands of this group, Dr. H. H. Kung, president of the Executive Yuan and directing political affairs, argued: "While

we are all anxious that General Chiang may be rescued and returned to safety at the earliest possible moment, our attitude is that the personal safety or the movements of one man should not be allowed to interfere with the normal conduct of the government.”¹ More vindictive than Kung was Ho Ying-ching, Minister of War, who directed the army movements against Shensi for the “release” of Chiang. Co-operating with him were Chang Chun, Wu Ting-chang, Chang Chiao-guo, Ho Chen-chi, and Chen Shao-kwan.

On the other side, strenuously pressing for a more conciliatory policy to avert the dreaded spectre of the greatest civil war ever to confront China—a consummation devoutly desired by Japan—were the Left Kuomintang leaders, including all those who favoured some consideration of the proposals for national unity. Heading this group was T. V. Soong, brother-in-law of Chiang Kai-shek, chairman of the board of directors of the Bank of China and member of the standing committee of the National Economic Council. T. V. Soong, and later Madam Chiang Kai-shek, flew to Sian to take part in the negotiations which ultimately led to the release of the Generalissimo. Supporting a conciliatory policy and a solution of the crisis without recourse to civil war were General Feng Yu-hsiang, member of the Military Affairs Commission, Yen Hsi-shan, Governor of Shansi province, and many others. Acting as intermediary for both the Soong-Chiang group and the Young Marshal was W. H. Donald, an Australian, personal friend and adviser of Chiang Kai-shek and confidant of Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang.

Soon after the “kidnapping” Madam Chiang consulted with her sister, Madam Sun Yat-sen. Madam Chiang later

¹ *China Weekly Review*, December 26, 1936.

wrote that matters in Nanking "looked to me like an unhealthy position on the part of the military officers who asserted that they felt it their inexorable duty to mobilize the military machine forthwith and launch an immediate punitive expedition to attack Sian."

The Japanese press could hardly conceal its eager hope that the faction favouring civil war would dominate the situation. "The *Mainichi* is almost openly exultant," stated the *Japan Weekly Chronicle* (December 24, 1936), "and the *Asahi* believes the coup 'may prove the occasion for a favourable turn in Sino-Japanese relations.' Gone are the days when the Japanese press begged daily for a strong united government in China, a government with which it would be possible to negotiate on terms of equality."

Efforts to blame the Communists (that is, the Soviet Union and the Chinese Communists) were ridiculed by the *Japan Weekly Chronicle*, which very early in the kidnapping, in its issue of December 17, 1936, declared: "The theory maintained in some quarters that Communist influence is behind the coup is untenable. It is not more than a few minutes ago since the Communists were said to have Chiang Kai-shek in their pocket, and though the ways of the Communists are doubtless dark and devious, it passes all understanding why they should seek at this particular moment to remove the strong man of China."

The attitude of the Communists towards the detention of Chiang Kai-shek was clearly and succinctly stated in the *Communist International*, January 1937,¹ official organ of the Comintern. A spokesman for the International wrote: "Quite independent of the will and even in spite of the will

¹ "Concerning Events in Sian" (Shensi), p. 62.

of the initiators of the Sian activities the latter were of great service to the bitterest enemies of the Chinese people: namely, the Japanese aggressors."

Minister of War Ho Ying-ching, however, did manage to order a demonstrative flight of twenty war planes over Sian. Troops were moved up and desultory fighting had already taken place when Chiang Kai-shek ordered a three-day truce, which was later indefinitely extended. In agreement with the Generalissimo, his captors released General Chiang Ting-wen, to go to Nanking to facilitate negotiations, and at the same time to insist that General Ho obey Chiang's orders, at least for the moment, to refrain from precipitating civil war.

Chang Hsueh-liang contritely explained to Madam Chiang, on her visit to her husband's place of captivity, that the intentions of the rebel officers were not anti-Nanking but were to put pressure on the Kuomintang leader to accept demands for national unity, and that their fulfilment had been badly blundered. "We did do wrong in seizing the Generalissimo," admitted the Young Marshal to Chiang's wife, "but we tried to do something which we thought was for the good of the country."¹

Very soon after the detention of Chiang the perpetrators of the plot addressed a manifesto to the Executive Committee of the National government, to the commanders-in-chief of the fighting forces, to all the newspapers, to the various organs of the All-China National Salvation League, as well as to all schools and legal bodies. In the following declaration were contained the much disputed demands that were at the same time submitted to Chiang Kai-shek, with insistence that he consent to them:

¹ *New York Times*, April 18, 1937.

"Ever since the loss of the northeastern provinces five years ago our national sovereignty has been more and more destroyed and our territory has daily dwindled away. We were first humiliated at the time of the Shanghai truce, then by the Tangku truce and the Ho-Umetzu agreement. There is not a single citizen who does not feel pain in his heart because of this. Recently there have been startling changes in the international situation, nations are intriguing with one another and using our nation and people as a sacrifice. When the East Suiyuan hostilities began, popular feeling reached the boiling-point and the soldiers became indignant. At this juncture our national leader ought to encourage the military and civilians to start the whole nation's united war of national defence. But while the soldiers at the front who are protecting our national territories are bathed in blood fighting the enemy, the diplomatic authorities are still seeking compromises. Ever since the unjust imprisonment of the patriots in Shanghai, the whole world has been startled and the whole country has been angry and in pain. To love one's country is an offence! This makes one's hair stand on end. Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, being surrounded by a band of bad people, is forfeiting the support of the masses. He is deeply guilty of harming the country. We, Chang Hsueh-liang and the others undersigned, advised him with tears, but were repeatedly chastised. The other day the students in Sian were staging their National Salvation movement and the policemen were ordered to kill these patriotic children! How could anyone with a human conscience bear to do this? We, being his colleagues of many years' standing, could not bear to sit and witness this; therefore we tendered our last advice to Marshal Chiang, while guaranteeing his safety, in order to stimulate his awakening.

"The military and civilians in the northwest unanimously propose the following demands:

"1. Reorganize the Nanking government and admit all parties to share the joint responsibility of saving the nation.

"2. Stop all kinds of civil wars.

"3. Immediately release the patriotic leaders arrested in Shanghai.

"4. Release all political prisoners throughout the country.

"5. Emancipate the patriotic movement of the people.

"6. Safeguard the political freedom of the people to organize, and to call meetings.

"7. Actually obey the Will of Dr. Sun Yat-sen.

"8. Immediately call a National Salvation conference.

"The above-mentioned eight items are the points of national salvation unanimously maintained by us and by all the military and civilians throughout the northwest.

"We, therefore, hope you gentlemen will condescend to meet public sentiment and sincerely adopt these demands, so as to open one line of life for the future, and cleanse your past guilt in ruining the country. The great cause is before us. It does not permit glancing backward. We only hope to carry out thoroughly the policies maintained for national salvation and beneficial to the country. As to merit or guilt, we leave this to the judgment of our fellow-countrymen.

"In sending this telegram we urgently await your order."¹

In his diary covering the days of his "kidnapping" Chiang

¹ The telegram to Nanking was signed at Sianfu, December 12, 1936, by the following: Chang Hsueh-liang, Yang Hu-cheng, Chu Hsiao-liang, Ma Hung-kuei, Yu Hsueh-chung, Chen Chen, Chiang Ting-wen, Shao Li-tze, Chen Tiao-yuan, Wei Li-huang, Chien Ta-chun, Ho Chu-kuo, Feng Ch'in-tsai, Sun Wei-ju, Chen Chi-ch'eng, Wang I-che, Wan Yao-huang, Tung Ying-pin, Miao Ch'eng-liu.

Kai-shek steadfastly maintains that he refused to sign any of the demands. He asserts that he was finally released without having consented to any modification of the policy of the Kuomintang government, a policy which he insisted was one of unity for the integrity of the nation. His claims, however, are disputed by officers involved in the coup. The Red army leaders who were closely conversant with every detail of the event and who regarded the detention of the Generalissimo as playing the game of Japanese imperialism, using all of its great influence with the Tungpei to preserve Chiang and send him back as national leader to Nanking, also publicly affirmed the claim that Chiang Kai-shek did sign the demands and did promise to modify his policies to conform to the program of national salvation by complete unification and anti-Japanese resistance.

While Chiang Kai-shek was still in captivity, on December 19, 1936, the Chinese Central Soviet government and the Central Executive Committee of the Chinese Communist Party addressed a telegram to the Nanking authorities urging that all steps be taken to avert civil war. To precipitate civil war, said the Red army leaders, was to hasten the enslavement of the country. They proposed a peaceful solution of the situation, both sides to recognize Tangkwan, a strategic pass on the Lunghai Railway between Shensi and Honan, as the boundary-line beyond which troops of neither side should cross, and Nanking immediately to call a peace conference to discuss the national crisis created.

That the Red Army was a conciliatory force restraining even the blundering commanders of the Shensi troops and the Tungpei from any rash deeds that might have had results quite opposite to those intended was freely admitted by Madam Chiang Kai-shek. In her account of the Sian incident,

she wrote: "We heard nothing of menaces from the Reds in all this time. Quite contrary to outside beliefs, we were assured that they were not interested in detaining the Generalissimo. Instead, *they preferred his quick release.*"¹ (My italics—H. G.)

On Christmas Day, December 25, 1936, Chiang Kai-shek was released. Captor and former captive flew from Sian to Nanking within a few hours of each other. In his departing speech in Sian, Generalissimo Chiang indicated that full harmony was established. He said that the coup was "a calamity that may be easily turned into a blessing." The "blessing" in the mind of every Chinese meant that there was a more happy outlook for national unity after the gravest political incident in the Kuomintang's history that did not result in civil war.

The joint flight of Chiang and Chang was a demonstration to the Chinese people of the conciliation of the two leaders. In order to wipe out the slightest stigma or stain on the prestige of the Generalissimo, the Young Marshal not only issued a statement admitting he had "committed the greatest of crimes in violating discipline and showing disrespect to the Generalissimo," but declared also that he was ready to accept whatever punishment was meted out to him. "I have shamefully followed you to Nanking," he said to Chiang, "in order sincerely to await punishment by you, punishment befitting in severity the degree of my crime, so that it may not only uphold law and discipline but also serve as a warning to others in future against the repetition of such crimes."

After a trial by a high military tribunal, Chang Hsueh-liang was sentenced to ten years' imprisonment, though he never was in the dock nor put behind bars. On recommenda-

¹ *New York Times*, April 19, 1937.

tion of Chiang Kai-shek he was granted a special pardon. Back in Nanking, however, Chiang Kai-shek soon was swayed by the influence of certain of the members of the pro-Japanese faction which had actually plotted his death under the pretence of saving the Nanking government's prestige in Sian. Under their prompting Chiang made speeches and statements at variance with his conciliatory attitude immediately after his release.

As a result, the Tungpei and Shensi troops, as well as other anti-Japanese forces, became restive. The Red army commanders again addressed themselves to the Nanking Generalissimo urging him to remain faithful to his promises. "Indeed," they wrote, "it is a worthy tradition of the Chinese race that it is famed for its fidelity to promises. We often regard a 'yes' worth more than a thousand taels. . . . This national habit has merited the praise of all foreigners. If Chiang puts his words at Sian into practice the great tradition of fidelity of the Chinese people will have had its greatest justification." In the same letter the Chinese Communists offered to support Chiang as leader of the Central government in order to complete the united national front against Japan.

Throughout, the foreign powers interested in China were greatly disturbed by the Sian events. The American press in China unequivocally warned Japan to keep its hands off China. Newspapers in the United States, less direct, nevertheless almost unanimously deplored the grave danger of civil war in China, and the threat of war in the Pacific as a likely consequence. They frankly hoped for a reconciliation. Many of them urged national harmony to avoid another Japanese attack.

The attitude of the Japanese press has already been indicated. Officially the Japanese government, through Amba-

sador Shigeru Kawagoe, expressed its sympathy with that faction of the Kuomintang that was at the moment inviting civil war.¹

Most surprising was the position taken by the British press in China. Readers will recall the blood-and-thunder tone of the *North China Daily News* and the entire British press, in 1925-7—that is, during the first period of anti-imperialist unity. But the advance of Japan, its aim not only to dismember all of China but to engulf the interests of the other capitalist powers in China, had deeply disturbed British opinion. This changed outlook was voiced most clearly during the Sian events. It added emphasis to the argument that anti-Japanese unity could make use of the antagonism of the other powers towards Japan. The *China Weekly Review*, on January 9, 1937, did not mince words in estimating the reversed policy of the *North China Daily News*, which is the semi-official mouthpiece of British imperialism in China. Said the *Review*:

“Imagine the astonishment of subscribers of that staid and usually conservative British journal when they opened their papers and discovered ‘contributed’ feature articles and editorials advocating a reconciliation between the ‘Right-wing’ Nanking government and the Communist forces in Shensi and Kansu. As the *North China Daily News* had largely been responsible for fomenting, if not instigating, the split in the ranks of the Kuomintang in 1926-7, its recent advocacy of a renewal of the alliance between the now thoroughly ‘Rightist’ Kuomintang and the Chinese Reds in Shensi-Kansu was the subject of widespread speculation. Are the articles in the official British organ a reflection of British opposition to the

¹ *China Weekly Review*, December 26, 1936.

recently concluded Japanese-German military alliance?"

The peaceable conclusion of the Sian incident and the undeniable shift in Kuomintang policies stimulated a political quickening among the Chinese people. New hope embraced its teeming millions. Self-exiled political leaders returned to China. Among them was the most prominent Japanophile, Wang Ching-wei, hoping to fish in troubled waters. He patiently anticipated the discrediting of Chiang and his resignation, hoping to step into the Generalissimo's position. The Japanese press urged him on. Wang then began to scheme and intrigue with various militarists. The Japanese newspaper the *Shanghai Mainichi*, most rabid of the anti-Chinese advocates, on Wang's return, January 18, 1937, said in an editorial: "The politico-scholastic group in the Nanking government was the real object of the Sian rebels' attack. But this group is in conflict with the pro-Europe-America group in the government [that is to say, they were pro-Japanese]. For these reasons this [pro-Japanese] group has extended a hand to Wang Ching-wei—a fact which is confirmed by the lengthy interviews which have taken place between Mr. Wang and the two leaders of the group: namely, Generals Chang Chun and Hsuing Shih-hui."

Many others returned also, as did General Chen Ming-chu from London, "political brains" of the famous 19th route army, an ardent supporter of the national united front against Japan.

In both China and Japan the aftermath of the "kidnapping" of Chiang Kai-shek was a political transformation already incipient before the Sian events. In China a plenum of the Kuomintang and subsequent developments marked the change, though words and deeds were contradictory; and in

Japan a succession of political crises and popular rebuffs to the Fascist-military clique emphasized the new stage of mass opposition to Japanese war preparations and the "positive policy" in China.

Before the third plenum of the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang, appeals for unity began to flood the country. They were not merely repetitions of previous manifestos. The Sian events had created entirely new conditions for the discussion of national unification by virtue of the fact that civil war had been averted; and by that very means the struggle for unity had advanced with seven-league boot strides.

The Central Executive Committee of the Communist Party addressed itself to the Kuomintang plenum with added authority and prestige gained from its attitude and action with regard to the Sian incident. However bitterly the pro-Japanese Kuomintang faction assailed the Communists, what the latter said had gained a legality of expression. In fact, if not in phrases or by actual resolution, the war against the Red army had come to what undoubtedly appeared to be its end. In their telegram to the third plenum the Communist leaders, after congratulating the nation on the peaceful settlement of the Sian events and urging the need for national unification, proposed five points for the consideration of the ruling party, as follows:

1. Cessation of all civil wars and concentration of the national strength to cope with external aggression.
2. Freedom of speech and assembly, and release of all political prisoners.
3. Summoning of a national salvation congress to be attended by delegates from all parties, factions, public bodies, and armies.

4. Acceleration of preparations for positive armed resistance.

5. Improvement of the people's living-conditions.

Public response to the Communist appeal was accurately reflected by the influential Chinese newspaper *Dung Pao*, which in a lengthy article commended the Communists for their stand in the Sian events—an attitude later taken, as has been said, by Madam Chiang Kai-shek herself. The newspaper urgently pleaded that the Communist proposals for a united national front be accepted.

Furthermore, Madam Soong Ching-ling (widow of Dr. Sun Yat-sen) took the initiative in having a petition presented to the plenum, a copy of which was printed in the *Shanghai Evening Post*, signed by General Feng Yu-hsiang, vice-chairman of the Military Affairs Council of the Nanking government; Sun Fo, son of Dr. Sun Yat-sen and chairman of the Legislative Yuan; Li Li-chung and Lu Chung-lung, prominent Nanking political figures; Shi Ing, Supreme Adviser of the Hopei-Chahar Political Council; and many other well-known leaders in the Nanking government. The petition proposed a program that not only is becoming realized but ultimately must guide the destinies of China. It urged that the example of resistance in East Suiyuan be extended to all China, including the lost territory of Manchuria; that an alliance be signed with Great Britain, the United States, France, and the Soviet Union for action in common to resist Japanese aggression; that the humiliating negotiations with Japan be discontinued; that all civil wars be suspended; that a national salvation congress be convoked; that laws restricting the democratic rights of the people of China be rescinded; that political rights, the basis of a truly democratic government, be extended to all the people; that the Chinese traitors to Japan be

removed from all offices; and that all political prisoners be released.

Unfortunately, the writing of the plenum's resolutions was still dominated by the Wang Ching-wei pro-Japanese group, though public opinion, and even the intention of many of the delegates who mechanically voted for the resolutions in order not to aggravate the conflict, desired a policy contrary to that formally announced at Nanking. The Kuomintang resolution, tongue-in-cheek fashion, maintained that the government had offered maximum resistance to Japanese invasion, and insisted that its policy would not be changed. Adamant on external policy (in phrases), the plenum was even more insistent on a continuation of the anti-Communist war. While declaring for peaceful methods of solving all internal problems, the plenum manifesto added that "*a distinction between attainment of unity by peaceful means and the cessation of civil war*" must be drawn. The meaning of this phrase becomes clearer from the plenum's reference to the Red army of China, saying that "the cardinal policy of the Central authorities must be to root out such elements [Communists]."

That the resolution could not ordain China to remain unmoved or unchanged by what had happened in Suiyuan, in Sian, and in the light of the new threats of Japan, was proved, of course, by subsequent events. The war against the Red army was not continued. Chiang Kai-shek took steps a little more than a month after the plenum to extend national unity to all provinces and groups of the Kuomintang. Negotiations, furthermore, were undertaken by the Nanking authorities for the re-establishment of Kuomintang-Communist unity.

The whole country breathed more easily. A feeling of

strength gripped China. The fear and hopeless despair at the threat of a new Japanese invasion were lifted, not because the peril had lessened, though changes were taking place in Japanese policy, but because the vast majority of the 450,000,000 Chinese felt more confident in their united power.

In Japan just as startling complementary developments were taking place. The failure of the Japanese plotters to provoke civil war as a result of the Sian incident, as well as the reverses delivered to the Suiyuan invaders, plus the ill-fated, high-pressure Sino-Japanese diplomatic negotiations, forced the resignation of the Hirota Cabinet in the latter part of January 1937. Japan entered an era of political crisis which has lasted ever since. The Hirota government had been subjected to the most withering parliamentary attacks aimed at its pro-Fascist policy, not so much because of its debacle in China, but because of the heavy tax burdens placed on the Japanese people to maintain an incessant war against China and to prepare for the gigantic war against the U.S.S.R. and the United States. Most obnoxious to the Japanese people was the alliance with Nazi Germany. That alliance was unpopular throughout Japan. No other diplomatic move had ever been so repugnant to the people. The Hayashi Cabinet which was formed in February suffered an even worse fate than the hard-pressed Hirota government. After dissolving parliament Hayashi was the butt of the worst electoral defeat in Japanese parliamentary history. The largest proletarian party (limited as it was by a leadership which had given whole-hearted support to the invasion of Manchuria) won a smashing victory in the elections of April 30, obtaining 37 seats in the lower house of the Diet as against only 18 it previously held. *"No government in Japan's history has received*

such a defeat at the polls," declared the Associated Press cable from Tokyo.¹ The military, exposed to the Japanese people and to the world as a small clique carrying out a disastrous policy at the expense of the Japanese nation, could rule only against popular will.

Before the election debacle for the Fascist-militarists, Japanese business men sought to revise Japan's policy towards China. The revision was more tactical than basic. The fundamental aim of Tanaka was never and will never be relinquished so long as Japanese imperialism remains intact. Soon after the Kuomintang plenum the Japanese Premier, Senjuro Hayashi, endeavoured unsuccessfully to overcome the mounting criticism of nervous Japanese business men and at the same time to allay rising Chinese suspicion as well as to ease the difficulties of the pro-Japanese faction in the Kuomintang. Foreign Minister Naotake Sato in a very timid maiden-speech to the Diet on March 8, 1937, disavowed territorial aggression in China. He was made publicly to eat his words on March 20 by threats of the military. Nevertheless the Tokyo Chamber of Commerce soon thereafter, in a conference of foremost business men, bankers, economists, and some military leaders, reluctantly admitted that while it was necessary to refrain from giving China the impression that Japan's policy had ever been wrong, still—

"It is true that Japan's North China policy, which is the principal stumbling-block for Japan's success, has many deplorable points, which should be corrected. Japan should try to remove China's misunderstanding that she intends to exploit North China. It is useless at this time for Japan to push her North China aims because that would only increase China's misunderstanding." Thus, certain of Japan's imperi-

¹ *New York Times*, May 3, 1937.

alist leaders saw the necessity of tacking before the rising storm.

They were quick to add, however: "It is necessary that Japan adopt a firm policy."

But the prophetic words of Baron Tanaka were being realized: "*Some day China might wake up!*"

CHAPTER XIII

China Faces the Future

THE key question in the struggle for the unity of China is the "remarriage," as it is termed in the Chinese press, of the Kuomintang and the Communist Party. The Kuomintang is the political apparatus and governmental power of the Chinese national bourgeoisie—industrial, banking, merchant, and landlord; the Communist Party is the party of the proletariat and the poorest peasantry. National unity would mean the agreement of all these class forces for the definite goal of achieving China's sovereignty in the face of the country's danger of complete dismemberment by Japan.

In China it is no longer asked: Will the Kuomintang and the Communist Party form a united front? The issue is put more specifically: When will they unite, under what terms, and with what consequences? The first phases of Kuomintang-Communist collaboration began soon after the events at Sian. The future must witness further co-operation, affecting, as it does, 450,000,000 people.

Collaboration of the Communists and the Kuomintang cannot be a formal organizational move. Based on funda-

mental political objectives, it has a definite goal. Joint action of the two great political groups of China will strengthen China as a nation, will increase its power of defence and offence against its main enemy, and will raise the potentiality of its social progress. Such national unification would be an important stage in the realization of the democratic revolution. All efforts that would make China strong, independent, and progressive harmonize with the objective of Chinese national unity.

Ultimately the purpose of unification must be the preparation of China to oust the Japanese invader and to free the conquered territory. The first step in this direction would be defence—that is, the prevention of further encroachment as planned by Japan.

The terms and condition of Kuomintang-Communist understanding will not develop schematically, without difficulties, zigzags, and partial failures. Unity is not based on capitulation of the Communists to an unchanged policy of the Kuomintang. The co-operation of nationally-minded Chinese for the common goal of preserving China's integrity assumed two-sided concessions. The Kuomintang, because of its historical war against the Communists, wanted publicly to have these concessions, at least in the initial stages, appear as face-saving as possible. The Communists did not make any mystery about their willingness to make concessions for the objective of attaining national unity. To the Communists, gauging their present program of land reform, Sovietization, and immediate prosecution of the class struggle in China to the main anti-imperialist goal of national unification is not a surrender of their revolutionary goal; rather, they see it as the shortest road to the attainment of the Communist Party program at the present historical stage of the Chinese revolution.

Discussing the concessions made by the Chinese Communists to achieve national unity, Wang Ming, Chinese representative on the Executive Committee of the Communist International, wrote:

"In agreeing to transform the Red army into a National Revolutionary army, and the Soviets into widely democratic organs of government, in agreeing to give up the confiscation of the landowners' estates, etc., the Communist Party of China took as its starting-point the estimate of the actual situation which had come about in China—that is, the fact of the growing activity of Japanese militarism and its agents in China and the real danger of the Chinese people becoming subjected to complete colonial enslavement."¹

National unity, with the defeat of Japanese aggression, would remove the most reactionary pressure against China's progressive development. There can be no discussion, the Chinese Communists maintain, of the future development of the Chinese revolution, of how swiftly it shall be transformed into a Socialist revolution, without the solution first of the problem of Japanese invasion. Defeat of the greatest and most threatening imperialist invader would, in fact, put China in the strongest position in her history. It would mark the end of the cycle of foreign invasion. China could then treat on a vastly different level with all other powers. Moreover, the very process of the struggle for the achievement of national integrity would be accompanied by the necessary democratic awakening of the people to arouse China to that degree of self-sacrifice and heroism necessary to wrest the victory from Japan. The majority of China's populace, comprising workers, peasants, small landlords, and merchants,

¹ Wang Ming: "The Salvation of the Chinese People," *The Communist International*, May 1937.

would put their indelible stamp on all social reform that would inevitably accompany the achievement of national unification. With national unity, the whole question of China's social problems—democratic, agrarian, labour, national economic—would be more urgently the order of the day.

Since an inseparable condition of national unification, agreed to by both Communists and the most progressive sections of China's nationalists, is the adoption of a democratic constitution, the establishment of a parliament and democratic safeguards, all the pressing agrarian and labour questions would of necessity be brought to the fore.

Neither is there a Chinese Wall between the ultimate achievement of national liberation, democracy, and economic and cultural progress in China and the question of China's development towards Socialism.

Much confusion and misunderstanding have been created by publication of the Kuomintang's terms for collaboration with the Communists in the national united front. The proposals adopted by the Kuomintang after the Sian events were as follows:

1. Abolition of the Red army and its incorporation into the command under Nanking authority;
2. Unification of state power in the hands of the Central government and the dissolution of the so-called Chinese Soviet Republic and other organizations detrimental to government unity;
3. Cessation of Communist propaganda; and
4. Stoppage of the class struggle.

The Communist response to points 1 and 2 was made unmistakably clear. The reply is well summarized by Edgar Snow, American newspaper correspondent, in his interview

with Mao Tse-tung.¹ "In conversation with various Soviet functionaries," writes Mr. Snow, "I was assured that the Soviet government might agree to change the name of the Soviets, as well as that of the Red army. On the latter's banners already the inscription has been altered from 'Workers' and Peasants' Red Army' to 'Chinese People's Anti-Japanese Vanguard Red Army.' It has been suggested in informal 'Red-White' talks that the Soviet districts might change their name to 'Experimental Area' or 'Special Administrative Districts.' Generally there seems to be a willingness among the Communists to make such changes in nomenclature as might facilitate an agreement, but not fundamentally affect the independent role of the Communist Party and the Red army."

In a united nation the Chinese Communists have declared they would abide by the democratic laws and the will of the people, giving their support to a parliamentary form of representative government and its recognized civil and military authorities. The Chinese Soviets would become an integral part of such a central government. The Red Army would be subordinated to the command of the central government authorities for the aims of national unification. The fate of the Soviet revolutionary land laws would be settled on the basis of local rights of a constitutional nature and by negotiation and discussion with the central government.

So far as attacks upon the Kuomintang are concerned, after national unity there would be a cessation of Communist propaganda in this sense; but under the democratic rights of free speech, free press and free assemblage all Chinese political groups, would retain the right independently to advocate political transformation along the line of their program, Communist or otherwise, as in other democratic countries.

¹ *China Weekly Review*, November 21, 1936.

The "stoppage of the class struggle" reduces itself to a phrase when one considers that national unity in China could not abolish classes but would create a basis for the collaboration of all nationally-minded Chinese for the preservation of their national integrity.

In the final analysis, the primary aim of national unity would be to win back and hold territory seized by Japan. Certainly that cannot be won without preparations for a war of defence and independence. The question of armed hostilities against Japan for the recovery of the Three Eastern Provinces, Jehol, and Chahar can never be approached as an exclusive Sino-Japanese issue. Neither can it be treated as a purely military question. One of the chief elements to be kept in mind is the inner situation of Japan. Japan is becoming less and less a nation unified under the "positive policy" for the dismemberment of China. In recent years, in fact, the Japanese people have been militantly resisting the war program of the army.

Besides, Japan can never envisage a war against China without its effect on the vital relations of the other imperialist powers. The attitude of the United States towards such a war would be decisive for either side. Nor can the question of American policy be divorced from its relations with the Soviet Union and its manoeuvres with Great Britain in Europe and in the Orient.

Hence those who view the question as a purely military one—that is, of the relationship of the highly developed Japanese army and navy to the backward and admittedly inferior military set-up of China—are bound to arrive at a distorted perspective.

Nevertheless, an examination of the question: Can China defeat Japan? should begin with a survey of the military

possibilities of a united China at war against a highly militaristic and industrially advanced Japan.

The literature on the questions raised by a probable war of liberation of China against Japan is meagre. The broad outlines, however, have been considered. Since the general discussion of this question in the Chinese and Japanese press, developments of the civil war in Spain have raised new problems for China. Spain has shown that a mass of untrained people can during the process of war be whipped into a people's army capable of meeting more highly trained armed forces, including formidable Fascist shock troops of Germany and Italy. This factor would work in China with even greater effectiveness than in Spain, for China has a larger relative man-power than Spain, and the vastness of the country would allow the training and development of entire armies while in another section of the country the war could be going on adversely.

An answer to this central question, however, requires first a brief estimate of the military and immediately related problems of such a war. For Japan it would be an imperialist war for the retention of conquered Chinese territory and for winning more. For China it would be a progressive war of national liberation, with victory benefiting the vast majority of Chinese.

Since 1930 the Kuomintang has been modernizing its army and extending military training. Various imperialist powers have, for ample profit, assisted in the modernization of China's army. The United States, for strategic reasons, with a view to counteracting the military moves of its competitor Japan, has aided in developing China's air forces and in establishing air bases. China has been busily constructing a great war machine, increasing its air and mechanized force.

China's army has not yet been fully tested. Aside from the magnificent defence of Shanghai in 1932 and the Chahar and Suiyuan resistance, this Kuomintang army has been employed mainly against the Chinese Red army.

Establishment of unity, with the ultimate objective of driving Japan out of China, would place at the disposal of the central command of China nearly two million armed men, without any further mobilization. According to Mr. Haldore Hanson, a military observer, the following is roughly the make-up of China's present armed forces: ¹

Central government troops (Kiangsu, Anhwei, Chekiang, Kiangsi, Fukien, Kwangtung, Hunan, Hupeh, Kueichow, Honan)	1,149,800
Han Fu-chu (Shantung)	53,500
Sung Oeh-yuan (Hopei and Chahar)	61,800
Yen Hsi-shan and Fu Tso-yi (Shansi and Suiyuan)	85,000
Northeastern troops (Shensi and Anhwei) ...	119,500
Yang Hu-cheng (Shensi)	31,000
Mohammedan troops (Kansu, Ninghsia, Chinghai)	40,000
Red army (Kansu, Shensi, etc.)	100,000 ²
Liu Hsiang (Szechwan)	131,000
Yunnan	21,900
Li Tsung-jen (Kwangsi)	54,000
Total	1,847,500

Japan could immediately mobilize 900,000 men for its

¹ "The New National Army in China's Defense Plans," *China Weekly Review*, March 13, 1936, p. 56.

² The number of effectives which could be put into the field at present by the Red army is much closer to 250,000.

regular army, and its full war strength at the end of one year would be 2,000,000. Against this full war strength of Japan's army, China, out of its population of 450,000,000 could easily expand its army to more than 10,000,000.¹ However, Japan could never devote itself exclusively to the problem of invasion of China or war against China. It would have to retain a huge army in Manchuria, along the border of the Mongolian People's Republic and along the Soviet border to assist Nazi Germany's plans for war against the U.S.S.R.

Besides increasing the effectiveness of the commanding staff and improving the army's technical equipment, the Chinese government has been constructing fortifications and defences, strategic roads and military routes. Without even taking into account the preponderating political forces and inter-imperialist antagonisms, Mr. Hanson concluded that "China's standing army is advancing towards the day when it can successfully resist the foreign aggressor" (Japan).

Mao Tse-tung, leader of the Chinese Red army, who more than any other living Chinese has had the greatest experience observing the fighting quality of the Chinese, in both the Red army and the Kuomintang forces, is convinced that in a war of liberation against Japan China would undoubtedly be the victor. Mao pointed out in his exhaustive interview with Mr. Edgar Snow that China has a vast reservoir of unutilized power. This, along with the creation of mighty lines of defence covering the whole country, could be organized into a powerful military machine. The foreign competitors

¹ O. Tanin and E. Logan: *When Japan Goes to War* (New York: Vanguard Press; 1936) p. 77. The authors in the greatest detail estimate the strength, weaknesses, and fatal limitations of the Japanese war machine and war economy.

of Japan, declared Mao, would never allow Japan to isolate China by a blockade of her shores in the event of war. At any rate, the battle against Japan would be on the "inner front," away from the seacoast and for the most part in the interior of China. A complete blockade of China's coast would not sever China's communications with other powers, Mao pointed out. "China is a very big country," he said. "It would not be conquered until every inch of its soil is under the sword of the invader. If Japan should succeed in occupying even a large section of China, getting possession of an area with as many as one hundred to two hundred million people, we will still be far from defeated." In terms of the Spanish civil war, it will be seen that this statement, made before the rebel uprising led by General Franco, is fully confirmed. Though the Spanish insurgents controlled one half of Spanish territory, the legitimate government was able to continue to carry on war, mobilize an entirely new army, train it, and prepare it for the offensive with every chance of victory.

"To sever Shanghai from the rest of China," continued Mao, "will not be as disastrous to the country as would be, for instance, the severance of New York from the rest of America. Moreover, it would be impossible for Japan to isolate all of China: The Chinese Northwest (bordering the Soviet Union and the Mongolian People's Republic) and the Southwest and West (bordering British- and French-controlled territory) cannot be blockaded by Japan, which continentally is a sea power."

Military observers in China generally agree that Japan's plan of attack on China in the event of a general war between the two nations would have four phases. They are as follows:

1. A Japanese army would press westward from Chahar,

Suiyuan, and Ninghsia seeking to cut China's communication with the U.S.S.R.

2. Japan's navy would occupy every major seaport from Kwangtung to Manchuria. By this move to enforce a complete blockade of the China coast to cut supplies off from America and Europe, the imperialist conflicts would be greatly heightened. Either Britain, France, and the United States must give up every dollar of their Chinese trade or act to break the blockade.

3. Shanghai would receive special attention from Japan as the main outlet and inlet of Chinese trade and as the industrial guardian of the mouth of the Yangtze. But Japanese military action in this centre of foreign interests would bring the imperialist antagonisms to the breaking-point. Since in a war Japan is dependent on outside sources for its oil, coal, iron, and other war materials, the inter-imperialist conflict would ultimately work to hamper Japan's invasion of China, leaving out of consideration for the moment the military or naval involvement of other powers.

4. Japan would proceed to invade the whole of North China to try to extend its rule especially in this sector.

China's answer to such a campaign has been stated by Mao Tse-tung:

"The strategy should be that of a war of manoeuvre, over an extended, shifting, and indefinite front: a strategy depending for success on a high degree of mobility in difficult terrain, and featured by swift attack and withdrawal, swift concentration and dispersal. It will be a large-scale war of manoeuvre rather than a simple positional war characterized by extensive trenchwork, deep-massed lines, and heavy fortifications. Our strategy and tactics must be conditioned by the

theatre in which the war will take place, and this dictates a war of manoeuvre.

"This does not mean the abandonment of vital strategic points, which can be defended in positional warfare as long as profitable. But the pivotal strategy must be a war of manoeuvre and important reliance must be placed on guerrilla and partisan tactics. Fortified warfare must be utilized, but it will be of auxiliary and ultimately of secondary strategic importance.

"Geographically, the theatre of the war is so vast that it is possible for us to pursue mobile warfare with the utmost efficiency and with a telling effect on a slow-moving war-machine like Japan's, cautiously feeling its way in front of fierce rear-guard actions. Deep-line concentration and the exhausting defence of a vital position or two on a narrow front would be to throw away all the tactical advantages of our geography and economic organization, and to repeat the mistake of the Abyssinians. Our strategy and tactics must aim to avoid great decisive battles in the early stages of the war and gradually to break the morale, the fighting spirit, and the military efficiency of the living forces of the enemy. . . .

"Besides the regular Chinese troops we should create, direct, and politically and militarily equip great numbers of partisan and guerrilla detachments among the peasantry. What has been accomplished by the anti-Japanese volunteer units of this type in Manchuria is only a very minor demonstration of the latent power of resistance that can be mobilized from the peasantry of all China. Properly led and organized, such units can keep the Japanese busy twenty-four hours a day and worry them to death.

"It must be remembered that the war will be fought in

China. This means that the Japanese will be entirely surrounded by a hostile Chinese people. The Japanese will be forced to move in all their provisions and guard them, maintaining troops along all lines of communication, and heavily garrisoning their bases in Manchuria and Japan as well.

"The process of the war will present to China the possibility of capturing many Japanese prisoners, arms, ammunitions, war machines, etc. A point will be reached where it will become more and more possible to engage Japan's armies on a basis of positional warfare, using fortifications, deep entrenchment, etc., for as the war progresses the technical equipment of the anti-Japanese forces will greatly improve, and will be reinforced by important foreign help. Japan's economy will crack under the strain of a long and expensive occupation of China and the morale of her forces will break under the trial of a war of innumerable but indecisive battles.

"The great reservoirs of human material in the Chinese people will still be pouring men ready to fight for their freedom into our front lines long after the tidal flood of Japanese imperialism has wrecked itself on the hidden reefs of Chinese resistance.

"All these and other factors will condition the war and will enable us to make the final and decisive attacks on Japan's fortifications and strategic bases and to drive Japan's army of occupation from China.

"Japanese officers and soldiers captured and disarmed by us will be welcomed and will be well treated. They will not be killed. They will be treated in a brotherly way. Every method will be adopted to make the Japanese proletarian soldiers, with whom we have no quarrel, stand up and oppose their own Fascist oppressors. Our slogan will be 'Unite and oppose the common oppressors, the Fascist leaders.' 'Anti-Fascist Jap-

anese troops are our friends, and there is no conflict in our aims.' ”

To conceive of war between Japan and China without considering the relation of the other Pacific powers is unthinkable. Every diplomatic and military move of Japan against China has its anti-Soviet counterpart. By the same token, every effort of the Soviet Union to aid in preserving world peace hampers Japan's plans for the further invasion of China. Moreover, Japan's increasing armaments to ensure domination of the Asian continent and to prevent restitution of Manchuria is countered in the U.S.S.R. by strengthening the Soviet Far Eastern defences. The huge Soviet Far Eastern military machine prevents Japan from apportioning its full armed might for the complete invasion of China. Japan assigns the strongest portion of its army for duty on the borders of the Soviet Union and the Mongolian People's Republic. As the economic, military, and world political importance of the Soviet Union grows, it becomes more difficult for Japan to devote itself exclusively to the conquest of China. Therefore the drive into North China is based on Japan's scheme not only to slice up the whole of China but particularly to cut away a swath of Chinese territory contiguous to the Soviet Union. Japan's chief war strategy in the north is to drive a wedge between the Soviet Union and China.

However, the relations of China, Japan, and the U.S.S.R. are even more far-reaching. And the relations of the imperialist powers in the Pacific are not favourable to the success of Japan in such a war of Chinese independence. In this respect the relations of the United States and the Soviet Union are paramount. Since a war of China for liberation must end either with complete independence or subjugation, the United States could not hope to maintain its policy of the

"open door" without at least "influencing" the defeat of Japan.

The next power to be taken into account is Great Britain. The historical policy of Britain in the Pacific, as in Europe, has been the maintenance of "the balance of power," with Britain as the holder of the scales. To that end, Britain sponsored the Anglo-Japanese alliance to impede the development and growth in the Far East of its chief competitor, the United States. When this partnership was unbalanced by the rise of Japan as the greatest imperialist menace of the Far East, coupled with a setback for Britain in the World War and the tremendous increase in the power and prestige of the United States, the scales were taken out of British hands. The invasion of Manchuria, aggravated by the Ethiopian and Mediterranean crisis for Britain, brought about the closest Anglo-American co-operation in the Pacific for a brief period. However, for Britain co-operation with the United States in the Far East is not a fixed policy. Britain still retains strong remnants of its "balance of power" policy.

Especially because of the growth of Chinese national unity, and the prospect of a strong and unyielding China, Japan is impelled towards soliciting British support. Realizing that it will be impossible for Japan to swallow China in one gulp, the Tokyo government will more and more direct its foreign policy in a way to encourage and invite British assistance. As the United States and the Soviet Union extend their collaboration to prevent Japan's belligerent hegemony in the Pacific, the diplomatic strategists of Tokyo will increase their attractive concessions to Britain. It would be safe to say that every sacrifice will be made by Japan to try to re-establish some form of Anglo-Japanese understanding in the Pacific. Crudely, Japan can be expected to propose to Britain the division of

China between themselves to the exclusion of the American competitor for domination of the Chinese markets.

Along with manoeuvres to prevent the solidification of Chinese unity, Japan will not neglect to bolster the small pro-Japanese cliques in the Kuomintang and elsewhere. Japan's dissimulation in China and its overtures to Britain are conditioned by a number of economic, diplomatic, and political developments unfavourable to Tokyo. Italian and German Fascism are encountering unexpectedly great obstacles in their European war plans. Popular opposition to the Nazi-Japanese alliance in Japan reached unprecedented heights. Repeated electoral defeats for the Japanese militarist-Fascist clique, and discontent over the tax burdens of the Manchurian invasion, the Chinese adventures, and the general war preparations, force the Japanese military leaders to deploy in their schemes of invasion.

All these factors, whose importance would be intensified by an aggravation of the war crisis in the Far East, must be taken into consideration as elements favourable to China in the prosecution of a war for liberation.

The unification of China will do most in realizing Dr. Sun Yat-sen's hopes of a truly democratic nation with an advanced constitution and a parliamentary form of government. The calling of the All-China National Congress of November 12, 1937 may be considered a long stride in the direction of establishing democracy in China. But if China is to develop the full strength of her numbers, the apathy and distrust of millions must be broken down and the nation awakened to political consciousness by the full guarantees of democratic liberties. And to this end the adoption of a constitution and the creation of a really representative parliament are primary.

For forty years Dr. Sun Yat-sen struggled to realize in China

the ideal of Abraham Lincoln—a government of, for, and by the people. Since 1911, eight constitutions have been proposed, without to any appreciable extent giving the 450,000,000 Chinese a guarantee of democratic rights. The first fundamental law proposed was contained in the so-called General Plan for the Organization of the Provisional Government (1911). That was followed by the Provisional Constitution (1912). Yuan Shih-kai, with foreign juridical aid, published the Constitution Compact (1914). There followed Tsao Kun's ambitious Constitution of the Republic of China (1922). Then came Tuan Chi-jui's National Constitution Draft (1925), and finally the Kuomintang's Draft Constitution of the Republic of China (1936).

All previous efforts before the Kuomintang's draft completely failed of support, recognition, or application. The Provisional Constitution for the Period of Political Tutelage, promulgated by the National government of Nanking in 1931, existed only on paper, and China since the 1911 revolution remained without fundamental law to guide its efforts to establish a democracy.

On May 5, 1936, after two and a half decades of efforts at constitution-making, a draft constitution was produced for presentation at the November 12 Constituent Assembly. As originally drafted, the proposed fundamental law was not truly democratic nor best designed to unify the nation for the most progressive aims.

The establishment of a central state authority based on the unification of the Chinese people, ensuring the growth of democracy, would carry to fulfilment the aims of the 1911 revolution. Political centralization of the country for defence against Japan would tend to end the gravitational pull of sections of China, the so-called spheres of influence, now un-

der the hegemony of foreign powers. The great battles for China's freedom originally begun by the Taipings after the Opium War now hold the most hopeful promise of successful realization. No doubt the compulsion to national unification, overriding the tremendous resistance of sectional feudal interests and of the pro-Japanese native allies, will drag in its train many opportunist militarists who will enthusiastically shout the slogan of unity because it is becoming more popular. But the power and the day of the individual militarist in China is waning. The danger of civil wars, though not ended, has been lessened to a greater extent than ever before since the formal establishment of the Republic. The bitterest opponent of Chinese unity is and will remain the greatest enemy of China—Japanese imperialism.

Haltingly, bowed down with the weight of an age-encrusted economy, impeded by outworn traditions, held back by ferocious imperialist invasion and shameful oppression, China is nevertheless fast moving forward. The land of the world's oldest living culture is proving its historical genius in solving the most difficult problems ever to confront and threaten a nation. When China, long divided, unites, she will grow strong and become a powerful master of her own destiny. The most ancient nation will march with giant strides in the van of human progress.

WHEN CHINA UNITES

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A NOTE ON THE TYPE IN WHICH THIS BOOK IS SET



DEVICE OF
ROBERT GRANJON

This book is set in Granjon, a type named in compliment to ROBERT GRANJON, but neither a copy of a classic face nor an entirely original creation. George W. Jones drew the basic design for this type from classic sources, but deviated from his model to profit by the intervening centuries of experience and progress. This type is based primarily upon the type used by Claude Garamond (1510-61) in his beautiful French books, and more closely resembles Garamond's own than do any of the various modern types that bear his name.

Of Robert Granjon nothing is known before 1545, except that he had begun his career as type-cutter in 1523. The boldest and most original designer of his time, he was one of the first to practise the trade of type-founder apart from that of printer. Between 1549 and 1551 he printed a number of books in Paris, also continuing as type-cutter. By 1557 he was settled in Lyons and had married Antoinette Salamon, whose father, Bernard, was an artist associated with Jean de Tournes. Between 1557 and 1562 Granjon printed about twenty books in types designed by himself, following, after the fashion of the day, the cursive handwriting of the time. These types, usually known as "caractères de civilité," he himself called "lettres françaises," as especially appropriate to his own country. He was granted a monopoly of these types for ten years, but they were soon copied. Granjon appears to have lived in Antwerp for a time, but was at Lyons in 1575 and 1577, and for the next decade at Rome, working for the Vatican and Medici presses, his work consisting largely in cutting exotic types. Towards the end of his life he may have returned to live in Paris, where he died in 1590.

This book was composed, printed, and bound by H. Wolff, New York. The paper was manufactured by S. D. Warren Co., Boston.

